On March 27, 2026, President Ram Chandra Paudel appointed Balendra ‘Balen’ Shah Prime Minister following the Rastriya Swatantra Party’s (RSP) decisive victory in the March 5, 2026, parliamentary elections. On the same day, Shah unveiled a 15-member Cabinet, the smallest in recent years, comprising largely first-time ministers and technocrats. The Government emerged from the political upheaval triggered by the September 2025 Gen-Z protests, which culminated in the collapse of the preceding administration amid widespread public anger over corruption, unemployment, governance failures and chronic political instability. Riding a near two-thirds parliamentary majority and unprecedented public goodwill, the Shah Government entered office promising to dismantle entrenched patronage networks, restore administrative accountability and redefine governance through transparency, technological innovation and institutional reform. The completion of its first 100 days on July 5, 2026, provides an opportunity to assess whether these promises have translated into measurable institutional change or remained largely declaratory.
Unlike its predecessors, whose tenure was dominated by coalition bargaining and frequent cabinet reshuffles, the Shah administration did not face an immediate struggle for political survival. Instead, its principal challenge lay in converting the political legitimacy acquired through the Gen-Z movement into durable institutional reform. The Government moved quickly to distinguish itself from previous administrations by projecting administrative discipline, fiscal restraint and decisiveness. At its first Cabinet meeting on March 27, 2026, it approved a 100-point governance roadmap, prioritising bureaucratic rationalisation, digitalisation of public services, restructuring of public institutions, implementation of the recommendations of the Gauri Bahadur Karki Commission into the September 2025 violence, and merit-based appointments across the civil service. The smaller Cabinet itself was projected as a break from Nepal’s long-standing practice of accommodating coalition partners through oversized ministries and politically negotiated portfolios.
Three months later, however, implementation remained uneven. While ministries announced reforms in passport issuance, driving licences, online grievance redressal and digital public services, many initiatives remained confined to policy announcements or pilot implementation. Proposals to reduce the number of ministries, restructure public enterprises and depoliticise the civil service required legislative amendments and administrative restructuring that had yet to commence. Even where improvements were visible – such as extended office hours in selected government departments and faster delivery of certain administrative services – they reflected incremental administrative adjustments rather than systemic transformation. Consequently, the Government’s first 100 days were characterised less by institutional restructuring than by the articulation of an ambitious reform agenda.
The administration’s anti-corruption campaign nevertheless emerged as the defining feature of its first 100 days. Acting on the recommendations of the Gauri Bahadur Karki Commission, Police arrested former Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli from his residence in Gundu, Bhaktapur, and former Home Minister Ramesh Lekhak from Suryabinayak, Bhaktapur, on March 28, 2026, in connection with culpable homicide charges arising from the alleged suppression of the September 2025 Gen-Z protests. Investigations were also initiated against several politicians, former ministers and businesspersons over allegations of corruption, abuse of office and money laundering, while the Government ordered reviews of major public procurement decisions taken under previous administrations, including the controversial electronic passport contract. Collectively, these measures reinforced RSP’s image as a political force prepared to confront entrenched political interests that successive governments had largely avoided.
The campaign, however, also generated concerns regarding executive overreach. The Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) described the arrests of Oli and Lekhak as politically motivated, arguing that the Government had sought to secure political advantage through executive action before judicial processes had run their course. Courts subsequently ordered the release of Oli, Lekhak, and former Energy Minister Deepak Khadka, strengthening opposition claims that due process had been compromised. Criticism also extended beyond Parliament. Editorials in Nepali Times, including 100 Days of Balenism (June 26, 2026) and Performance vs Process (June 27, 2026), argued that the increasing reliance on ordinances, pressure on constitutionally independent institutions during the passport procurement investigation, and the concentration of decision-making within the Prime Minister’s Office risked weakening the rule of law and institutional accountability that the Government itself had pledged to strengthen. The debate thus shifted from whether corruption should be investigated to whether anti-corruption could legitimately be pursued at the expense of constitutional process.
These concerns increasingly dominated parliamentary proceedings. On May 14, 2026, legislators from the NC and the CPN-UML repeatedly obstructed proceedings in the House of Representatives (HoR) after Prime Minister Shah declined to respond personally to debates on the Government’s annual policy and programme. Opposition leaders accused the Prime Minister of avoiding parliamentary scrutiny despite enjoying a commanding legislative majority. NC President Gagan Thapa argued that electoral legitimacy could not substitute for constitutional accountability and cautioned against confusing popular support with executive authority. Opposition members similarly criticised the Government’s growing reliance on ordinances, contending that executive convenience was replacing legislative deliberation despite the absence of coalition constraints. The repeated disruptions reflected a broader political strategy aimed at reframing the debate from corruption and administrative reform to constitutional governance and institutional accountability.
The Government also confronted early challenges to its own reformist credentials. On April 9, 2026, Labour Minister Deepak Sah resigned following allegations that he had used his office to facilitate the continuation of his wife, Junu Shrestha, on the Health Insurance Board. Acting on the recommendation of the RSP’s Central Disciplinary Commission, which concluded that Sah had violated party rules governing the misuse of public office, Prime Minister Shah accepted his resignation. Less than two weeks later, on April 22, 2026, Home Minister Sudan Gurung came under scrutiny over his alleged links with controversial businessman Deepak Bhatta, who is under investigation for money laundering. Although neither controversy threatened the Government’s parliamentary majority, both dented the RSP’s carefully cultivated image as an uncompromising anti-corruption movement. They also demonstrated that the standards of accountability the Government sought to impose upon Nepal’s traditional political parties would inevitably be applied to its own leadership.
The Government’s commitment to accountability was itself subjected to institutional scrutiny during the review period. On July 1, 2026, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) sought clarification from RSP following media reports that party memberships had allegedly been issued to persons below the age of 18. In a statement issued the same day, the Commission disclosed that it had formally written to the party seeking an explanation and relevant records after taking cognisance of the reports. Although the inquiry remains inconclusive, the episode underscored that the standards of transparency and legal compliance advocated by the RSP would increasingly be tested against its own organisational practices. More broadly, it reflected the willingness of constitutional oversight bodies to subject the new political establishment to the same level of scrutiny traditionally reserved for Nepal’s mainstream parties.
The Shah Government also initiated a series of politically significant proposals aimed at restructuring the state. At the RSP’s General Convention in June 2026, the party endorsed a comprehensive constitutional reform agenda, including the abolition of provincial governments established under the 2015 Constitution, arguing that the existing federal structure had generated administrative duplication, fiscal burdens and overlapping jurisdictions without substantially improving governance. The proposal, while consistent with RSP’s longstanding advocacy for a leaner state, immediately triggered criticism from federalist parties, constitutional experts and provincial leaders, who argued that dismantling provincial institutions would require extensive constitutional amendments and risk reopening debates that had largely been settled following the promulgation of the Constitution. Although no legislative initiative have yet been introduced, the proposal highlighted the Government’s willingness to challenge fundamental features of Nepal’s post-2015 constitutional settlement.
Foreign policy, by contrast, reflected continuity tempered by cautious recalibration. The Shah Government avoided any formal departure from Nepal’s long-standing policy of maintaining balanced relations with India and China. Nevertheless, its diplomatic style differed noticeably from previous administrations. Unlike successive CPN-UML and Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Centre (CPN-Maoist Centre) governments, which cultivated close party-to-party ties with the Communist Party of China (CPC) alongside official diplomatic engagement, the RSP government largely confined its interaction with Beijing to state institutions, reflecting both the party’s non-ideological orientation and the absence of historical political linkages with the CPC. Chinese interest in the new dispensation was evident even before the Government assumed office, when a CPC delegation visited Kathmandu on March 17, 2026, to assess the evolving political situation and prospects for bilateral cooperation. Beijing subsequently congratulated RSP on its electoral victory and reiterated its willingness to deepen bilateral relations, but also adopted a cautious approach towards a government whose foreign-policy priorities remained uncertain.
This caution was particularly evident in relation to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). During Foreign Minister Shishir Khanal’s visit to Beijing (June 14 to 17, 2026), Nepal reaffirmed its commitment to expanding bilateral cooperation; however, the Nepali readout omitted any reference to the BRI, despite the Chinese side reiterating its readiness to advance “high-quality” BRI cooperation. No major Chinese-funded infrastructure projects were approved, accelerated or cancelled during the Government’s first 100 days, nor did Kathmandu initiate any review of ongoing projects inherited from previous administrations. Beijing also refrained from commenting publicly on the arrests and investigations involving senior UML and Maoist leaders, treating the developments as Nepal’s internal affairs, while prioritising continuity in bilateral relations over established political partnerships. Taken together, these developments suggest not a strategic shift away from China, but an effort to de-politicise Nepal-China relations by replacing party-centric engagement with a more institutional state-to-state framework.
The Government’s approach towards India similarly displayed continuity, though accompanied by a more assertive diplomatic style. Kathmandu reiterated its commitment to maintaining close cooperation with New Delhi across trade, connectivity and security while simultaneously emphasising greater policy autonomy and sovereign equality in bilateral engagement. Prime Minister Shah’s preference for institutional rather than personality-driven diplomacy, including his reluctance to follow established conventions of frequent bilateral political engagement during the Government’s initial months, generated considerable media speculation in both countries. Nevertheless, no substantive deterioration occurred in bilateral cooperation. Existing mechanisms relating to cross-border infrastructure, trade and energy continued to function, indicating that stylistic changes in diplomacy had not translated into a fundamental reorientation of Nepal’s foreign policy.
Beyond individual policy initiatives, the Shah Government’s first 100 days may signify a broader transition in Nepal’s political evolution. For nearly three decades, successive governments derived their legitimacy from coalition arithmetic, historical political movements and elite accommodation. By contrast, RSP has sought to derive legitimacy primarily from administrative performance, anti-corruption and direct public engagement. This represents a significant departure in the basis of political authority. At the same time, the administration has increasingly concentrated political decision-making within the Prime Minister’s Office, relied extensively on executive directives and ordinances, and demonstrated limited tolerance for institutional delay. While these methods have accelerated decision-making, they have also generated concerns regarding the erosion of parliamentary deliberation, judicial oversight and constitutional safeguards. The central tension of the Government’s first 100 days, therefore, lies not between reform and continuity, but between administrative expediency and institutional process.
Overall, the Shah Government has unquestionably altered the tone and pace of governance in Nepal. Compared to its predecessors, it has demonstrated greater political coherence, administrative urgency and a willingness to confront entrenched political interests. Equally, however, many of its flagship reforms remain at the level of policy declaration, while several high-profile interventions have generated sustained parliamentary, judicial and civil society scrutiny. The Government’s principal achievement during its first 100 days has therefore been to reshape Nepal’s political discourse rather than its institutions. Whether this marks the beginning of durable democratic renewal or the emergence of a more centralised model of executive governance will depend, not on the speed with which reforms are announced, but on the extent to which they are implemented through transparent institutions, constitutional safeguards and the rule of law. That question is likely to define Nepal’s political trajectory well beyond the Shah Government’s first 100 days.
