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NATO Faces a New Drone Dilemma Over the Baltic

As Ukrainian drones stray into NATO airspace, the alliance must balance the defence of its eastern flank with the risks of intercepting weapons whose origins and intentions are not always immediately clear.

5 mins read
Photo: NATO

NATO is confronting an increasingly complicated challenge in the skies over the Baltic states as drones linked to the war between Russia and Ukraine repeatedly cross into alliance airspace. The latest incident, in which Italian NATO fighter jets shot down a drone over Latvian airspace, has raised questions not only about who was responsible for the intrusion but also about the alliance’s ability to distinguish between hostile attacks, misdirected weapons and deliberate provocations.

The incident was examined by German newspaper Die Zeit, which reported that Italian NATO aircraft operating over Lithuania and Latvia as part of NATO Baltic Air Policing were scrambled to intercept and destroy the drone. The aircraft appeared to be a long-range model of the type used by both Russia and Ukraine.

The timing provided an important clue. On the same night, Ukraine used unmanned aerial systems to attack the Russian oil port of Ust-Luga on Russia’s Baltic coast, north of Latvia. The strikes caused fires at the port, although Russian authorities said the blaze was quickly extinguished. The Latvian military did not identify the drone involved or say where it had been launched. It did, however, say that the aircraft had entered Latvia following “electronic interference”.

That statement suggests that the drone may have been a Ukrainian combat aircraft diverted from its intended route by Russian electronic warfare. Its original target may have been Ust-Luga or another location in Russia. But the precise circumstances remain unclear, illustrating the difficulty NATO faces when unmanned aircraft enter its territory during an ongoing war.

The latest incident is not isolated. According to Die Zeit, NATO aircraft have now shot down three drones over the Baltic states. On May 19, a Romanian Air Force F-16 destroyed a Ukrainian aircraft that had strayed into southern Estonia. On June 8, a French Rafale fighter used a missile to destroy another drone believed to have deviated from its intended course.

In addition, six drones have crashed on the territory of the Baltic states this year, while another four have come down in southern Finland. Most caused no significant damage, although one drone crashed onto a disused oil-storage facility in the Latvian city of Rēzekne in early May, damaging four tanks. On March 25, a drone struck the chimney of the Auvere power plant in Estonia’s Ida-Virumaa county.

The disruption has extended beyond physical damage. At the end of May, an air-raid alarm triggered by a drone sent the Lithuanian capital Vilnius into heightened alert. The country’s president and members of parliament were forced to take shelter in bunkers, while rail and air traffic was disrupted for several hours.

Such incidents were comparatively rare before 2026. On September 7, 2024, for example, a Russian Shahed military drone crashed in Latvia’s Rēzekne district after entering Latvian airspace through Belarus and Lithuania. Russian reconnaissance drones had also frequently flown close to the borders of Estonia and Latvia, repeatedly coming close to violating their airspace.

The frequency of incidents increased as Ukraine expanded its ability to attack targets inside Russia, particularly in the north-west of the country. Ukrainian forces have targeted the ports of Primorsk, near the Finnish border, and Ust-Luga, less than 50 kilometres from Estonia. Other targets have included the oil refinery at Kirishi, south of St Petersburg, and a smaller terminal in the city used to export petroleum products including diesel and petrol.

Russia has responded with electronic warfare. Electromagnetic jammers can disrupt the signals used by drones and force them away from their intended routes. Another technique, known as spoofing, interferes with GPS signals and transmits false coordinates, potentially causing drones to alter course. Despite these measures, Russia has succeeded in intercepting only a fraction of the one-way attack drones launched by Ukraine.

For NATO, the resulting situation presents an unusual dilemma. The alliance supports Ukraine in resisting Russia’s invasion, yet it cannot simply allow an unidentified drone to fly unhindered through NATO territory. The operator may be unknown, the aircraft may be out of control, and a drone that enters allied airspace can itself become a threat to civilians or infrastructure.

There is also a political dimension. Any damage caused by Ukrainian drones inside NATO territory could be exploited by Russian propaganda, potentially increasing public anxiety in alliance countries and weakening support for continued assistance to Ukraine.

The Baltic states have relied on NATO for the protection of their airspace since Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined the alliance in 2004. Because none of the three maintains its own fighter aircraft, allied countries rotate responsibility for air policing over the region.

The mission itself has recently changed. Its mandate was expanded from surveillance to include the defence of airspace and the shooting down of “objects that pose a danger”. Since Russia’s war against Ukraine began in 2014, NATO’s air missions along its eastern flank and over the Black Sea have been strengthened.

Germany has participated in the Baltic Air Policing mission since 2005, with German Eurofighter aircraft regularly deployed for several months at a time. When the German Air Force last led the Baltic air-surveillance mission, between March and November 2024, its Eurofighters were required to scramble 15 times to intercept Russian aircraft and escort them back towards their own airspace. In 2025, the Bundeswehr reported approximately 20 “Alpha Scrambles” — alert launches conducted for reconnaissance, surveillance and, if necessary, the deterrence of foreign aircraft.

A further German deployment is scheduled for September this year. NATO also launched Eastern Sentry on September 12, 2025, after Russian aircraft entered Estonian airspace and drones violated Polish and Romanian airspace. The mission provides additional vigilance along NATO’s eastern flank through the deployment of fighter aircraft, reconnaissance and transport aircraft, helicopters, air-defence systems and frigates, alongside improved intelligence sharing.

The scale of the activity is substantial. NATO records approximately 350 to 400 “Alpha Scrambles” across Europe each year, with most occurring over the Baltic region and the Baltic Sea.

Governments in the region have largely placed political responsibility for the drone incidents on Russia. Latvian officials have argued that as long as Russian aggression against Ukraine continues, foreign drones may enter Latvian airspace. The three Baltic governments have also suggested that Russia could deliberately direct drones towards the Baltic states in an attempt to frighten populations and reduce public support for Ukraine.

Estonia has taken a nuanced position. Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna encouraged Ukraine at the end of May to continue attacks on Ust-Luga and other targets around St Petersburg, while simultaneously urging Kyiv to exercise greater caution in selecting flight routes.

Lithuania has adopted an especially critical stance towards Moscow. Its government warned last week that Russia could use captured Ukrainian drones to stage provocations against the Baltic states. According to Lithuania’s military intelligence, information existed concerning a possible “false flag operation” intended to create tensions. Defence Minister Robertas Kaunas said one objective could be to make NATO hesitate and reduce support for Ukraine, adding: “I can assure you that this will not happen.”

The succession of incidents demonstrates how the geography of the war is increasingly intersecting with NATO territory. Drones designed to strike targets hundreds of kilometres away can be diverted by electronic interference, lose their intended route or potentially be manipulated for other purposes. Once they cross an international border, however, the military and political consequences become considerably more complicated.

For NATO, the challenge is no longer simply detecting an approaching aircraft. It is determining what the object is, who controls it, why it has entered allied airspace and how to respond without turning an unintended incursion into a wider confrontation. As the war continues to generate increasingly sophisticated drone operations near NATO’s eastern borders, that distinction is becoming more consequential for the alliance’s air defence and its broader strategy towards the conflict.

Sri Lanka Guardian

The Sri Lanka Guardian is an online web portal founded in August 2007 by a group of concerned Sri Lankan citizens including journalists, activists, academics and retired civil servants. We are independent and non-profit. Email: editor@slguardian.org

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