Amidst the prevailing course of geopolitics, allies are shifting, and agreements are being made for the vital national interest. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the Netherlands is a segment of this trend. Before, India’s foreign policy was focused on larger European countries such as France and Germany; however, the spectrum of this limited policy posture is now extended to other European countries as well to expand the strategic and economic horizon.
During the two-day visit, which started on May 16, discussions have been made on multiple sectors, including security, innovation, green hydrogen, semiconductors, and strategic partnerships on water. India perceives this visit as getting primary support in the technological domain, while the Netherlands intends to secure a larger consumer market for its products and technological export. Alongside it, New Delhi is also looking for ways to reduce dependence on the United States through tariff-free cooperation in sectors like energy, artificial intelligence, and semiconductors.
Hague views India as a crucial partner within their China+1 strategy, while amidst the geopolitical tension between China and the West, which continues to rise, many Dutch companies are seeking to reduce their dependence on China by geographically diversifying production and investment. However, the structural problem persists within the Indian domestic market; it is still heavily reliant on foreign technology to fill domestic needs, and the indigenization ambition is under the Viksit Bharat agenda 2047. Therefore, India’s premier visit was sold as a strategic breakthrough, but the reality is far more ordinary.
New Delhi and The Hague’s “Strategic Partnership” and 2026–2030 roadmap sound impressive; however, they mostly repackage predictable cooperation already visible in trade, technology, and diplomacy. The bilateral trade volume between the two countries is $27.8 billion (2024-25), and India is the 4th largest investor with cumulative Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) of $55.6 billion. Looking at the potential of these two countries, it is highly unlikely that the cooperation between India and the Netherlands will convert into a strategic dimension, as both countries prioritize playing it safe and not putting all the eggs in one basket. Strategic partnerships need continued convergence of interest; therefore, the 17 agreements, from semiconductors to green hydrogen, read more like intent statements than proof of delivery.
In addition, India’s Tata Electronics and Dutch ASML have signed an agreement to build a semiconductor plant. The agreement was made in the presence of Dutch Prime Minister Rob Jetten and Narendra Modi, and it is significant in its nature, as a semiconductor has wide importance not only in the tech domain but also as a part of the national security strategy. India has long dominated software services and has high footprints in the information technology sector worldwide. However, the agreement indicates that India’s domestic industries can fill the gap left by foreign technological support.
The groundbreaking $11 billion investment includes lithography technology in the factory to make 300 millimeter wafers; however, its effects are not limited to the economic sector only, but it is also an attempt to reshape the competitive landscape. The technological breakthrough by India is causing a digital and economic imbalance for neighboring Pakistan, and this will create a new race between these countries in the semiconductor domain.
At the same time, it is an expression of India’s complicated pivot policy in the new geopolitical landscape, especially in the context of the BRICS group. Even as New Delhi is an active member of the grouping of five emerging economies known as the BRICS, it is working on a diversification of its alliances, which it wishes to use as a way to defend itself against the growing influence of China. India’s strategic alliances with Europe through high-tech, tariff-free agreements make it the leading “China+1” competitor.
It is now evident that this diplomatic maneuvering illustrates that the contemporary multipolar world is no longer formed by rigid blocks but by fluid and strategic networks shaped by technological sovereignty. However, India’s transition of its relationship from just economic to strategic still needs a pragmatic inquiry, and upon conclusion, the convergence of interests does not fulfill such criteria, but it is the diplomatic maneuver to fill its domestic structural flaws.
