Dual-use naval facilities are commercial ports, shipyards, or maritime hubs operationally designed and equipped to support military operations when required though they operate primarily for civilian trade in peacetime.
The issue at hand is whether the Hambantota International Port (HIP) operated as a public-private partnership between Sri Lanka and China is one such dual-use naval facility, as propagated by the US?
Sri Lanka handed over the Port to China on December 09, 2017, after the finalisation of the hotly disputed 99-year old lease for the strategic port on July 29, 2017. Having opposed Chinese projects in Sri Lanka in the run-up to the 2015 presidential election, the then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe attended the handing over ceremony. China paid USD 1.2 bn for the Port.
In spite of repeated denials by successive governments over the years, the US still identifies HIP as a dual-use naval facility. India, too, subscribes to that view. There is no doubt that the Quad, a strategic partnership among the US. India, Japan and Australia considers HIP as such and its policy, vis-a-vis Sri Lanka, geared to meet that challenge. But, is HIP really a dual-use naval facility as alleged and Sri Lanka part of the overall Chinese strategy. The other issue is whether Sri Lanka is a willing partner of the Chinese strategy or caught up in that due to circumstances beyond its control.
The Indo-Pacific Defence Forum, published quarterly by the US Indo-Pacific Command, has regularly dealt with HIP. Its first issue this year went all out to emphasise HIP’s status as a dual-use naval facility. Sarosh Bana, Executive Editor of Business India magazine, in an article, titled ‘Indian Ocean Primacy,’ published in the first issue of the Indo-Pacific Defence Forum, referred to HIP as a dual-service naval facility.
In the article that dealt with the Indian move to establish a strategic naval base this year, in Andhra Pradesh, to neutralise China’s Longpo naval base on Hainan island, Bana categorised Bangladesh Navy base BNS Pekua and Kyaukphyu deep seaport being developed in Myanmar. Bana declared all above mentioned facilities as part of China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) infrastructure scheme. Since 2013, China has invested as much as USD 700 bn for OBOR projects covering over 150 countries across Africa, Europe, Latin America and the Indo-Pacific.
Specialist in political economy Dr. Alfred Oehlers, in an article, titled ‘Peace Through Economic Strength,’ also carried in the same edition of the Indo-Pacific Defence Forum, discussed the Hambantota Port, while another specialist in Chinese affairs Dr. Jinghao Zhou dealt with overall Chinese strategy at global level. Zhou’s article was titled ‘Countering OBOR’ and primarily argued how ports in Chinese hands could be used for military purposes.
Obviously the US and its partners are deeply concerned over the growing Chinese, influence both at regional and global level. Sri Lanka remains one of their key focus as HIP, located just 10 nm from major east – west shipping routes, continues to grow, quite rapidly and received significant international attention during the war between Israel-US against Iran (February-June, 2026).
US sub strike
HIP received global attention in the wake of a US torpedo attack on non-belligerent Iranian frigate IRIS Dena off Sri Lanka’s southern coast. The attack took place off Galle Port, within the country’s exclusive economic zone, in the first week of March, just days after the eruption of hostilities in West Asia. Sinking of IRIS Dena was the only attack that took place outside the war zone before Pakistan-Qatar mediated talks that brought about a fragile ceasefire that enabled the re-opening of Strait of Hormuz, albeit amidst many a violation.
In the immediate aftermath of the unprovoked attack on unnamed IRIS Dena returning home after participating in International Fleet Review (IFR) and Exercise Milan 2026 at Visakhapatnam (15-25 June), Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar declared Hambantota as a Chinese military facility. This happened in the presence of Sri Lanka Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath at Raisina Dialogue 2026 (March 5 to 7) in New Delhi. Dr. Jaishankar said so as he responded to a pointed query regarding India’s much-touted position as the region’s net security provider. India was given a shocking jolt without even a warning, when the US struck in Delhi’s backyard, ignoring its status as the purported regional policeman.
Without mentioning that India, too, participated in US-led military exercises off Diego Garcia, Dr. Jaishankar referred to joint US-British base at Diego Garcia, Chinese military base at Djibouti in east Africa and Hambantota.
The US submarine strike also underscored that regardless of the climax of US-India relations during Narendra Modi’s third consecutive term as the Prime Minister, beginning in June 2024, the overall US strategy may disregard domestic and regional issues. India that backed the Israeli-US offensive against Iran by conveniently remaining silent on the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on 28 February, 2026, after Modi visited Israel on the eve of the daring surprise attack on Iran, however had to protest US military action during the last phase of Pakistan-Qatar mediated talks to arrange a ceasefire. India bitterly complained when US targeted ships crewed by Indians in the Hormuz Strait.
In the second week of June, 2026, the US attacked three ships, namely The Marivex, a Palau-flagged oil tanker, merchant tanker Jalveer and merchant tanker Settebello in the Gulf of Oman. The attack on Settebello claimed the lives of three Indians. The US justified attacks on the basis that all three ships violated blockade imposed on Iranian ports. Can such unilateral actions be justified under any circumstances?
Indian and foreign news agencies quoted India’s Centre of Indian Trade Unions as having said in a statement: “When a foreign military kills Indian workers in international waters, the government of India must speak – loudly and firmly.” That statement even received the attention of CNN.
The US launched the blockade on 13 April, 2026, after failing to achieve its primary objectives though Iran endured significant damage. The US forces disabled eight vessels and redirected 134 others.
India insisted that “targeting of commercial shipping and civilian infrastructure in the region must end. But, India never condemned the sinking of an unarmed Iranian frigate returning home from Visakhapatnam.
The US allowed Sri Lanka and India to accommodate two other ships that were accompanying IRIS Dena at the time of its sinking off Galle-Hambantota stretch. The US had the opportunity to hit all three ships but refrained from doing so.
Expanded US role
While claiming Sri Lanka a part of OBOR strategy on the basis of HIP being a dual-use naval facility, the US and India stepped up military assistance to Sri Lanka. Since the transferring of a US Coast Guard vessel in 2004/2005 to Sri Lanka, the US provided a range of assistance with direct intelligence support during the 2006-2009 period leading to destruction of four LTTE floating warehouses in the high seas.
But with the US-India backed regime change operation achieving the desired result in 2022, the superpower and the regional power appeared to have advanced their strategy to a new level. The removal of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa had been of pivotal importance to their game plan but emergence of Ranil Wickremesinghe as Gotabaya’s successor undermined their strategy.
On behalf of the conspirators, the then Indian High Commissioner Gopal Baglay (2020 to 2023) went to the extent of urging Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena to take over the presidency as an interim measure to thwart Wickremesinghe’s ascent to power for obvious reasons.
The US quietly dropped accountability issues that dominated bilateral issues since the successful conclusion of war in 2009 from its agenda while it stepped-up military assistance to cash-strapped Sri Lanka.
US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Paul Kapur, on 22 June, declared in Colombo the delivery of U.S. satellite communications technology to the Sri Lanka Navy, their self-proclaimed Indo-Pacific partner. The US Embassy, in a statement issued following the official announcement made on aboard SLNS Gajabahu at the Port of Colombo, quoted Kapur as having said: “This secure, real-time connection —representing a transformational upgrade for the Sri Lanka Navy— will be available aboard their entire fleet of offshore patrol vessels and ensures no communication gap at sea. It will allow our Sri Lanka partners to respond quickly to emergencies, protect the cargo ships that fuel our economy, and disrupt illegal activity across the Indian Ocean before it reaches our shores.”
On the following day, the US officially handed over 10 US-built TH-57 Sea Ranger (Bell 206) single engined helicopters to the Sri Lanka Air Force. The event, held at the Ratmalana air base, was attended by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Kapur and US Pacific Air Forces Commander General Kevin Schneide.
It would be pertinent to mention that the SLNS Gajabahu is one of the four former US Coast Guard vessels transferred since 2004/2005. But, the US refrained from transferring ships to Sri Lanka during the war and the second ex-Coast Guard vessel was made available in 2017, a decade after the end of the conflict. Of the four US Coast Guard vessels, Sri Lanka took delivery of the last one a couple of months ago and it arrived here in May.
The US-Sri Lanka relations had never been so strong though the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) was signed in March 2007 during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s first term. The US and India seemed to be overtly happy with the ruling National People’s Power (NPP) approach.
The US-India accusations that HIP is a dual-use naval facility while simultaneously providing military assistance seems contradictory.
A forgotten move
Soon after the 2019 presidential election, Gotabaya Rajapaksa deeply antagonised China when he declared that the 99-year lease of the Hambantota Port was a mistake. President Rajapaksa revealed his decision to renegotiate the agreement.
In an hour-long exclusive interview, his first since becoming the President, aired on Nitin A Gokhle’s Strategic News International (SNI) web platform and on the defence website Barthshakthi, the newly elected President said: “We were never to give control of the Port [Hambantota] to China; that was a mistake.” Rajapaksa pointed out that the decision was made by the previous administration.
“The previous Government gave it on a 99-year lease, and even though China is a good friend of ours and we need their assistance for development, I am not afraid to say that was a mistake.”
But, the President retracted his statement soon after China warned that re-negotiations wouldn’t be possible under any circumstances. The President had no option but to call a special meeting with the Colombo-based journalists working for international news agencies to retract his statement to the Strategic News International (SNI) web platform and the defence website Barthshakthi. Who influenced President Rajapaksa to declare his intention to renegotiate the Hambantota Port deal? Did President Rajapaksa at least consult his elder brother Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa or the Cabinet of Ministers? Or did Gokhle, in some way, influenced the President.
The President couldn’t have been unaware of the possible angry Chinese reaction as Sri Lanka suffered due to the foolish Yahapalana decision to suspend the Colombo Port City project. In keeping with UNP leader Ranil Wickremeinghe’s promise to halt the Colombo Port City project, in the run-up to the presidential election, in January 2015, at his behest the Cabinet of Ministers suspended the project. Sri Lanka made the announcement on 5 March, 2015.
The utterly irresponsible Yahapalana leadership justified their idiotic decision on the failure on the part of China and Sri Lanka to follow proper procedures in launching the project. The Indian and US hand in the Colombo Port City work stoppage was transparent. But, at the end, China forced the Yahapalana government to lift the suspension to pave the way for the resumption of work.
The NPP hadn’t been formed at that time. The JVP formed the NPP ahead of the 2019 presidential poll and opposed both the Colombo Port City and the Hambantota Port, primarily over sovereignty concerns. But since winning the presidential and parliamentary polls in 2024, the JVP-led NPP seemed to be continuing with Chinese projects while creating extra space for the US and India. It wouldn’t be wrong to say that Sri Lanka is tilted towards the US-India combine. Regardless of the often repeated pledge to what some called strict commitment to non-alignment, Sri Lanka is now in that US-led camp. US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Kapur’s declaration onboard SLNS Gajabahu proved that.
Indo-Lanka relations
The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Defence, on 5 April, 2025, in Colombo, immediately followed by India securing controlling shares of the security-related Colombo Dockyard Ltd., previously owned by Quad member Japan, marked an increasing loss of sovereignty to an overwhelming neighbour. Altogether, India and Sri Lanka signed seven MoUs. The presence of the Indian Premier at the signing ceremony underscored the importance of the occasion.
Both governments are of the view that all MoUs cannot be fully disclosed. They believe that there is no need or responsibility on the part of India and Sri Lanka to do so. However, none of the political parties represented in the current Parliament are not publicly opposed to the Indian approach. Over the years, India, China and the US have enhanced relations with political parties here as well as others, they are confident of pursuing their agendas.
While the local and global focus is on Hambantota Port, within 24 hours after Premier Modi concluded his visit to Colombo in the first week of April 2025, the Colombo West International Terminal (CWIT), Lanka’s first fully automated container terminal with an $800 million investment, officially began operations.
The project, developed under a 35-year Build, Operate, and Transfer (BOT) agreement, is managed by a consortium of India’s Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Ltd (APSEZ), Sri Lankan conglomerate John Keells Holdings PLC, and the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA).
There are five container terminals at the Colombo port. They are Jaya Container Terminal (JCT), the oldest built during JRJ tenure; South Asia Gateway Terminals (SAGT), Colombo International Container Terminals (CICT), Unity Container Terminal (UCT), and the Colombo West International Terminal (CWIT). China spearheads the CICT operation. China (China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited [CMPort]) owns 85% stake and the rest belongs to Sri Lanka (Sri Lanka Ports Authority).
Regardless of US and Indian interventions, China has sustained its operations here primarily focusing on Beijing’s major investments. China suffered a setback in 2024, when the US-India combine forced President Ranil Wickremesinghe to announce a one-year ban on foreign research ships visiting Sri Lanka. It was supposed to end on December 31, 2024. But, the NPP, in spite of publicly promising to state its stand on the ban that obviously targeted China, is yet to disclose its position. In fact, the writer raised this issue with Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath in January this year and he assured an announcement within two months.
Sri Lanka is in a deepening dilemma as the US and India relentlessly pressure the country on multiple issues. New Delhi is keen to upgrade the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and also connect the two countries through a land bridge in line with the overall enhancement of bilateral relations at every level. The seven MoUs finalised on 5 April, 2025, were meant to take the relations to the next level. The following are the MoUs (1) HVDC Interconnection (high-voltage direct current power link) for Import/Export of Power (2) Sharing Successful Digital Solutions Implemented at Population Scale for Digital Transformation (3) Development of Trincomalee as an Energy Hub (4) defence cooperation (5) grant assistance for the Eastern Province (6) cooperation in the fields of health and medicine and (7) Pharmacopoeial cooperation between the Indian Pharmacopoeia Commission.
With Sri Lanka in total political turmoil, foreign powers may find it easier to advance their agendas at different levels, simultaneously.
