On September 23, 2025, Balochistan Chief Minister (CM) Sarfraz Bugti, joined by ruling and opposition leaders, announced the suspension of the controversial Balochistan Mines and Minerals Act 2025 via executive order. The decision followed a meeting with opposition leaders and committee members, who agreed to re-table the Act in the Provincial Assembly, for further deliberation. Earlier the day, a joint meeting of opposition parties in the Balochistan Assembly declared the Mines and Minerals Act, 2025, unconstitutional, and against provincial autonomy and ownership rights of the province under the 18th Constitution Amendment, and demanded its withdrawal.
The Act also faces legal challenges in the Balochistan High Court (BHC), with former leaders, political parties, and lawyers arguing that it violated provincial rights and undermined Balochistan’s control over its natural resources. On July 2, 2025, the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI-F) challenged the Mines and Minerals Act 2025 in the Balochistan High Court, arguing that it was detrimental to the people of Balochistan. A constitutional petition against the Act was filed by senior lawyer and Senator Kamran Murtaza, on behalf of the party’s provincial chief, Senator Maulana Abdul Wasay. While talking to the media after filing the petition, Senator Murtaza and Senator Wasay observed, “All natural resources belong to the people of Balochistan who are the real owners of these resources, and we will not allow anyone to deprive the due right of the people of Balochistan.”
On August 3, 2025, after multiple petitions from different political parties filed in BHC challenging the Mines and Minerals Act, the Court formed a two-member bench comprising Chief Justice Rozi Khan Bareech and Justice Sardar Ahmed Halimi to hear the petitions and directed the federal and provincial governments to submit their responses. The legislation has been contested by several political parties, including Awami National Party (ANP), Balochistan National Party (BNP), Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP), National Party, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), and others. The court has clubbed all petitions together for consolidated hearing.
Succumbing to intense political pressure and legal challenges, the Provincial Government withheld the Balochistan Mines and Minerals Act 2025 for further deliberation, but the timing of the introduction and passage of the Bill in the Assembly exposed its disturbing intentions. While the whole public and media attention was on the Jaffar Express hijacking (March 11-12), the Act, was quietly passed on March 14, 2025, in the Balochistan Provincial Assembly. A similar Bill, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Mines and Minerals Amendment Act 2025, proposed on April 4 in the KP Assembly, however, failed to pass scrutiny, and this sparked a national debate on the Balochistan Act as well. Otherwise, the contentious provisions of the latter would not have been re-examined.
The Balochistan Mines and Minerals Act 2025, purported to create an “internationally competitive” environment for domestic and foreign investment in the province’s mining sector. Section 22(2) establishes the Mineral Investment Facilitation Authority (MIFA), comprising provincial and federal entities, but operating under the federal Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC). Section 22(3) grants MIFA the authority to direct provincial departments, effectively centralizing control over Balochistan’s mineral resources under federal oversight. Sections 121 and 122 further assert the Act’s supremacy over existing provincial mining laws, reducing Balochistan’s role to a bystander with limited policy-making powers. The Federal Government, through the Federal Mineral Wing, gains control over critical processes, including issuing mining licenses, bidding, rents, and royalties.
Historically, Pakistan’s provinces have held authority over mineral resources under the Regulation of Mines and Oil Fields and Mineral Development Act, 1948. The 18th Amendment of 2010 reinforced this autonomy, granting provinces exclusive jurisdiction over minerals (excluding nuclear energy, oil, and gas) and setting constitutional limits on federal overreach via Article 172(3). The Balochistan Mines and Minerals Act 2025 undermines these protections, centralizing control and contradicting the spirit of provincial autonomy.
The uproar over the new mineral legislation unmasks the staggering disparity between the abundant natural resources the province possesses and the underdevelopment, both in economic growth and human life index. Balochistan is geological treasure trove, holding a significant portion of Pakistan’s mineral wealth. Among the most prominent projects is the Saindak Copper-Gold Project, operational since 2003 under the management of the Metallurgical Corporation of China. The project has produced over 120,000 metric tons of copper, approximately 2.2 tons of gold, and 4.3 tons of silver. Similarly, the Reko Diq project stands as one of the world’s largest untapped reserves, containing over 5.9 billion tons of ore with an estimated 12.3 million tons of copper and 22 million ounces of gold. The Duddar Lead-Zinc Project in Lasbela is another significant initiative, holding 1.7 million tons of lead and 2.5 million tons of zinc. Balochistan also contributes more than 50 per cent to Pakistan’s total chromite production, with estimated reserves of around 2 million tons. In terms of energy minerals, the province hosts over 217 million tons of coal in areas such as Duki, Mach, and Harnai. Iron ore reserves in Dilband alone are estimated at 165 million tons, which, if developed, could significantly reduce Pakistan’s reliance on iron imports.
Beyond metals, Balochistan is a leading producer of marble and dimension stones, including the internationally renowned Ziarat White and Black and Gold types. Marble reserves exceed one billion tons, while barite reserves are estimated at over 1.5 million tons, accounting for 90 per cent of Pakistan’s total barite production. Other significant non-metallic minerals include gypsum, fluorite, and magnesite, each with large commercial potential.
Despite this enormous natural wealth, Balochistan’s Government, local politicians and civil society organizations persistently allege neglect and an unfairly marginal share of revenues from the Federal government.
Pakistan is heavily dependent on fossil fuels, with gas accounting for 42 per cent, oil 27 per cent and coal 17 per cent of consumption. Non-fossil fuel sources such as nuclear, hydro and renewables account for just 14 per cent. This makes the economy highly vulnerable to oil and gas prices. Till 1995, Balochistan produced almost 56 per cent of Pakistan’s total output of natural gas. However, according to a September 24, 2022, report, Balochistan’s contribution has dropped to 23 per cent. Though the report did not indicate how much of this is consumed in Balochistan, according to a March 2022 report, when Balochistan’s contribution had dropped to 22.7 percent in 2017, it consumed only 5.81 percent of the country’s total output. Natural gas was discovered at Sui in Balochistan as far back as in 1952, yet vast areas of the province, including the very regions producing gas, remain without reliable access to piped natural gas. The then Balochistan Assembly Opposition Leader Malik Sikandar on January 21, 2020, argued, “they took away gas from us in the 1950s and gave it to Punjab and Sindh without even connecting it to Dera Bugti.”
Despite its immense natural endowment, Balochistan remains the poorest, least developed province in Pakistan. Over 70 per cent of Balochistan’s population lives below the poverty line, compared to the national average of around 39.5 per cent. According to the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) report of May 2024, among the four provinces of Pakistan, multidimensional poverty is highest in Balochistan. 48 per cent of the population of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 45 per cent in Sindh, and 30 per cent in Punjab subsist below the poverty line.
One of the major developmental concerns in Balochistan is the declining state of healthcare in its rural regions. Despite being the largest province of Pakistan, Balochistan remains neglected in terms of healthcare infrastructure and public welfare. Rural populations continue to suffer due to limited access to hospitals, clinics and qualified medical professionals, with most rural areas lacking skilled staff, essential medical supplies, and modern equipment. AWorld Health Organization (WHO) report unveiled on April 2, 2024, underlined significant discrepancies in Balochistan’s healthcare infrastructure. Official records claim the existence of 1,661 healthcare facilities, including hospitals and basic health units (BHUs). However, WHO’s investigation found that 257 of these facilities were non-existent on the ground. The investigation, which covered 1,404 healthcare facilities, revealed that eight were in total disrepair, yet continue to receive government funding and medical supplies. The report further noted that 140 facilities were entirely non-operational, despite significant budget allocations. Additionally, 656 facilities were partially operational, and 220 had limited accessibility.
This critical situation has led to an increase in pregnancy-related fatalities, infant deaths, and the wider spread of preventable illnesses. Balochistan has the highest infant mortality rate in South Asia, with over 66 deaths per 1,000 live births. According to a World Bank report of 2019, the infant mortality rate in Balochistan is significantly higher than the average for Pakistan, which was 48 per 1,000. Balochistan has the lowest literacy rate among Pakistan’s provinces, a disparity attributed to factors including a lack of educational infrastructure, poverty, social barriers, and a considerable gender gap in enrolment. According to the Economic Survey 2024-2025 report by Pakistan Finance Division, the provincial literacy rate is lowest in Balochistan, at 42.01 per cent (Census 2023). Punjab leads the provinces with 66.25 per cent literacy rate, followed by Sindh at over 57.54 per cent and KP at 51.09 per cent. The national literacy rate stood at 60.65 per cent in 2023.
A major contributing factor to Balochistan’s low literacy rate was the dilapidated state of educational infrastructure. A significant portion of schools in the province are in poor condition or are completely decrepit. In rural areas, many schools lack proper buildings, and classes are often held in the open air, under trees, or in temporary shelters. Many schools lack basic necessities, which creates an unwelcoming and unsafe learning environment, especially for adolescent girls. The number of schools, especially for females and at the primary level, is insufficient to meet the educational needs of the population. A 2021-22 report by the Balochistan Education Department showed that over 1,700 schools in the province were non-functional. The uncomfortable and unsafe conditions, particularly for girls, contribute to high dropout rates, especially at the secondary level.
Persistent underdevelopment, high poverty rates, and poor social indicators, despite significant natural resource wealth, have been fuelling insurgency in the province, with a sense of existential threat galvanizing the Baloch insurgency. While armed resistance has existed in various forms since Pakistan’s inception, CPEC provided a new and powerful unifying motive, as well as a high-profile target. Baloch nationalist groups argue that the project is a mechanism for China and Islamabad to entrench their exploitation.
Armed resistance has long been there in Balochistan in various forms since Pakistan’s very inception, but the current cycle escalated with the assassination of tribal elder Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2006 by Pakistan Army. The insurgency accelerated further with the advent of CPEC. Since the inception of CPEC in 2013 – a USD 65 billion Belt and Road Initiative involving highways, railways, and energy infrastructure, the province has become a battleground between the Pakistan security establishment and Baloch insurgent groups. Baloch insurgent groups, including the Baloch Raji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS), the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), the Baloch Liberation Front, and the Baloch Republican Army, among others, view CPEC as a mechanism for China and Islamabad to exploit the province’s resources, while marginalizing its people, and accuse the project of erasing Baloch culture and identity.
Violence against CPEC-related personnel has surged in recent years. A May 16, 2024, Federal Interior Ministry report noted 62 deaths in eight attacks on CPEC workers between 2020 and 2024, with incidents in Balochistan, Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Baloch Liberation Army’s Majeed Brigade has claimed responsibility for several high-profile attacks on Chinese nationals. On December 10, 2024, the National Counter Terrorism Authority reported 20 Chinese and eight Pakistani deaths, with 34 Chinese and 25 Pakistanis injured, in 14 attacks since 2021. On March 2, 2025, BRAS announced a major restructuring of its military and diplomatic strategy, declaring that it will unify its forces under a centralized command and intensify operations against Pakistan and China in Balochistan.
There has been no attack on Chinese workers or projects associated with CPEC in 2025, so far. However, on February 24, 2025, eight people, including six SF personnel, were injured in a bomb attack on a convoy of trucks guarding the copper project in the Mangochar area of Kalat District. According to an unnamed official, a convoy of 29 trucks transporting blaster copper from the Saindak project to Karachi, was targeted on the Quetta-Karachi National Highway in Mangochar. The officials said no Chinese nationals were traveling in the convoy.
According to partial data compiled from open-source reports by SATP, since July 19, 2007, at least 17 attacks directly targeting Chinese nationals have been recorded in Pakistan (12 in Balochistan, three in Sindh and two in KP), resulting in 87 deaths (data till September 28, 2025). The dead included 19 Chinese nationals, 13 Pakistani SF personnel, 42 Pakistani civilians and 13 attackers. Another, 66 persons, including six Chinese nationals, were injured in these attacks. Out of two attacks reported in KP, one attack was claimed by TTP. One attack on a Chinese national in Karachi involved the Sindhi nationalist group, the Sindh Revolutionary Army (SRA).
Pakistan’s dire economic situation has forced it to look beyond China for investment, and Balochistan’s minerals are the most significant available resource to attract foreign investment. The Pakistan Minerals Investment Forum 2025 (PMIF25), held on April 8-9,2025, in Islamabad, hosted 300 foreign delegates to showcase the country’s mineral potential. Organized with the Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL), the forum aimed to position Pakistan as a key player in the global minerals market. Amid US tariff disputes with China, which dominates 90 per cent of the world’s rare earth production, Pakistan’s proximity to the US – strengthened after the May 2025 Indo-Pak ‘war’ – has made it an attractive partner. A US delegation, led by Eric Meyer of the State Department’s Bureau of Central and South Asian Affairs, visited Islamabad during PMIF25, to explore investment opportunities, suggesting the Act’s rushed passage in March was strategically timed to facilitate foreign access to Balochistan’s resources.
Meanwhile, on August 26, 2025, while renewing its appeal for international support in what it describes as the “Baloch national war of liberation,” BLF declared that its struggle was a defensive resistance against Pakistani subjugation and aimed solely at achieving the right to self-determination. BLF strongly condemned the US for entering into new agreements with Pakistan for the mining of Balochistan’s mineral wealth. According to Gwahram Baloch, Washington’s decision was “a grave injustice,” contradicting its claims of being a global champion of democracy and human rights. He warned, “Balochistan will become a quagmire for anyone who partners with Pakistan in the plunder of our resources. China is already a failed example.”
The BLF also extended its warning to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, urging both nations to avoid investing in Balochistan.
The suspension of the Balochistan Mines and Minerals Act 2025, under pressure of political parties as well as judicial compulsion, is a tactical retreat, not a change of heart. It once again exposes Federal Government’s sinister design and enduring impulse to control and plunder Baloch natural resources for the Punjabis, who the Baloch have come to consider as the enemies of Baloch interests. Though the battle has been won for the time being, the greater war for the Baloch rights remains.
