The proposed hydrographic cooperation agreement between India and Sri Lanka, initiated by the previous regime, has ignited serious debate, with growing concerns over its potential to erode Sri Lanka’s control over its maritime domain. While a former minister assured the public that such an agreement would not materialise, the issue refuses to fade away, raising urgent questions about national sovereignty and strategic autonomy.
Sri Lanka’s vast and underutilised ocean resources make hydrographic control a critical national asset. Surrendering authority over hydrographic surveys to a foreign power could severely cripple Sri Lanka’s ability to manage its ocean economy, particularly its ambitions in the blue economy. The experiences of Mauritius and the Maldives—where similar agreements with India led to complications—offer a stark warning. The Maldives, in particular, was forced to seek external intervention to reclaim control over its maritime affairs. Sri Lanka must ask itself: is it willing to risk a similar fate?
The Sri Lanka Navy Hydrographic Service already possesses the expertise and equipment to conduct hydrographic surveys and produce internationally recognised charts. If Sri Lanka is fully capable of handling its own hydrographic operations, why should another country be granted access to this highly strategic domain? The Ministry of Defence must take decisive legal measures to ensure that control remains firmly in Sri Lankan hands. The establishment of the National Hydrographic Office was intended to secure national oversight—ceding these responsibilities to India would not only compromise national security but also have serious economic ramifications.
One of the most controversial aspects of the proposed agreement is the clause that would grant India the status of a producer nation for nautical charts within Sri Lankan waters. This would effectively block Sri Lanka from establishing itself as an independent producer and could result in substantial financial losses. As it stands, the UK Hydrographic Office is the primary charting authority for Sri Lanka’s waters, under a 2025 agreement with the NHO. Sri Lanka benefits financially from royalties on every chart sold that includes its maritime data. Signing a conflicting agreement that hands these privileges to India would be an unforgivable strategic blunder.
In response to these concerns, the Sri Lanka Navy has proposed restricting the MoU to training, technology transfers, and expertise exchange—without allowing India to conduct surveys or produce charts. However, history has shown that such diplomatic manoeuvres often fail to prevent mission creep. If India gains a foothold in Sri Lanka’s hydrographic operations, what’s to stop it from expanding its influence under the guise of cooperation?
A further complication arises from the fact that hydrographic matters in India are managed entirely by the Indian Navy, whereas Sri Lanka’s recently established NHO lacks comparable institutional strength. The risk of India dictating terms due to this imbalance in capability should not be ignored. If the agreement is structured as a direct navy-to-navy MoU rather than a full-fledged intergovernmental treaty, it could be categorised under defence cooperation. This approach might limit India’s direct control over Sri Lanka’s hydrographic operations while still allowing structured collaboration in non-sensitive areas. But even this raises critical questions: should India have any role at all in Sri Lanka’s hydrography?
Another alarming issue is India’s unauthorised publication of international charts covering Sri Lankan waters—without Sri Lanka’s consent. This blatant disregard for International Hydrographic Organization regulations is not just a procedural oversight; it is an assertion of control over Sri Lanka’s maritime data. Why should Sri Lanka trust a partner that has already bypassed its authority?
Beyond economic and security concerns, the broader geopolitical implications of this agreement must be considered. Reports suggest that security agreements related to hydrographic surveys require India’s approval, a stipulation that directly undermines Sri Lanka’s sovereignty. Even more troubling are claims that multiple agreements—some of them potentially compromising—are set to be signed, with details deliberately kept from Parliament and the Cabinet. The lack of transparency fuels suspicions: who stands to gain from these deals, and at what cost to Sri Lanka?
While hydrographic cooperation with India presents certain opportunities—such as access to advanced training and technology—Sri Lanka must not allow itself to be lured into a position of dependency. Instead of signing agreements that could diminish its autonomy, Sri Lanka should strengthen its National Hydrographic Office and invest in self-sufficiency in hydrographic operations. Maintaining its longstanding partnership with the UK Hydrographic Office, which has already expressed willingness to assist in Sri Lanka’s transition to full chart-production capability, remains a far safer option. Sri Lanka must also assert control over its maritime data and demand accountability for India’s unauthorised charting of Sri Lankan waters while ensuring full transparency on any agreements affecting national security and economic interests.
Sri Lanka’s maritime sovereignty is not a commodity to be traded. The decisions made today will determine whether Sri Lanka remains the master of its own waters or becomes a pawn in a larger geopolitical game. The government must choose wisely.
