The Concern
I recently received a message from a concerned traveller who regularly uses Sri Lankan Airlines’ services. The communication included a recording in which a journalist conveyed an alarming proposition: that an ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP – the journalist did not use the specific term) finding had established that Sri Lanka had “failed in licensing of pilots requirements” and in complying with aviation laws and regulations, with the further suggestion that this could lead to ICAO “blacklisting” Sri Lanka and its airlines. , Such an allegation, particularly when made in the context of pilot licensing and the safety of air navigation, cannot be dismissed as idle speculation.
The compelling importance of aviation safety admits of no qualification, for the safety of air navigation is founded upon a delicate architecture of law, regulation, institutional competence and public confidence, in which even the perception of a deficiency may have consequences extending beyond the technical domain into the economic and reputational well-being of a State and its national carrier. It is therefore entirely justifiable that travellers, particularly those who entrust their lives to an airline operating under the regulatory aegis of a sovereign State, should be concerned when reports or assertions appear to suggest that deficiencies have been identified in the State’s aviation safety oversight, including the licensing of pilots and compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
The following observations are by no means intended to impugn, question or diminish the integrity of any journalistic report or the professional responsibility of those who have brought matters of legitimate public interest to attention. Their purpose is rather to place certain assertions within their proper legal and institutional context and, where necessary, to clarify distinctions which may otherwise become blurred in public discourse. In particular, allegations concerning ICAO safety oversight findings require precision, as an inaccurate interpretation may unnecessarily cause apprehension among travellers and, in turn, produce reputational and commercial consequences that could adversely affect Sri Lanka’s national carrier without a corresponding evidentiary foundation.
The remarks are made in my capacity as a former member of the ICAO Secretariat.
Aviation safety is an area where rumour can acquire the dangerous characteristics of fact because the travelling public quite properly assumes that the license carried by the person at the controls of an aircraft is the product of an unimpeachable regulatory process. Yet it is equally important that assertions of this nature be tested against the documentary record, particularly where the name of ICAO is invoked. My examination of the available ICAO and Civil Aviation Authority of Sri Lanka (CAASL) material leads me to a conclusion which is considerably more nuanced than the proposition conveyed to me: there is no evidence that Sri Lanka has “failed” a 2026 ICAO USOAP audit, because the evidence presently available indicates that the comprehensive USOAP CMA audit of Sri Lanka is scheduled for 12–25 May 2027, while Sri Lanka has been preparing for that forthcoming activity. As far as I can deduce, ICAO’s own current USOAP material does not support the proposition that a 2026 audit of Sri Lanka produced the alleged findings.
There is an important point of chronology. The CAASL announced in May 2026 that it had conducted a staff awareness programme concerning the forthcoming USOAP-CMA activity. That is preparation for an audit, not publication of the result of an audit. More significantly, ICAO’s current planning material identifies Sri Lanka — Audit — 12 to 25 May 2027. In other words, as matters stand in August 2026, the next comprehensive USOAP CMA audit is a 2027 event. The assertion that Sri Lanka “failed the 2026 USOAP test” therefore appears to conflate preparation for a forthcoming audit with the outcome of an audit which has not yet taken place.
There has, however, been USOAP activity concerning Sri Lanka since the 2018 comprehensive audit. ICAO’s USOAP CMA report records an off-site validation of Sri Lanka in November 2020. An off-site validation is fundamentally different from a new comprehensive on-site audit. It is part of the continuous-monitoring process through which ICAO examines evidence concerning corrective action and implementation. The CAASL’s own public archive identifies the principal publicly available comprehensive USOAP CMA audit as the audit conducted from 4 to 15 June 2018.
What is USOAP?
The above distinction is not academic. USOAP is not an examination in which a State receives a simple “pass” or “fail.” It is an institutional examination of whether a State has established and effectively implemented a safety oversight system. ICAO’s current Safety Report explains that the programme employs standardized Protocol Questions to assess the effectiveness of a State’s implementation of the eight Critical Elements of safety oversight. The eight elements comprise primary aviation legislation; specific operating regulations; the State system and functions; qualified technical personnel; technical guidance, tools and safety-critical information; licensing, certification, authorization and approval obligations; surveillance obligations; and resolution of safety issues.
The audit areas complement these Critical Elements. They encompass primary aviation legislation and civil aviation regulations (LEG); civil aviation organization (ORG); personnel licensing and training (PEL); aircraft operations (OPS); airworthiness of aircraft (AIR); aircraft accident and incident investigation (AIG); air navigation services (ANS); and aerodromes and ground aids (AGA). The revised USOAP methodology has also incorporated additional Safety Management System and State Safety Programme dimensions. ICAO’s 2026 documentation confirms that the 2024 edition of the Protocol Questions incorporated SMS-related questions into PEL, OPS, AIR, ANS and AGA, with State Safety Programme questions constituting a new audit area.
Personnel Licensing
The significance of personnel licensing in this architecture should not be underestimated. PEL is not merely an examination of whether pieces of paper called licenses exist. It examines whether the State has an effective system for determining that pilots and other aviation personnel meet the applicable requirements, whether examinations and skill tests are properly administered, whether medical certification is controlled, whether licenses and ratings are appropriately issued, whether approved training organizations are properly supervised and whether the regulator maintains continuing oversight. The central question is consequently not “does Sri Lanka issue pilot licenses?” but whether the State can demonstrate that its licensing system reliably produces and maintains competent aviation personnel in conformity with the applicable ICAO Standards and national regulations.
This is where the alleged statement that Sri Lanka “failed in licensing of pilots requirements” requires careful interpretation. A USOAP Protocol Question concerning personnel licensing can be assessed as “not satisfactory” where the State cannot demonstrate that every element required by that question has been implemented or cannot provide sufficient evidence of compliance. ICAO’s regional USOAP documentation makes this explicit: a State must demonstrate that all elements of a Protocol Question have been implemented and provide the relevant evidence; where evidence is insufficient, the PQ may be assessed as not satisfactory, after which the State is expected to develop and implement a Corrective Action Plan. A “not satisfactory” PQ is therefore not synonymous with “fraudulent pilot licenses,” nor does it establish that pilots currently operating aircraft are unqualified.
This distinction becomes particularly important in relation to the second allegation communicated to me: that there were records of fraudulent pilot licensing which jeopardized the safety of navigation. I have found no authoritative ICAO source establishing that a recent USOAP activity discovered fraudulent Sri Lankan pilot licenses or that ICAO identified fraudulent licensing in Sri Lanka as an SSC. The available ICAO material does not substantiate that proposition. Nor does the CAASL’s publicly available USOAP material presently establish such a finding. It would therefore be irresponsible to transform an allegation concerning “licensing requirements” into an assertion of fraudulent licenses without documentary evidence identifying the particular licences, the particular regulatory deficiency, the responsible persons and the formal ICAO finding.
There is an additional danger in this respect. In June 2026, there was a highly publicized case involving a former Air Canada captain, who was accused by Canadian police of having used fraudulent pilot licensing credentials in connection with more than 900 flights. That case was Canadian, not Sri Lankan. It concerned an individual who had allegedly misrepresented his qualifications to Air Canada and aviation authorities. It would be entirely wrong to allow that story, occurring in the same year, to become confused with Sri Lankan regulatory oversight or an ICAO finding against Sri Lanka.
Legislation and Regulations
The third question — whether there have been breaches of Sri Lankan laws and regulations by the CAASL — requires the same discipline. A USOAP finding can identify a deficiency in the State’s implementation of an ICAO Standard, including deficiencies involving legislation, regulations, licensing, certification, surveillance or enforcement. That does not automatically mean that the national civil aviation authority has committed an offence or acted unlawfully under domestic law. There is a crucial distinction between non-compliance with an ICAO Standard, inadequate implementation of a regulatory requirement, administrative deficiency, and unlawful conduct under national law. These concepts should not be collapsed into one another.
Indeed, Sri Lanka’s own regulatory architecture demonstrates that the CAASL has established formal mechanisms for licensing, certification and surveillance. Its air operator certification procedures provide for continuing surveillance and corrective action where deficiencies are found and contemplate restrictions or withdrawal of an Air Operator Certificate where an operator fails to correct deficiencies. The existence of a deficiency identified by an audit would therefore not, by itself, prove that the CAASL had deliberately breached its own laws. One would have to identify the particular provision, the act or omission allegedly violating it, the responsible authority and the evidence of violation.
The historical record is instructive. Sri Lanka underwent an ICAO comprehensive safety oversight audit in 2018, and the CAASL publicly records that audit as having taken place from 4 to 15 June 2018. The results revealed areas requiring improvement. This is hardly extraordinary. USOAP is designed precisely to expose weaknesses in State oversight. Indeed, ICAO’s global 2026 Safety Report shows that even globally the lowest levels of effective implementation are associated with aircraft accident and incident investigation, aerodromes and ground aids, resolution of safety issues, qualified technical personnel and surveillance obligations.
Can ICAO Blacklist?
The proposition that ICAO can “blacklist” Sri Lanka therefore requires a further correction. ICAO does not possess a general power under the Chicago Convention to blacklist a Member State or its airlines in the sense of issuing a universal prohibition against their international operations. ICAO is not a supranational aviation regulator possessing police powers over the 193 Contracting States. The Chicago Convention rests upon the principle that States retain sovereignty over their territories and airspace while undertaking international obligations concerning civil aviation. Article 37 is particularly important in this context because it establishes the obligation of States to collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures and organization in matters affecting air navigation.
ICAO’s authority is therefore principally normative, supervisory, coordinative and facilitative. It establishes SARPs, monitors State implementation, conducts USOAP activities, identifies deficiencies, communicates findings and assists States in correcting them. The practical consequences of poor performance can nevertheless be serious. A foreign State may, on the basis of its own safety assessment, impose additional oversight or restrictions on operators from another State. The European Union may act under its own Air Safety List regime; the United States Federal Aviation Administration operates its International Aviation Safety Assessment system; and individual States may impose operational conditions under their national law. These are not ICAO blacklists, and it is essential not to confuse national or regional regulatory mechanisms with USOAP.
Significant Safety Concerns
The most serious mechanism within USOAP is Significant Safety Concern, or SSC. An SSC is not simply a low EI score. It arises where ICAO identifies an immediate safety risk resulting from the State’s failure to provide effective safety oversight — in particular, where the State permits the holder of an authorization or approval to exercise the privileges associated with it despite the fact that established minimum requirements have not been met. ICAO’s interactive USOAP results page makes an important point: an SSC does not necessarily mean that the air operator, aircraft, aerodrome or air navigation service provider itself is deficient; rather, it means that the State is not providing sufficient safety oversight to ensure effective implementation of applicable ICAO SARPs.
That distinction is of enormous importance in relation to SriLankan Airlines. An adverse USOAP finding against the State does not automatically mean that every aircraft operated by SriLankan Airlines is unsafe. The USOAP system is fundamentally an examination of State oversight capability. If, for example, the State had failed to maintain an effective licensing system, ICAO would be concerned principally with the regulatory machinery through which pilots are licensed and supervised. The appropriate question would then be whether the State had allowed individuals to exercise the privileges of licenses when the relevant minimum requirements had not been satisfied.
The term “blacklisting” is therefore rhetorically powerful but legally inaccurate. The more accurate concept is that an SSC can generate international regulatory consequences because ICAO communicates the findings to other Contracting States. ICAO expressly states that detailed findings relating to an SSC are made available to the State concerned to guide rectification and to other ICAO Member States so that they may take whatever action they consider necessary to ensure safety. The State is also required to report progress to ICAO. Thus, the system creates a form of international transparency and regulatory pressure rather than an ICAO-imposed blacklist.
There is, however, nothing soft about an SSC. Its practical consequences can be severe. Other States may decide that additional scrutiny is necessary. Foreign regulators may subject operators from the State concerned to heightened surveillance. Commercial relationships may be affected. Insurance considerations may arise. Passenger confidence may suffer. Bilateral air service arrangements may become more difficult. The reputational consequences can be substantial. It is therefore a mistake to conclude that because ICAO cannot formally “blacklist” a State, an SSC is merely an administrative inconvenience. It is a very serious international safety signal.
How Does ICAO Help?
The more constructive question is what happens after a State receives adverse findings. Here the philosophy of ICAO is markedly different from that of a punitive tribunal. ICAO’s purpose is not merely to discover that a State is deficient and then leave it to its own devices. The Organization operates within the broader philosophy of No Country Left Behind, seeking to assist States in implementing SARPs and improving safety oversight capability. Corrective Action Plans are central to the process. Where a Protocol Question is found not satisfactory, the State is expected to determine the root of the deficiency and identify corrective measures, supporting documentation and evidence of implementation.
ICAO may then conduct an ICAO Coordinated Validation Mission (ICVM) or an off-site validation to determine whether corrective action has actually been implemented. This is crucial because aviation safety cannot be achieved by the production of documents alone. The regulator must demonstrate that its system works in practice. An amended regulation sitting in a government file does not establish effective implementation if inspectors do not apply it, licensing officers do not understand it, examinations are inadequately controlled or surveillance is not conducted.
ICAO also provides technical assistance, training and capacity development. The Organization conducts USOAP preparation courses and workshops, trains National Continuous Monitoring Coordinators, assists States in understanding Protocol Questions and provides implementation support. ICAO’s current training programme includes dedicated Government Safety Inspector training in Personnel Licensing, which demonstrates the continuing emphasis upon the competence of national regulators themselves.
ICAO’s Continuous Monitoring Approach (CMA) represents a significant philosophical evolution in international aviation safety oversight. Rather than treating the safety audit as a periodic event which begins and ends with the arrival and departure of an ICAO audit team, CMA seeks to maintain an ongoing appreciation of a State’s safety oversight capability through the continuous collection, analysis and validation of safety information. It is consequently a dynamic, risk-based process through which deficiencies are identified, associated risks assessed, corrective strategies prioritized and the effectiveness of remedial measures subsequently validated. Its greatest virtue lies in transforming USOAP from an episodic inspection into a continuing dialogue between ICAO and the State, thereby making aviation safety not a certificate to be periodically acquired, but a regulatory condition that must be continuously demonstrated.
The regional dimension is equally important. Sri Lanka belongs to the Asia-Pacific aviation community, where ICAO’s Regional Office and regional safety mechanisms work with States on regulatory deficiencies. The South Asian Cooperative Development of Operational Safety and Continuing Airworthiness Programme, or COSCAP-SA, was established as a cooperative mechanism involving States including Sri Lanka, specifically to strengthen regional safety oversight capabilities. The principle is straightforward: where a State lacks sufficient institutional capacity, international cooperation can provide expertise, training and technical resources.
The logic is analogous to medicine. An ICAO audit is not intended to pronounce a patient terminally ill. It is intended to diagnose weaknesses before they become catastrophic. A State with a deficient licensing system needs competent licensing inspectors, proper examination procedures, reliable records, effective medical certification, qualified training organizations, oversight of flight-test examiners and mechanisms for continuing surveillance. If the deficiency is legislative, legislation must be amended. If it is organizational, institutional responsibility must be clarified. If it is human-resource related, inspectors must be trained and retained. If it is a surveillance deficiency, inspection programmes must be strengthened. If the problem is enforcement, the regulator must demonstrate that it can act when violations are detected.
There is another important lesson in the current Sri Lankan situation. The CAASL has itself been undertaking regulatory oversight activities during 2026 with ICAO support and has been preparing its personnel for the forthcoming USOAP CMA process. That is precisely the behaviour one would expect from a regulator preparing to demonstrate compliance rather than from a State that has just been “blacklisted.” The available public record therefore points towards a process of regulatory preparation and capacity strengthening rather than a completed adverse USOAP judgment.
My Take
The traveler’s concern deserves respect, but the conclusion conveyed to me requires substantial qualification. There is no presently available authoritative evidence that Sri Lanka failed a 2026 ICAO USOAP audit. More importantly, ICAO’s current planning documentation places Sri Lanka’s next comprehensive USOAP CMA audit in May 2027, while the CAASL’s public statements in 2026 concern preparation for that forthcoming audit. There is also no authoritative ICAO evidence presently before me establishing that a recent USOAP activity discovered fraudulent Sri Lankan pilot licenses or declared an SSC against Sri Lanka on account of fraudulent licensing. The allegation of “failure in pilot licensing requirements” may conceivably derive from a misunderstanding of a Protocol Question, an earlier finding, a corrective-action issue, or even an unrelated regulatory matter, but it should not be converted into a statement of fact without the underlying ICAO document. Nor can one properly say that ICAO has found the CAASL to have breached Sri Lankan law merely because a USOAP Protocol Question might be unsatisfactory.
Non-compliance with an ICAO Standard, deficient implementation of a national regulation, and breach of domestic law are distinct legal propositions. Finally, ICAO does not operate a conventional blacklist. Its more sophisticated mechanism is one of audit, transparency, corrective action, validation and international peer pressure, with the SSC functioning as the highest-level warning that a State’s oversight system may present an immediate safety risk. If an SSC were ever issued, the answer would not be to abandon the State but to assist it in removing the deficiency while ensuring that other States are informed sufficiently to protect international aviation. That is the essence of ICAO’s philosophy: the objective of a safety audit is not to punish a State for being imperfect; it is to ensure that an imperfect oversight system becomes a demonstrably effective one. In aviation, the ultimate measure of regulatory success is not whether a State can produce an impressive certificate on the wall, but whether the State can demonstrate, through evidence, competent personnel, effective licensing, continuous surveillance and credible enforcement, that the certificate means what it purports to mean.
