Since August 2024, a shift has occurred in the geopolitical landscape of South Asia, with the emergence of a closer China-Pakistan nexus in Bangladesh. This development is largely attributed to the change of government in Bangladesh. The interim government, has shown a noticeable inclination towards consolidating ties with both China and Pakistan.
From late-2024 Beijing moved from a bilateral outreach to Pakistan and Bangladesh, to creating a practical trilateral track: official meetings, proposals for a Joint Working Group (JWG) and an emphasis on concrete, functional cooperation, including trade, agriculture, health and industrial exchanges.
Parallel to Beijing’s push, Islamabad has incrementally reopened diplomatic channels with Dhaka. On December 19, 2024, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif met with Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus in Egypt during the 11th Developing Eight Organization for Economic Cooperation Summit. On April 17, 2025, Yunus publicly urged stronger ties with Pakistan, signaling Dhaka’s interest in normalising relations and exploring trade and investment opportunities. Further, on August 23-24, 2025, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, made an official visit to Dhaka
Economically, the trilateral cooperation is advancing through multiple channels. On June 19, 2025, China hosted the inaugural Bangladesh-China-Pakistan dialogue in Kunming, where the three sides agreed to deepen cooperation in trade, industry, health, agriculture, and climate change. In Bangladesh, China’s strong presence in projects such as the Payra Deep Seaport and Matarbari Power Plant underscores Beijing’s economic diplomacy, while also giving Pakistan a platform to frame trilateral engagement in economic terms, and support normalization with Dhaka. Moreover, bilateral trade between Bangladesh and China reached USD 24 billion in 2024, with Chinese exports accounting for USD 22.88 billion – firmly establishing Beijing as Bangladesh’s largest trading partner. Notably, after decades of strained relations, Pakistan and Bangladesh initiated cooperation in August 2024. As a result, bilateral trade between the two countries rose by 27 per cent between August and December 2024, with a mutual goal of reaching USD 3 billion in trade volume within a year.
Evidence of this emerging nexus includes a renewed focus on military cooperation as well. In January 2025, Bangladesh expressed interest in acquiring the JF-17 fighter jets, an aircraft co-produced by Pakistan and China, as part of its “Forces Goal 2030” military modernization program. Further, in January 2025, military-to-military contacts have been revived, with senior officials from Bangladesh and Pakistan meeting in Rawalpindi to discuss joint training and exercises. Bangladesh’s navy also participated in the “Aman 2025” naval exercise in Karachi, a move that signals a warming of military relations.
The drivers behind this nexus including Beijing’s strategic aim to deepen influence in South Asia by knitting together bilateral ties into practical trilateral frameworks that expand economic and security cooperation, while signaling regional weight-building against competing influences. This is accelerated by Pakistan’s need for investment and political backing. Islamabad continues to rely on Beijing for large-scale finance and diplomatic support. Renewed Chinese investment pledges and CPEC momentum remain a central Pakistani strategy. On the other hand, cautious pragmatism guides Dhaka, as it seeks economic opportunities (trade, medical and infrastructure assistance), though it remains wary of rapid political entanglement or formal security alignment; this explains its guarded stance at Kunming, refusing immediate JWG endorsement on June 23, 2025.
India is the key external factor shaping this nexus, viewing any China-led institutionalisation in South Asia as tactically significant. China’s infrastructure-driven approach (BRI/CPEC and port projects) is seen in New Delhi as a challenge to its traditional influence in Bangladesh. Dhaka’s hedging – seeking Chinese economic gains while evading overt alignment, shows its effort to balance Indian sensitivities, limiting how far the trilateral can develop. India is likely to monitor outcomes such as port access, military ties, or formal working groups, and respond with trade, connectivity, and diplomatic incentives to preserve Dhaka’s autonomy. The outcome of Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh, with a possible consolidation of the radical Islamist vote may, however, significantly disturb this tentative balance, as Islamist parties in Bangladesh have adopted a viscerally anti-India stance.
Indeed, the trilateral cooperation is widely viewed as a calculated effort to potentially challenge India’s influence in the region. China, already a crucial arms supplier and a key investor through its Belt and Road Initiative, is believed to be using this emerging partnership to advance its strategic interests in the Bay of Bengal. This alignment of interests between China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh creates new challenges for India’s national security, raising the possibility of a “two-and-a-half front” scenario, military tensions with Pakistan, tactical competition with China, and internal instability fueled by developments in Bangladesh.
