The Houthi movement’s ability to sustain its military campaign against commercial shipping in the Red Sea increasingly depends on access to smuggled weapons, components and manufacturing equipment, according to the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). A DIIS assessment says international naval operations have concentrated primarily on protecting commercial vessels and intercepting missiles and drones, while paying less attention to systematically disrupting the supply networks that replenish the Houthi arsenal.
The gap has become more significant as the composition and geography of Houthi procurement have changed. Although the overall scale of smuggling remains unknown, seizure and trade data indicate that the flow of military-related goods is growing and increasingly consists of components and raw materials rather than complete weapons systems. In 2024 and 2025, more than 80 per cent of documented items seized while being transported to the Houthis were components or raw materials for weapons production. Between 2021 and 2025, Chinese-manufactured items, mainly commercially available components and raw materials, represented 35 per cent of documented materiel, compared with 21 per cent originating from Iran.
The Houthis have also expanded procurement and smuggling networks across the Horn of Africa. DIIS cites evidence of deeper links with the Somali terrorist organisation al-Shabaab involving weapons transfers, technical training and logistical support. The more dispersed supply chain allows the Houthis to continue their military campaign despite international interdiction efforts and US-led strikes intended to reduce their existing stockpiles.
DIIS argues that Yemen’s Coast Guard could provide an important local capability because of its presence close to Yemen’s coastline and its knowledge of local maritime routes. The force is responsible for securing ports and territorial waters and countering smuggling, illegal fishing, human trafficking and piracy. Its cooperation with international partners has so far included occasional joint patrols, training and information sharing. In March 2026, the European Union added cooperation with the Yemeni Coast Guard to the mandate of its Aspides military operation in the Red Sea, potentially providing a basis for more formalised cooperation.
The international response nevertheless faces practical limits. The 2015 UN arms embargo established the Verification and Inspection Mechanism in Djibouti, but the mechanism lacks enforcement tools. International naval deployments are also constrained by finite surveillance assets and shortages of amphibious ships and trained personnel. DIIS therefore identifies a strengthened Yemeni Coast Guard as a possible complement to international forces rather than a replacement for them.
The institution has had to rebuild after years of war. Established in 2002 with international support, principally from the United States, the Coast Guard had developed substantial infrastructure before the conflict. Italy, for example, funded a coastal tracking system that was largely completed by 2011. Much of that progress was subsequently lost as equipment was destroyed, looted or cannibalised for parts.
When rebuilding began in earnest in 2020, the Coast Guard had been reduced to between 120 and 220 personnel in Aden, compared with roughly 2,400 before the war. With support principally from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, as well as bilateral partners including the UK and increasingly Saudi Arabia, the force has reportedly grown to about 4,500 staff. Many, however, lack specialised coast guard training, while unstable and inadequate salaries remain a major obstacle to retaining qualified personnel. DIIS argues that increasing numbers alone will not create a sustainable force and that investment in leadership and technical skills is equally necessary.
The fleet has also expanded, but most vessels remain small boats designed for port security and operations within Yemen’s 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. Only a few operational vessels can conduct sustained patrols further offshore. The Coast Guard has identified larger patrol boats, coastal surveillance systems, secure communications equipment and upgraded operational centres as further requirements. Equipment must also withstand Yemen’s harsh maritime conditions, where salt water, heat and heavy use create continuing demands for spare parts and maintenance.
The Coast Guard’s effectiveness is further complicated by Yemen’s fragmented political authority. Although it answers administratively and operationally to the Interior Minister, with President Rashad al-Alimi as supreme commander, government-held territory remains divided among competing factions. The Coast Guard operates through three districts, headquartered in Mokha on the Red Sea, Aden on the Gulf of Aden and Mukalla on the Arabian Sea, with access to resources, political backing and operational authority varying between them. Salary payments are reportedly more reliable in some districts because different authorities provide financial support.
This fragmentation has also produced disputes between government agencies over responsibility for incidents, including responses to oil spills, reflecting weaknesses in communication and information sharing. At the same time, rising interdictions demonstrate that Yemeni forces can disrupt illicit shipments close to shore. In July 2025, the National Resistance Forces led by Presidential Leadership Council member Tariq Saleh announced the seizure of 750 tons of illicit material and weapons in the Red Sea.
But DIIS notes that the Houthi campaign has increased both the strategic importance and political value of the Coast Guard. Publicised seizures can help Yemeni security actors present themselves as preferred international partners, while competition over the institution’s leadership, mandate and foreign relationships has contributed to its politicisation. The central challenge identified by DIIS is therefore not simply expanding the force, but building a sufficiently trained, equipped, funded and coordinated Coast Guard capable of sustaining maritime interdiction close to Yemen’s coast.
