Nearly seven months into the US and Israeli war against Iran, Tehran’s so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’ has been substantially altered. Iran-backed proxy groups across Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq and Yemen have faced military operations, political pressure or economic measures, but their fortunes have diverged. The Soufan Center says Lebanese Hezbollah has been severely degraded, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have suffered major losses, while the Houthis in Yemen and some Iraqi militias continue to demonstrate significant operational capacity.
The shift is occurring alongside continued efforts by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to sustain its forward-defence strategy through allied militias. During negotiations over a June Memorandum of Understanding, IRGC trainers and advisers travelled to Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen to provide training and equipment to proxy forces. The movements indicate the importance Tehran continues to attach to these organisations for offensive and defensive operations, even as the broader campaign against Iran-aligned groups has reduced some of their capabilities.
Hezbollah, once regarded as the strongest component of the Axis, has been severely weakened by Israeli military operations. Yet its disarmament remains a major challenge. The Soufan Center describes the task as a “Herculean effort” and notes that many experts consider it infeasible. Hezbollah has shown no interest in responding to calls for disarmament, while Israel and the group continue exchanging fire in Lebanon. Two weeks ago, the Israeli military launched an offensive against the Ali al-Taher ridge, a strategic tunnel complex used by Hezbollah. Under a US-mediated ceasefire reached in June, Israel is due to withdraw from southern Lebanon, with Lebanese Armed Forces personnel expected to replace its forces. That process is a key element of the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah.
In Yemen, meanwhile, the Houthi movement has emerged as the most active member of the Axis. The group is fighting the Presidential Leadership Council, the Aden-based internationally recognised government, as well as Saudi Arabia, its principal backer. The Houthis largely remained on the sidelines during the initial stages of the US and Israeli war against Iran. Some analysts interpreted that restraint as a deliberate Iranian decision to preserve the group as an “ace up its sleeve”. Whatever the reasoning, the Houthis have since entered the conflict more actively, adding further pressure to commercial shipping around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Following the October 7 attacks, the Houthis intermittently entered the conflict with Israel and used their position near the Bab el-Mandeb to disrupt global trade. Their attacks contributed to severe disruption of shipping and prompted the United States to conduct an approximately two-month campaign against Houthi targets. Although that operation degraded some Houthi capabilities, Houthi media portrayed it as a victory. The renewed conflict with the Presidential Leadership Council and Saudi Arabia has so far not involved attacks disrupting vessels travelling through the waterway, through which roughly a tenth of global trade passes.
The Houthis are also becoming less dependent on direct Iranian support. According to reporting by Bloomberg cited by The Soufan Center, equipment and components from China have helped the movement acquire the ability to manufacture weapons inside Yemen. Chinese companies provide dual-use goods, while Chinese components are important to the Houthis’ increasingly sophisticated drone programme. China also supplies Tehran with dual-use components supporting Iran’s own drone programme, while IRGC trainers and advisers continue strengthening proxy capabilities.
Iraq presents another difficult disarmament challenge. Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has pledged to disarm Iran-backed militias, but those groups remain active and continue operations aligned with Tehran. Most recently, Iraqi militias joined the Houthis in launching armed drones against Saudi Arabia’s East-West oil pipeline. Like Hezbollah and Hamas, the Iraqi Shia militias have become embedded in state structures, possess political legitimacy and exercise influence in areas where the Baghdad government has limited reach. They increasingly claim responsibility for attacks under the collective name Islamic Resistance in Iraq.
In Gaza, Hamas’ al-Qassam Brigades and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have suffered major losses during the sustained Israeli military campaign that followed October 7. Israeli Chief of Staff Lt Gen Eyal Zamir reportedly told Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Israel Katz earlier this month that Hamas had been “defeated” and was now a “defeated organization”. At the same time, Israeli Military Intelligence and leaked Israel Defense Forces documents indicate that Hamas is attempting to rebuild its strength in Gaza while engaging on paper with the Board of Peace over a ceasefire reached last October that includes its disarmament.
The pressure on Iran-backed militias has also been accompanied by attempts to conduct operations beyond the Middle East. Hamas, Hezbollah and Kataib Hezbollah have conducted or attempted external operations in Europe, including alleged terrorist attacks. Earlier this month, Germany indicted seven men over an alleged Hamas plot targeting the Israeli embassy in Berlin, Jewish institutions and pro-Israel demonstrations. Kataib Hezbollah has likewise sought to target Jewish interests in Europe, particularly through the front organisation Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia, according to The Soufan Center.
