China has developed the most systematic effort among outside powers to learn from the drone war in Ukraine, with military and defence-industry analysts typically documenting new battlefield techniques within about four months of their emergence. Yet translating that research into publicly visible changes in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) generally takes a year or more, according to an analysis published on October 7 by the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
The study, written by Lilly Min-Chen Lee, a non-resident fellow at Taiwan’s Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology, and Kateryna Bondar, a senior fellow at CSIS, examines how China is studying a conflict that has accelerated the development and deployment of uncrewed military systems. The authors describe Chinese analysts as treating the war as a “living textbook” and identify 2024 as “year one of world drone war”, when Russia and Ukraine were deploying drones at sufficient scale to demonstrate their growing influence on modern warfare.
Drawing on more than 90 Chinese-language sources published between July 2022 and August 2026 across 45 outlets, the researchers traced how battlefield developments entered Chinese military and defence-industry discussions. Their material ranged from the Central Military Commission’s newspaper to journals operated by China’s missile, shipbuilding and aviation conglomerates, offering a view of how lessons from the conflict are being examined across the country’s military establishment and industrial base.
The scope of that analysis extends well beyond the immediate use of drones to attack enemy positions. Chinese researchers have investigated the economics of mass-produced uncrewed systems, ways to shorten the kill chain between detecting a target and striking it, and the use of fibre-optic first-person-view (FPV) drones that are harder to disrupt through electronic jamming. They have also examined layered defences against aerial and maritime drones, the organisation of specialised drone units, the industrial capacity required to sustain mass production and the practical effectiveness of large drone swarms.
To establish how quickly these ideas were being absorbed, Lee and Bondar examined five developments: sea-drone attacks, fibre-optic FPV drones, interceptor FPV drones, raids resembling Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb and the organisation of drone units. For each, they compared its first appearance in combat with the first Chinese analytical coverage and the subsequent public appearance of related PLA training or equipment.
One of their central findings is that Chinese analysis frequently approaches the war from the perspective of a force defending against drone attacks. Ukraine’s strikes on Russian ships and ports using sea drones, as well as raids on Russian airfields, have been examined as possible models for attacks against Chinese military assets. The researchers found that defensive lessons were the quickest to become visible in new equipment, suggesting that preparations to detect, intercept and withstand uncrewed attacks have been a particularly immediate focus.
Evidence of this defensive emphasis has appeared in several areas. A paramilitary unit of the People’s Armed Police has trained with FPV drones, while counter-drone missile-gun systems, lasers and high-power microwave weapons have appeared in public displays. PLA exercises have also incorporated responses to aerial and maritime drones. Such developments indicate that the study of battlefield experience is being accompanied by practical training and the public presentation of new defensive capabilities, although the available evidence does not establish how comprehensively these systems have been integrated into operational forces.
The speed of adaptation has varied considerably between individual battlefield innovations. One of the fastest examples followed Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb, launched on June 1, 2025, when drones launched from inside Russia struck strategic bomber bases. About four and a half months later, a PLA brigade conducted an exercise defending against an attack team of more than 20 drone operators. Lee and Bondar linked the exercise to the Ukrainian operation, but the report broadcast by Chinese state broadcaster CCTV did not mention Ukraine.
The incorporation of maritime drone threats into naval training took longer. The earliest PLA Navy exercise against sea drones identified by the researchers took place in August 2025, when unmanned boats were included in a missile-boat drill as a harassment scenario. This occurred 35 months after the first Ukrainian sea drone washed ashore near Russia’s Black Sea port of Sevastopol. In April 2026, an Eastern Theatre Command frigate flotilla conducted dedicated live-fire training against uncrewed boats, marking a further step towards preparing naval forces for this type of threat.
China is also building domestic institutions to develop expertise in uncrewed warfare. Lee and Bondar identified new military universities and degree programmes covering unmanned-systems command and uncrewed equipment engineering. On September 30, the PLA established the College of Unmanned and Intelligent Engineering within the PLA Army Engineering University, creating a dedicated institutional setting for the study of these technologies.
The authors said the PLA was examining not only how drones could strengthen defensive capabilities but also how they could support offensive operations and allow relatively inexpensive uncrewed systems to impose disproportionate costs on concentrated forces. However, they identified a fundamental limitation in China’s approach: the country is observing rather than fighting the war.
The difficulty, Lee and Bondar argued, is determining how the PLA can continue testing and adapting new concepts without exposing its troops to the pressure of combat. Chinese analysts can document innovations, assess their potential and incorporate them into exercises, equipment development and military education. But the interval between identifying a battlefield lesson and demonstrating its effectiveness under real combat conditions remains a central constraint on how far those observations can be translated into military capability.
