The Houthis’ ability to sustain their military campaign against commercial shipping in the Red Sea depends heavily on continued access to smuggled arms, components and manufacturing equipment, according to a brief by the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). Disrupting those supply networks is therefore central to limiting the group’s ability to replenish its arsenal. Yet international naval deployments responding to Houthi attacks have focused primarily on protecting commercial shipping and intercepting missiles and drones, rather than systematically disrupting the networks that move military-related goods towards Yemen. The Yemeni Coast Guard could provide a more sustainable, locally rooted capability by using its knowledge of the coastline and near-shore presence to identify and disrupt smuggling closer to Yemen.
The scale of the illicit supply network remains unknown, but seizure and trade data indicate that both the volume and composition of military-related goods reaching the Houthis are changing. In 2024 and 2025, more than 80 per cent of documented items seized while being transported to the group consisted of components or raw materials for arms production rather than complete weapons systems. Between 2021 and 2025, Chinese-manufactured items, primarily commercially available components and raw materials, accounted for 35 per cent of documented materiel, compared with 21 per cent of Iranian origin. The Houthis have also expanded procurement and smuggling networks in the Horn of Africa, including deeper ties with the Somali terrorist organisation al-Shabaab involving weapons transfers, technical training and logistical support.
The more dispersed nature of this supply chain presents a challenge to international interdiction efforts and to US-led military strikes intended to degrade existing Houthi stockpiles. The 2015 UN arms embargo, established through Resolution 2216, led to the creation of the Verification and Inspection Mechanism in Djibouti, but the mechanism lacks tools to enforce compliance. International naval deployments in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are also constrained by finite surveillance assets and shortages of amphibious ships and trained personnel.
The Coast Guard is a civilian law enforcement institution responsible for securing Yemen’s ports and territorial waters and countering smuggling, illegal fishing, human trafficking and piracy. Cooperation with international partners has included occasional joint patrols, training and information sharing, although these arrangements have largely been ad hoc. In March 2026, the European Union added cooperation with the Yemeni Coast Guard to the mandate of its Aspides military operation in the Red Sea, potentially providing a basis for more formalised cooperation.
The force, however, faces substantial institutional and operational constraints. Established in 2002 with international support, principally from the United States, the Coast Guard had developed infrastructure including an Italian-funded coastal tracking system that was largely complete by 2011. The war subsequently destroyed, looted or stripped much of its equipment for parts. When rebuilding began in earnest in 2020, the force had been reduced to an estimated 120 to 220 personnel in Aden, compared with roughly 2,400 before the war. With support principally from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, alongside bilateral partners including the UK and increasingly Saudi Arabia, its personnel strength has reportedly grown to about 4,500, although many lack specialised coast guard training.
Personnel numbers alone do not resolve the problem. Unstable and inadequate salaries remain a major obstacle to absorbing international assistance, while the force needs competent leadership and personnel with technical skills. Its fleet has expanded but remains dominated by small vessels designed for port security and operations within Yemen’s 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. Only a few operational vessels can conduct sustained multi-day patrols further offshore. The Coast Guard has identified larger patrol boats, coastal surveillance systems, secure communications equipment and upgraded operational centres as further requirements.
Equipment also presents a question of sustainability. Salt water, heat and intensive use impose continual demands for spare parts and maintenance, while equipment that is poorly adapted to local operating conditions may deteriorate rapidly. Additional assets therefore do not automatically translate into lasting operational capacity unless they can be maintained under Yemeni conditions.
The institutional challenge is compounded by fragmented authority. Administratively and operationally, the Coast Guard answers to the Minister of Interior, while President Rashad al-Alimi is supreme commander. In practice, however, government-held territory is divided among several factions, and control of ports and coastal bases does not always correspond neatly with the Coast Guard’s formal chain of command. Its three districts, headquartered in Mokha for the Red Sea, Aden for the Gulf of Aden and Mukalla for the Arabian Sea, can have different levels of political support, operational authority and salary reliability.
The political competition surrounding the institution has become more pronounced as the Houthi campaign has increased the strategic value of Yemen’s coastline. The Southern Transitional Council, National Resistance Forces and other actors have exercised influence across government-held areas, while control and support for maritime security capabilities have become part of wider competition. The National Resistance Forces led by Presidential Leadership Council member Tariq Saleh, which operate along the Red Sea coast around Mokha, received maritime assets from Saudi Arabia in early 2026.
There are signs that Yemeni forces can achieve results close to shore. In July 2025, the National Resistance Forces announced the seizure of 750 tons of illicit material and weapons in the Red Sea. But the growing number of publicised seizures also has a political dimension, allowing Yemeni security actors to present themselves as attractive partners to international powers. The Danish Institute for International Studies notes that this competition has contributed to the politicisation of the Coast Guard’s leadership, mandate and international relationships, even as questions remain over whether publicised seizures necessarily reflect a corresponding increase in the institution’s underlying capacity.
