Piracy off Somalia’s coast has surged in 2026, adding pressure to international shipping as regional conflicts divert naval forces from anti-piracy operations and expose longstanding weaknesses in coastal security. By mid-September, 25 incidents had been recorded in the waters around the Horn of Africa, compared with nine operations in 2025, according to figures compiled by the European Union Naval Force Operation Atalanta. The resurgence, which the International Maritime Organization has also identified as a growing concern, marks the highest level of activity in the region since 2013.
The increase comes as naval resources have been redirected towards other security crises in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz. The movement of warships to protect commercial shipping and respond to regional conflicts has reduced the maritime deterrence that helped suppress Somali piracy after its peak in the late 2000s and early 2010s. At the same time, disruptions to established shipping routes have brought more vessels past the Somali coastline, creating additional opportunities for pirate groups. The result is a renewed threat to a global trading system already burdened by maritime chokepoint disruptions, elevated war-risk insurance premiums and high petroleum prices since the Iran war began in February 2026.
Somali piracy operates through established methods. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, piracy includes illegal acts of violence, detention or depredation committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private vessel against another ship on the high seas. Attacks and armed robberies also occur within Somali territorial waters. Pirate groups commonly use dhows and hijacked fishing vessels as larger “mother ships”, from which they launch smaller, faster boats against commercial vessels offshore. Near the coast, attacks can be conducted directly from small skiffs. The objective is typically to seize a ship or its crew and demand a ransom for their release.
The conditions that enabled piracy emerged following the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, after the fall of Siad Barre. The resulting power vacuum left the country’s roughly 3,500-kilometre coastline without an effective coast guard for decades. Foreign fishing vessels entered Somali waters, competing with local fishermen and undermining livelihoods in coastal communities. Armed groups initially emerged in response to these pressures, but piracy subsequently developed into an organised criminal enterprise, particularly between 2005 and 2012, when the absence of effective state control allowed attacks to expand.
International intervention substantially reduced piracy without resolving these underlying problems. United Nations Security Council resolutions supported the deployment of naval forces to patrol the region, including the European Union’s Operation Atalanta, whose operational areas encompass the Somali Basin, Red Sea, Gulf of Suez, Gulf of Aqaba and Gulf of Aden. Shipping companies strengthened onboard security procedures and increasingly hired privately contracted armed security personnel to protect vessels crossing the region. These measures helped deter attacks, but they did not eliminate the poverty, unemployment, weak governance and disrupted fishing economy that made piracy possible.
The financial structure of piracy has also proved resilient. During the 2005–12 peak, Somali pirates collected between $339 million and $413 million in ransom payments, according to World Bank estimates. Hijacked vessels could remain anchored off the coast while negotiations continued, supported by local networks whose members stood to benefit financially. A 2013 World Bank assessment estimated that as much as $300,000 from a single ransom could go directly to businessmen, clan leaders and local politicians, effectively as bribes. Financiers who fund pirate operations typically receive between 30 and 75 per cent of ransom proceeds, while the armed participants carrying out the attacks receive considerably less.
These arrangements link piracy to local power structures and make it difficult to suppress through naval operations alone. Clan protection and the financial interests of influential individuals can help pirate groups maintain access to coastal bases and resources. Persistent poverty, unemployment and the disruption of local fishing livelihoods, compounded by cuts to US aid programmes, have further contributed to the conditions in which piracy can re-emerge.
The threat also intersects with militant activity elsewhere in the region. According to the 35th report of the United Nations Monitoring Team, a reciprocal arrangement between al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, and Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi movement involves al-Shabaab increasing piracy operations in return for advanced weapons and training from the Houthis. The Monitoring Team’s 37th report states that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has received a share of al-Shabaab’s piracy revenue, although the payments appear to derive from fees charged to vessels for safe passage rather than ransom payments following hijackings.
International responses remain centred on maritime deterrence. Several African and Gulf countries, alongside France, have supported a proposal for a new counter-piracy task force. Operation Atalanta continues to monitor captured vessels and suspected pirate mother ships, sometimes preventing attacks from progressing. In September 2026, pirates boarded the merchant vessel Glamor in the Gulf of Aden, but its crew secured themselves inside the ship’s citadel. The pirates abandoned the vessel after Operation Atalanta, a Japanese patrol aircraft and the Indian Navy responded.
Other incidents demonstrate the limitations of this approach. The cargo ship Sward, captured in April 2026, was released after 138 days in captivity. Pirates reportedly used it as a mother ship to extend their operational range and hijack other vessels, including the MV Lutuf. The Somali Federal Government and the Turkish Navy said they retook the Lutuf by force, while authorities in Puntland alleged that a ransom of $2.5 million had been paid.
The seasonal pattern of piracy could further complicate the response. According to BIMCO, the international shipping association representing shipowners, military authorities assess that the southwest monsoon suppresses piracy between June and August because strong winds and rough seas restrict offshore operations. With the monsoon ending, conditions may become more favourable for attacks. Ransom payments from recent hijackings could also provide financing for additional operations, while the diversion of naval forces and the persistence of weak coastal governance leave the underlying drivers of Somali piracy largely intact.
