Israel is not adequately prepared to defend against a coordinated drone attack launched from within its own territory, despite years of warnings and growing investment in counter-drone technology, according to an investigation by the Israeli newspaper Haaretz. Security officials, military sources and defence industry experts interviewed by the newspaper say significant gaps remain in the country’s ability to detect, identify and intercept hostile unmanned aircraft, particularly those operated through alternative communication systems that can bypass conventional electronic warfare measures.
The vulnerability has acquired greater significance since Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb in June 2025, when Ukrainian forces used more than 100 explosives-laden quadcopters concealed inside cargo containers transported by trucks into Russia. The containers were taken to locations near military airfields, where their roofs were remotely opened and the drones launched against aircraft parked on the ground. More than 40 Russian strategic bombers were severely damaged, several of them completely destroyed.
The operation demonstrated that relatively inexpensive, small aircraft could reach strategically important military installations far from the front line and inflict damage previously associated with sophisticated military weapons. Its methods have since become an important reference point for military planners examining the vulnerability of air bases, command centres and other sensitive installations.
Israel subsequently employed comparable methods against Iran. Less than two weeks after the Ukrainian operation, Israel launched Operations Roaring Lion and Epic Fury. According to reports, including in The Wall Street Journal, Israel had spent months smuggling components for dozens of explosive first-person-view (FPV) drones into Iran. These were assembled before the operation and deployed against air defence and ballistic missile batteries.
The possibility that Israel’s adversaries could reproduce such tactics has become a concern among security officials. In mid-October, approximately a week before the election, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented what he described as his new national security concept, developed after the October 7 massacre. Although he identified nuclear weapons as Israel’s principal threat, he placed drones immediately afterwards.
Netanyahu warned that drones could enable an enemy to concentrate attacks on vulnerable installations, including radar systems, communications networks, command-and-control centres and political leaders. He specifically referred to the possibility of drones being launched from locations such as Ramallah, Ramat Gan or Romema, a neighbourhood in Jerusalem, to conduct targeted attacks against Israel’s senior leadership. About a week after the speech, photographs published by Haaretz journalist Uri Misgav appeared to show nets apparently intended to protect Netanyahu’s private residences in Jerusalem and Caesarea against drone attacks.
The threat is not confined to military installations. Haaretz’s investigation identified Ben-Gurion International Airport, where American aircraft also refuel, among the potential targets. Satellite imagery available to the public shows that numerous military aircraft at Israeli air force bases are parked in exposed positions rather than protected structures. Other possible targets include emergency storage facilities, government buildings, power plants and crowded stadiums.
Drones have fundamentally altered the economics of aerial warfare. Since the Islamic State first began employing quadcopters in Iraq and Syria, relatively small and poorly funded military organisations, terrorist groups and guerrilla forces have gained access to capabilities previously associated with conventional air forces. Apart from carrying explosives, drones can provide real-time intelligence and conduct aerial bombing missions.
The introduction of armed FPV racing drones in Ukraine accelerated this development. Operators control the aircraft through goggles displaying live images from onboard cameras, allowing highly manoeuvrable drones to approach specific targets. Aircraft that can be assembled for a few hundred dollars can perform precision attacks previously requiring guided missiles costing tens of thousands of dollars or more. Iran has also used such drones to attack targets at US Army bases in Iraq and Kuwait during the past year.
Defensive technology has developed alongside the threat, but existing systems have limitations. Conventional counter-drone measures often rely on electronic warfare to disrupt communications between operators and aircraft. This approach becomes less effective when drones use fibre-optic cables, which are immune to radio-frequency jamming. Hezbollah deployed fibre-optic drones during the latest fighting in Lebanon, killing 13 Israel Defence Forces soldiers and wounding dozens.
Another method involves drones equipped with SIM cards and controlled through cellular networks. These can be disrupted electronically, but doing so risks interfering with other communications in the surrounding area. Both technologies complicate the identification and interception of hostile aircraft, particularly when they operate among legitimate civilian drones.
Effective protection requires several detection systems working together, including radar, optical equipment and listening systems. Interception options include firearms equipped with smart sights, shotguns firing buckshot or birdshot, sensor-guided machine-gun turrets, lasers, nets and interception drones. Experts also stress the importance of personnel training, including camouflage, the use of protective nets and awareness of the threat.
The financial demands are substantial. According to a study by the US Congressional Budget Office cited in the investigation, establishing multi-layered defences for a single military base covering approximately 13 square kilometres would require an initial investment of about $72 million, followed by an annual budget of $5 million. Extending comparable protection across Israel’s strategic infrastructure would involve considerably broader requirements.
Haaretz’s discussions with senior IDF officials, the Civil Aviation Authority and defence technology specialists indicate that efforts to improve preparedness are under way. However, warnings about the threat have circulated for more than a decade, including a 2017 State Comptroller’s report on national preparedness, and important technological, operational and regulatory deficiencies remain.
The IDF acknowledges that control units have only recently been deployed along all borders to monitor low-altitude airspace, distribute intelligence and coordinate responses to drones and other low-flying aircraft. Military officials believe the expanded deployment will improve detection and interception. However, security sources interviewed by Haaretz say border monitoring cannot adequately address an Operation Spiderweb scenario in which drones are secretly transported and launched from within Israel. They identify intelligence capable of disrupting preparations before an attack as the only complete preventive measure.
Regulating civilian drone activity presents another difficulty. Authorities need to identify authorised aircraft and maintain a comprehensive picture of low-altitude airspace before they can reliably distinguish legitimate operations from hostile activity. Following the October 7 attack, in which Hamas also used drones, the Knesset approved emergency regulations requiring operators to install transmitters for remote identification. The regulations were not enforced and subsequently expired.
During the past three months, the Civil Aviation Authority and the defence establishment have attempted to revive the initiative through a proposed civilian authority for low-altitude airspace, subordinate to the Transportation Ministry and intended to complement the security control system. As an interim measure, Defence Minister Israel Katz last month signed an order prohibiting drones controlled through fibre optics or cellular SIM communications from flying in Israeli airspace for six months.
Katz said the decision followed concrete intelligence and increasing threats from internal and external adversaries, including attempts to attack senior officials, criminal drone activity, intelligence gathering and smuggling. However, Haaretz reports that enforcement remains doubtful until the necessary infrastructure exists to monitor civilian airspace and identify all authorised drones.
