Editor’s note: This essay is based on excerpts from the full academic paper “The Latent Maritime Potential of BRICS+: A Time for Realignment” by the suthor, published in the Strategic Review for Southern Africa.
As the global order undergoes seismic shifts marked by the rise of the Global South, one alliance of nations has emerged as a potential fulcrum of power: BRICS+. Comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and the more recently admitted members Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, the expanded BRICS+ grouping is now home to nearly half of the world’s population and possesses considerable economic, territorial, and strategic assets. Yet among the bloc’s most overlooked and underutilised domains lies its collective maritime potential.
With the exception of landlocked Ethiopia, all current BRICS+ member states possess coastlines, many of which lie along critical global maritime trade corridors. Brazil occupies a vast section of the South Atlantic; India and China command access to the Indian and Pacific Oceans; South Africa sits at the pivotal meeting point of the Indian and Atlantic Oceans; while Egypt, Iran, and the UAE play strategic roles in maritime chokepoints such as the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Bab el-Mandeb. This gives the group an unparalleled collective influence over the arteries of global trade and maritime security. Nonetheless, despite this vast oceanic presence and economic reliance on maritime flows, BRICS+ has largely failed to translate its latent maritime strength into coordinated policy, institutional cooperation, or sustained strategic engagement.
The idea of a “Blue BRICS+” – a cooperative, integrated maritime bloc – remains more aspiration than reality. The 2018 Johannesburg Declaration stands out as one of the rare instances where BRICS officially acknowledged the potential of ocean-based cooperation. That document made reference to sectors such as offshore energy, aquaculture, port development, and shipbuilding. It also pointed to the sustainable use of marine resources as a field ripe for collaboration. Yet, despite these words, maritime concerns have not featured prominently in subsequent summits, declarations, or institutional priorities. The Johannesburg II Summit of 2023 made no reference to maritime affairs, even as member countries continued to expand national-level maritime strategies and investments. This dissonance between national ambition and collective inertia reflects a deeper issue: BRICS+ lacks a maritime identity.
At the national level, many BRICS+ countries have demonstrated a deepening commitment to maritime development and ocean governance. China’s Maritime Silk Road initiative, part of the broader Belt and Road framework, has significantly expanded its naval reach and port infrastructure investments across Asia, Africa, and beyond. India’s Maritime Agenda 2020, updated in recent years, outlines an ambitious plan to modernise ports, boost shipbuilding, and secure the Indo-Pacific. Brazil has consistently promoted the notion of a “Blue Amazon” – a marine region rich in biodiversity and energy reserves – and aims to better manage and protect it. South Africa’s Operation Phakisa focuses on unlocking the economic potential of its vast maritime zones. Russia, meanwhile, has revitalised its Marine Board to coordinate maritime strategy across its diverse naval and civilian sectors.
Among the new BRICS+ entrants, similar maritime ambitions are evident. Egypt is developing a National Blue Economy Roadmap as it modernises its ports and expands its maritime logistics sector, particularly in the Red Sea. The UAE has launched a Sustainable Blue Economy Strategy, promoting diversification and sustainability across its shipping, energy, and tourism sectors. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 aims to convert its Red Sea coastline into a global logistics and tourism hub. Iran, with its significant coastline along both the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, continues to project its naval presence across West Asian waters. Although Ethiopia lacks a coastline, it has made port access a strategic priority, negotiating deals with Djibouti, Somaliland, and Eritrea to ensure its economic connectivity. Clearly, the constituent members of BRICS+ do not lack maritime interest or ambition – what is absent is a mechanism to align these interests collectively.
The implications of this gap are far-reaching. In an era where global maritime domains are becoming increasingly contested, BRICS+’ disjointed posture limits its ability to shape norms, respond to crises, or assert influence. This is particularly striking when one considers the growing threats to maritime security in regions where BRICS+ states are present or proximate. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and the Arabian Sea has re-emerged as a concern, even as naval confrontations in the Indo-Pacific heighten strategic tensions. Non-state actors such as the Houthi movement in Yemen have demonstrated the ability to disrupt shipping in the Red Sea, while criminal networks continue to exploit weak maritime governance structures to traffic arms, drugs, and people.
Moreover, the oceans themselves are undergoing transformation. Climate change is reshaping coastlines, threatening biodiversity, and endangering livelihoods dependent on marine ecosystems. The expansion of undersea cable networks – which carry 95% of international communications and financial transactions – introduces new domains of strategic vulnerability. Despite these developments, few BRICS+ members, except for China and the UAE, are prominent participants in international bodies like the International Cable Protection Committee. This absence speaks volumes about the limited coordination around emerging maritime challenges.
While joint naval exercises have taken place among some BRICS+ members, they remain ad hoc and outside any formal BRICS+ military framework. For example, China, Russia, and Iran have held several trilateral naval drills in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. South Africa has participated in joint exercises with India and Brazil under the IBSAMAR initiative, and also with China and Russia in more recent manoeuvres. Yet these exercises are not embedded within a shared command doctrine, nor do they represent a unified strategic agenda. Instead, they remain symbolic gestures of solidarity rather than operational steps towards maritime coherence.
This lack of institutional integration in the maritime domain is not due to insurmountable obstacles but rather to inertia and the bloc’s inward-looking posture. BRICS+ remains primarily focused on economic and financial cooperation, as evidenced by the prominence of the New Development Bank (NDB) and discussions around de-dollarisation. Maritime cooperation, on the other hand, suffers from both strategic neglect and a lack of bureaucratic infrastructure. Without a formal body or secretariat to coordinate maritime issues, each member continues to pursue its own agenda in isolation.
Yet there is much to be gained from collective action. A more robust BRICS+ maritime strategy could help unlock economic growth through blue economy initiatives, including sustainable fisheries, eco-tourism, and renewable ocean energy. Joint investment in port infrastructure and digital maritime corridors could enhance intra-BRICS+ trade and reduce reliance on Western-dominated supply chains. Moreover, a shared approach to maritime security could help stabilise key regions, ensure the safety of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and offer a counterbalance to dominant Western naval alliances such as NATO and the Quad.
One way forward would be the establishment of a BRICS+ Maritime Council or Working Group to develop a unified vision. Such a body could coordinate existing national strategies, propose common policies, and identify priority areas for collaboration, ranging from environmental protection to infrastructure investment. It could also facilitate knowledge sharing, capacity building, and engagement with international maritime institutions. Parallel Track II dialogues involving academics, think tanks, and non-governmental organisations could help seed ideas and generate consensus on sensitive issues such as maritime boundary disputes, illegal fishing, and blue carbon markets.
Furthermore, BRICS+ could explore the creation of a multilateral Coast Guard coordination mechanism to respond to piracy, smuggling, and disaster relief. This would not only enhance maritime governance but also build trust among member states. Including maritime issues in summit communiqués and leader-level discussions would send a clear signal of intent and elevate the oceans to a strategic priority.
A sustainable and inclusive maritime approach also requires a normative framework. BRICS+ should align its vision with global initiatives such as the UN Sustainable Development Goal 14 (Life Below Water), the 2023 High Seas Treaty on biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction, and the International Maritime Organisation’s decarbonisation agenda. In doing so, it can position itself as a responsible steward of the global commons and a champion for the Global South in multilateral forums.
Importantly, a Blue BRICS+ agenda must embrace the principle of “blue justice”—ensuring that ocean development does not replicate inequalities but instead uplifts marginalised communities, protects indigenous knowledge systems, and prioritises sustainability. With marine ecosystems under threat and small-scale fishers facing mounting pressures, a people-centred maritime strategy would distinguish BRICS+ from extractive models of the past. By investing in marine education, ocean literacy, and equitable access to marine resources, the bloc could model a new kind of global maritime governance.
What is ultimately at stake is more than just strategic influence or economic advantage. In a world increasingly defined by interdependence and fragmentation, the oceans offer a space where multilateralism, cooperation, and common purpose can still be forged. For BRICS+—a grouping that seeks to embody the voice of the Global South—this is an opportunity not just to assert power, but to define it differently.
The question is no longer whether BRICS+ should act in the maritime domain, but whether it can afford not to. Its members possess the coastlines, the ports, the fleets, and the strategic geography. What they need now is the political will to act in concert, the vision to connect national initiatives into a shared blueprint, and the commitment to make maritime cooperation more than a passing reference in summit declarations.
If BRICS+ can rise to this challenge, it has the potential to transform itself into not only an economic and diplomatic force but also a maritime one—capable of shaping norms, securing commons, and advancing justice on the world’s oceans. A Blue BRICS+ is not a luxury; it is a necessity for a bloc that seeks to build a new kind of global order. The seas have always connected civilisations. Perhaps they will now help unite BRICS+—not just as an alliance of states, but as a maritime community with shared aspirations and responsibilities. The time for alignment is now.
