On November 4, 2025, at least four Kuki militants associated with the United Kuki National Army (UKNA) were killed and another one was injured in an encounter with the Indian Army at Khanpi village under the Henglep Subdivision of Churachandpur District in Manipur, along the Manipur-Myanmar border. According to defence sources, the encounter began when terrorists opened unprovoked fire on the Army column. The operation, led to the recovery of four weapons, including one AK-56 rifle, one M4A1 carbine, ammunition, and other warlike stores. Six UKNA cadres were also arrested during the operation. Five of the arrestees were later identified as Paolonlal Kipgen (30), Kamlalien (23), L Longkhel Singsit (26), Thangsawan (14), and Kangjipao (37).
Earlier, on October 27, 2025, a village chief identified as M. Haokip (50) was killed after being attacked by suspected UKNA militants at T. Khonomphai village under the Henglep Sub-division in Churachandpur District.
On July 22, 2025, at least five UKNA militants were reportedly killed and two were injured at the UKNA’s Dabeijang camp under the Khoupum Police Station in the Tamenglong District, near the Assam-Nagaland border, in a factional gunfight between UKNA cadres and the Chin Kuki Mizo Army (CKMA) – both non-signatories to the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement with the Centre. The deceased militants were identified as Alex, Seiboi, Pongba, Ringo, and Rambo.
On June 30, 2025, in another suspected case of factional violence, four persons – including three Kuki National Army (KNA) cadres and a civilian – were killed by heavily armed cadres of UKNA at K. Mongjang village in Churachandpur District. The deceased were identified as ‘deputy commander-in-chief’ of KNA Thangboi Haokip aka Thahpi aka Thenkhothang, two of his bodyguards identified as Thahpi Seikhogin (34) and Lengouhao (35), and a woman bystander identified as Phalhing (72). More than 12 empty 5.56mm shells were recovered from the spot.
According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), there have been at least four UKNA-related incidents of violence in 2025, leading to 14 fatalities (12 terrorists and two civilians). There were two such incidents in 2024, resulting in two fatalities (both terrorists). No UKNA related violent incidents were recorded in 2023. This sharp escalation reflects the outfit’s resurgence in the wake of renewed ethnic polarisation and inter-group rivalries since the crisis of 2023.
Some other significant recent incidents include:
October 1, 2024: The ‘public relations officer’ of UKNA, Satkhohau Haokip, was found dead at Leishang village in Churachandpur District. Bullet injuries were found on the body and was reported that he had been abducted from his residence in Kaprang village under the Tuibong Block of Churachandpur District by unknown armed assailants in the intervening night of September 30 and October 1.
May 5, 2024: A UKNA ‘camp commander’, Thangminlal Haokip (39) aka Hunter aka Tamin, was shot dead by his own bodyguard at Geljang village in Old Nabil near Leimatak, under Henglep Police station in Churachandpur District. Sources disclosed that Thangminlal Haokip was allegedly involved in the attack on oil and gas tankers on the Imphal-Jiribam NH-37 near Kaimai, on April 16.
In a statement issued on April 17, 2024, UKNA claimed responsibility for a highway attack, which targeted supply convoys ferrying essential goods and fuel to Imphal. The outfit’s ‘defense secretary’ stated that the assault was a “first offensive operation” against the alleged movement of materials in support of the Meitei community. One tanker driver was injured in the attack. The UKNA further warned that no Imphal-bound goods vehicles should operate along NH-37, reflecting the group’s attempt to enforce an economic blockade and disrupt state logistics as a pressure tactic.
Collectively, these incidents trace a consistent trajectory of the UKNA’s renewed operational assertiveness.
UKNA represents one of the most active armed groups operating in Manipur’s ethnic insurgency landscape. The group became active following the ethnic clashes between the Meiteis and the Kuki-Zos that broke out in May 2023. Emerging from the complex socio-political matrix of Kuki sub-nationalism, the organization has been implicated in a series of violent incidents, factional confrontations, and organized extortion activities along the Indo-Myanmar border. The UKNA’s ideological orientation is anchored in Kuki ethnonationalism, which seeks to assert the political and territorial rights of the Kuki-Zo community within the context of the larger Indo-Myanmar frontier. However, its activities in 2025, as documented through multiple armed engagements, reveal a transformation from ideological militancy toward predatory violence, extortion, and internecine conflict.
UKNA is an armed Kuki-Zo outfit operating primarily in Manipur’s hill districts, particularly in Churachandpur and adjoining border areas. Formed in 2015, the group claims to fight for the protection of Kuki interests and the establishment of a separate administrative arrangement for the Kuki-Zo people.
Emerging amid growing fragmentation within Kuki insurgent formations, the UKNA drew several former cadres from the Kuki National Army (KNA) and smaller local outfits. Its founding leadership reportedly included self-styled ‘chairman’ Thanglun Haokip and ‘commander-in-chief’ Paokhothang Kipgen, both long-time insurgent figures with prior involvement in earlier Kuki armed movements. The outfit operates largely outside the SoO framework, maintaining autonomous command and control structures, and its leadership has leveraged cross-border networks in Myanmar for arms procurement and mobility.
While earlier armed organisations of the Kuki-Zo community often engaged with the Indian state in cease-fire and peace-process frameworks, the UKNA appears to reject such accommodation – it is not a signatory to the SoO and has repeatedly engaged in violence both against rival insurgent groups and the security forces. Since its formation, the UKNA has combined militant tactics, criminalised revenue generation and inter-group rivalry, making it a complex actor in Manipur’s hill insurgency. Its decision to remain outside the SoO accords implies a rejection of the formal constraints of weapons’ storage and camp restrictions that signatory groups must abide by – thus giving it greater operational autonomy, but less legitimacy in negotiated politics.
Significantly, the renewed SoO Accord in mid-2025 – extended between the Centre, the Manipur Government, and 24 Kuki-Zo groups – aimed to restore calm amid ongoing ethnic unrest. Yet, its limited impact is evident in the continued violence by non-signatory outfits like the UKNA. UKNA exploits the security vacuum to expand its influence through intimidation, extortion, and armed offensives. Its defiance of the truce highlights a deepening divide within Kuki militancy, where signatory groups engage in dialogue while hard-line factions such as UKNA sustain armed violence.
The UKNA’s operations appear to straddle three overlapping rationales: ethnic assertion of Kuki-Zo identity; competition with other Kuki armed outfits; and criminalised revenue generation in areas of limited state presence.
By remaining outside the SoO framework, UKNA has positioned itself as a “hard-line” formation that, in terms of its tactics, combines ambushes, targeted assassinations, extortion and confrontations with security forces.
The UKNA’s interactions with civilian governance structures are increasingly coercive. In October 2025, it issued a diktat banning all sports and entertainment in Kuki-Zo areas from November 1, onwards, alleging that celebratory activities were disrespectful to the “martyrs” of the group.
UKNA’s trajectory since 2024 underscores the resurgence of hard-line Kuki militancy amid the fragile ethnic equilibrium in Manipur. From its initial highway attacks to inter-factional clashes and confrontations with SFs, the group’s operational footprint reveals a shift from political militancy to violent opportunism. Its refusal to join the SoO framework reflects both ideological rigidity and the pursuit of unrestrained autonomy in revenue generation and territorial dominance. UKNA’s actions – marked by ambushes, assassinations, and coercive diktats – have deepened insecurity in the Hill Districts and complicated peace-building efforts. As the state grapples with overlapping insurgent and ethnic fault lines, UKNA’s rise exemplifies how unaddressed grievances, fractured negotiations, and militarised identities continue to fuel cycles of violence, creating a formidable challenge to stability and inclusive governance in Manipur’s borderland frontier.
