The US is aggressively promoting its new, so far untested, prototype tank, the M1E3. The Army says it is revolutionary, takes advantage of the latest technology, and solves the problems encountered in Ukraine. But the new tank is only halfway there. It is not robotic.
Every army today is challenged by new battlefield conditions. The massive armor losses in Ukraine, including some of the latest and greatest western tanks, including the Abrams main battle tank, have exposed significant vulnerabilities and rendered modern tanks far less effective and survivable.
For the Abrams tank, of the initial batch of 31 Abrams tanks, 87% were destroyed in Ukraine.
German-made Leopard tanks also were not successful. 70% of German 2A6 tanks, among the most modern of the series, were knocked out of action. Leopard 2A4’s also did not do well.
Russian tanks (used by Russia and Ukraine) also fared poorly, partly due to foolish deployments by Russian commanders who were obliged to stay on roadways and suffered multiple ambushes.
Before the war the consensus of experts was that the Leopard tank was the best in the world, followed closely by the Abrams. Both tank models fell victim to anti-tank weapons, mines (including air dropped mines) and drones.
In the war, especially in the first year or two, western anti-tank weapons, especially the US FGM-148 Javelin and the British-Swedish NLAW were highly effective against Russian tanks mostly because the missiles fired by these weapons could attack the main tank weak point, namely the turret (using somewhat different methodologies, the Javelin could pop up into the air and hit the turret from the top, while the NLAW would explode close to the top of the turret). Both are fire and forget weapons.
The Russian shoulder-fired anti-tank weapon, especially the AT-14 Kornet, has good range, and can laser designate a target, but the shooter has to operate the Kornet until it hits the target, exposing the shooter to significant risk. The AT-14 has a powerful tandem warhead designed to break through armor. The Kornet destroyed Abrams, Leopard and, in one case, the British wonder-tank, the Challenger (that was more a liability than a game changer in Ukraine).
Russia started to shift to using airborne weapons against armor. By 2023 when Ukraine launched a major offensive intending to sever the “land bridge” connecting Russia to Crimea by pushing south to the Sea of Azov, specifically targeting the cities of Melitopol and Berdyansk, the Russians used static tank traps and obstacles (the Surovikin line) and various weapons including helicopters firing anti-tank rockets. Ukraine lost an estimated 500 to 550 vehicles along the southern and eastern axes. Approximately 90–100 tanks were lost (destroyed, damaged, or abandoned), over 200 infantry fighting vehicles (like the Bradley) and armored personnel carriers were hit. The Russians also took out specialized engineering gear, such as the Leopard 2R and Wisent, which Ukraine needed to breach the Surovikin line.
Russia next turned to drones, including the very effective ZALA Lancet loitering munition. The Lancet is credited with damaging or destroying hundreds of high-value Ukrainian targets, including M777 howitzers, Leopard 2 tanks, S-300 radar systems, and even parked MiG-29 fighter jets at airbases over 50 km from the front.
Today the battlefield is saturated with drones and tanks and other armor can be destroyed by drone strikes and, more recently, by drones deploying mines from the air.
The new Abrams replacement is supposed to overcome all the shortcomings of the Abrams and other western tanks.
A Closer look at the M1E3
The M1E3 is a lot lighter than the Abrams. The Abrams models weigh between 68 and 74 tons, not counting bolt-on parts such as reactive armor, active protection systems, or cope cages. The M-E3 is a lot lighter, around 60 tons, putting it in the class of the long retired M-60, which approached 57 tons. The weight reduction is intended to improve range and endurance and allow the tank to operate in muddy fields, a problem for the ultra-heavy Abrams.
One presumes the armor of the M1E3 has been improved, but the Army has not said anything on that score. Armor was regarded as a big advantage of the Abrams that featured a classified composite armor that evolved from the British-developed Chobham armor. In a lighter tank, weight reduction comes primarily from reducing armor thickness. It could be that the M1-E3 is trading off its other defensive systems for armor, but it is impossible to know that now.
The M1-E3 entirely replaces the Abrams tank power plant with a hybrid-electric system that relies on a Cummings diesel engine. The Abrams uses a Lycoming turbine (jet) engine, which generates 1,500 hp but is fuel-hungry. The M1-E3 does not have to run its engine when the tank is at idle, relying instead on batteries for internal power. The Army has not reported yet on the Cummings engine’s horsepower, but it is probably half that of the Abrams. The tank probably has plenty of torque, because the diesel drives the electric motors that power the tank. Electric engines can deliver torque to running wheels almost instantly.
Years ago Israel’s leading tank expert, General Israel Tal, told me that speed was not the important thing for a tank. Instead it was the ability to accelerate very quickly, which is important to avoid an incoming enemy shell or rocket. In cars, this is often thought of as how fast you can go from zero to 60 mph. The M1-E2 on paper should have very fast acceleration, only limited by the power train itself.
Unlike almost all the tanks used in Ukraine (save some Russian experiments that did not pan out), the M1-E3 will have a built-in active protection system (APS). The Army says a built in system is lighter than a bolt-on one, such as Israel’s Trophy APS. On the other hand, a built-in system is more difficult to modify while a bolt-on one can be updated easily. How this will count in real world operations remains to be seen.
There are two key features of the M1-E3 that deserve special notice. The first is that the M1-E3 is the first American tank with an auto-loader. Shells (and shell types) can be selected by the auto-loader without a tank operator having to lift and move a 50 lb. projectile. The Russians have had auto-loaders for about 60 years, but auto-loaders were poo-pooed by the US Army as not worthy of a good tank operator and anyway were used by “them Russians.”
The second big change is that none of the 3-man crew (compared to the Abrams 4-man crew) will be located in the turret, considered the most vulnerable part of the tank. This apparently helps simplify armor protection for the crew, since they will all be in one place. However, if armor protection on the turret is reduced, what happens if the crew has to evacuate the tank? One of the better features of the Abrams tank is that many tank crews, after the tank was hit, have been able to get out of the tank. Of course the best solution is the one Israel adopted, which is a rear door. But a rear door is not possible on most western tanks because the power pack (including engine and transmission) are in the back of the tank. Israel’s Merkava reversed that and put the engine in the front.
The new tank has the latest sensors, radars, jammers, and 3-D view screen for the crew. One presumes that the tank is integrated with other tanks, but that is not yet clear. What is odd, though, is why any crew is needed at all. Since the crew is only seeing the outside environment through screens, and is depending on cameras and other sensors for situational awareness, putting a tank crew outside of the tank (located somewhere else) seems a very realistic option. Doing so would immediately reduce the amount of armor protection needed and create an agile armor force that could prove adaptable to drone-supplied situational data, target identification, obstacle avoidance, and a better ability to collaborate with other armor, artillery, drones and command and control.
Will it Work?
The new tank is being shown around before any testing of its core systems and operational concepts. If the tests are done right, more will be learned about the tank’s utility, effectiveness and survivability.
The battlefield in Ukraine is fast evolving, as new technology including artificial intelligence, improves weapons and battlefield command and control. The introduction of FPV fiber optic drones also is a game changer, as these drones cannot be jammed. In turn this may stimulate a new generation of obscurants and dazzlers, aimed at making drone targeting more difficult.
The US is poised on investing hundreds of billions of dollars in an experimental tank that is half-way on the road to something new. One wonders why the Army did not ask Elon Musk to design a tank around Starlink and Tesla’s evolving self-driving software? Likewise, why not a fully robotic system that might be far cheaper than the standard heavy armor approach?
To Tank or Not to Tank remains an open question.
