by Our Foreign Affairs Editor
Cambodia is one of the most corrupt countries on earth, but when crisis hits the border, the country handles the broader situation in a way many people might not expect,” Ou Virak told the Sri Lanka Guardian in an exclusive interview. “Nothing about this conflict makes sense… it’s just a few men trying to prove their macho, to prove their egos, and people suffer again.” These remarks framed a conversation in which he spoke directly about the history of the Cambodian–Thai border conflict, the role of international mechanisms, the difficulties within both countries’ responses, and the realities faced by displaced people and migrant workers. Throughout the discussion, he relied on historical context, specific events, and first-hand observations rather than speculation, repeatedly pointing to documented positions, public statements, and institutional arrangements that shape the crisis.
Born in 1976 during the first year of Khmer Rouge rule, Ou Virak’s early life was defined by events that marked the course of contemporary Cambodian history. His father, an officer in the Lon Nol army, was killed by the Khmer Rouge before he was born. He lived through the Khmer Rouge period with his mother and four older brothers, and after the subsequent years of Vietnamese occupation, the family fled to refugee camps in Thailand. They remained there until receiving refugee status and resettling in Fresno, California, in 1989 when he was thirteen. He attended Theodore Roosevelt High School before earning a BA in economics from California State University, Fresno, and an MA in economics from San Jose State University, where he also became Vice-President of the National Cambodian Student Association. Returning to Cambodia, he lectured on economics at Pannasastra University and then joined the Cambodian Center for Human Rights as Advocacy and Public Relations Director in 2005, becoming its President in 2007. That same year, he received the Reebok Human Rights Award for his campaign for freedom of expression and the release of human rights advocates imprisoned for criticising the government. He went on to found the Alliance for Freedom of Expression in Cambodia and served in regional mechanisms related to human rights, including the NGO Working Group on establishing a National Human Rights Commission and engaging with ASEAN human rights frameworks. Today he is the founder and president of Future Forum, a public policy think tank in Phnom Penh.
When asked to describe his organisation, he explained that Future Forum is “a public policy think tank based in Phnom Penh,” focusing on “policy analysis and public policy research,” and supporting young Cambodian researchers to build capacity in evidence-based policy work. The core full-time team is “about ten staff,” he said, but they work with “about fifty researchers at any moment,” reflecting a wider network engaged in long-term research projects. He then turned to the subject of the Cambodian–Thai border conflict, offering a chronological explanation of its origins. “It depends on how far back we want to go,” he noted, acknowledging the centuries-long relationship between Khmer and Thai communities. For the contemporary dispute, he traced the roots to the period of French colonisation: “In 1904…the agreement was that the border will lie naturally based on the terrain, the watershed. In 1907, the people who actually go out and draw the map had Preah Vihear inside Cambodia because they realised it belonged to Cambodia.” He emphasised that Siam “did not protest that” and that the map “was agreed in 1907.” Later, in the 1950s and 1960s, tensions rose, leading Cambodia to bring the case before the International Court of Justice. “Thailand agreed to that jurisdiction until they lost it, and they lost the case in 1962,” he said. Even after the ICJ ruling, “the Thai side did not continue to protest it,” and the matter remained largely quiet until 2008, when Cambodia succeeded in listing Preah Vihear as a UNESCO World Heritage Site, prompting renewed nationalist reaction and armed skirmishes along the border from 2008 to 2011. According to him, the conflict “went into hibernation” afterward despite the absence of mechanisms for a lasting settlement, resurfacing only recently.
On the question of the peace agreement reached after recent clashes, he described the circumstances leading to it in factual terms. “It was achieved basically because of Trump’s backing and Trump intervention,” he said. During a visit to Scotland, Trump issued statements and “threatened to withhold tariff talks or at the very least stop the negotiation on US tariffs,” which were high for both countries. As a result, “Thailand reluctantly agreed to it,” he said, explaining that the Thai position “has always been that they refuse third-party involvement, including ASEAN.” He pointed out that after the ceasefire, public statements from Thai military officials indicated dissatisfaction. He cited specific examples, including comments by Bun Song, the Region Two commander, who “said publicly many times that they want to finish the job, they were not happy with the cease agreement… they will find any pretext to start another war to get back some of the territories.” He described a pattern in which Thai authorities “refuse the observation or third-party mediation,” even while agreeing to a ceasefire that was internationally facilitated. For instance, he noted that the proposed ASEAN observation team was met with reluctance: “Thailand was dragging their feet… they don’t want ASEAN observation team. They don’t want other mechanisms to internationalise the conflicts.”
Regarding Cambodia’s position, he said that Cambodia generally prefers international involvement. “Cambodia would keep on going back to international mechanisms because that’s protection for smaller, weaker states,” he explained. “Cambodia has been doing that and continues to do that now.” He referred to Cambodia’s willingness to use mechanisms such as the ICJ, the UN Security Council, and appeals to external actors: “We want the ICJ to come in. We want the UN Security Council to come in. We want Trump to come in.” He added that Cambodia supported the internationalisation of the dispute because of its limited institutional capacity: “We are not equipped to fight a bigger neighbour. Economically, we are poor and weak and small. We don’t have things in place to provide necessary support to people in crisis.”
When asked about the single biggest failure in the Cambodian government’s response, he did not focus on political motives but on structural capacity. He said Cambodia was “not prepared for two reasons: one, we might be caught off guard, but two, Cambodia is not running anything effectively and efficiently.” He noted the absence of “systematic support infrastructure,” the prevalence of “makeshift” arrangements, and the unevenness of assistance. While describing the Cambodian government as “weak” and “one of the most corrupt countries on earth,” he emphasised that this relates to domestic governance and not to its behaviour toward international mechanisms. “Domestic corruption has nothing to do with international rule-based systems,” he said, adding that “Cambodia behaves when it comes to international things.”
On the humanitarian situation, he explained that humanitarian groups “are able to operate freely,” though safety remains uncertain due to continuing fighting. He said that both Thailand and Cambodia face limitations: Thailand could address “immediate crisis mode,” while Cambodia lacked infrastructure, meaning that support was “sporadic” and “organic.” He emphasised that many people would inevitably receive uneven levels of assistance. When asked about the gap between policymakers’ statements and conditions on the ground, he described the Thai response as “much more prepared” while stating that long-term issues such as livelihoods and psychological impacts remained beyond both countries’ capacities. In Cambodia, villagers “learn how to cope” because they have faced similar situations repeatedly.
On the question of displaced populations, he did not give specific figures, emphasising that none had been formally compiled. “The number could be 200,000, could be half a million,” he said, depending on how displacement is defined along the border. He highlighted the significant impact on migrant workers: “Almost one million came back to Cambodia from the first fighting,” and many attempted to return despite high risks. He said these workers had been affected “not directly, but indirectly,” due to the shutdown of regular cross-border movement. “There’s a lot of people who are going to be affected by this,” he said, noting that regular daily or weekly movements had been halted. Summarising his view of the situation, he said, “There’s hardly anything that makes sense out of this conflict.”
