A sweeping shift in European public opinion toward the United States has been revealed in new survey data highlighted by Die Zeit, capturing what analysts describe as a rapid erosion of trust in the transatlantic alliance since Donald Trump returned to the White House around a year and a half ago. The findings, based on a large-scale poll conducted across 15 European countries, suggest that long-standing assumptions about American reliability as Europe’s security guarantor are weakening at a pace not seen in the post-war era.
At the centre of the survey, carried out in May 2026 by the European Council on Foreign Relations with 19,400 respondents, is a stark statistic: only 11 percent of Europeans now describe the United States as an “ally.” In 2024, that figure was roughly twice as high. The data points to a broader transformation in perception, with half of respondents now viewing Trump’s America as merely a “necessary partner,” while a quarter go further, describing it as a “rival” or even an “enemy.”
The backdrop to this shift is a period marked by repeated political tension between Washington and European capitals. Since returning to office, Trump has threatened to annex Greenland, announced plans to withdraw US troops from Europe, imposed tariffs on allied countries as a form of pressure, and repeatedly raised the prospect of the United States leaving NATO. These actions, combined with a confrontational tone toward European governments, form the context in which trust has sharply declined.
The transatlantic relationship, once framed as the cornerstone of Western security, was built over decades of cooperation dating back to the founding of NATO in 1949 and the post-war Marshall Plan. For much of the Cold War and beyond, the assumption held that the United States would act as Europe’s ultimate security backstop in times of crisis. That assumption, the survey suggests, is now increasingly questioned by European publics.
The erosion of confidence is not limited to symbolic attitudes but extends to core questions of security. A majority of respondents across Europe now doubt that the United States would come to their country’s defense in the event of an attack. This skepticism has been reinforced by Trump’s public questioning of NATO’s mutual defense commitments and his remarks suggesting that countries spending too little on defense might not expect American protection. The survey also reflects perceptions shaped by US military action in the Middle East, undertaken without consultation with European leaders, which many respondents interpret as evidence of a more unilateral American foreign policy.
At the institutional level, NATO’s credibility appears under strain. Although Article 5 of the NATO treaty is often understood as a guarantee of collective defense, the text allows member states to take actions they deem necessary rather than mandating automatic military response. Historically, deterrence relied on the belief that the United States would fight alongside its allies if necessary. The weakening of that belief is now central to European concerns about future security arrangements.
The impact is particularly pronounced among countries geographically closer to Russia. States such as Poland and Estonia are increasing defense spending as fears over potential aggression intensify. At the same time, survey responses show that many Europeans still place trust in intra-European solidarity, with majorities in most countries believing they would receive support from neighboring European states in the event of a crisis. This sense of European mutual reliance appears strongest in countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden.
One of the most striking shifts revealed by the data is growing public support for the idea of European strategic autonomy, including discussions about a shared nuclear deterrent. According to the survey, support for a European nuclear umbrella has increased in several countries, particularly Italy and Denmark, while Germany has also seen a rise in backing for the concept. The debate has been amplified by experts quoted in Die Zeit, including Ukrainian historian Serhii Plokhy of Harvard University, who noted that if countries with limited economic capacity such as North Korea could develop nuclear weapons, technologically advanced states like Germany would also have the capability. He also referenced estimates suggesting that up to 40 countries could potentially develop nuclear weapons within a few years if they chose to pursue them.
Alongside security concerns, the survey highlights shifting preferences in defense procurement. A majority of Europeans now favor reducing reliance on US weapons systems and instead purchasing military equipment from European partners. This preference is especially strong in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden, where more than 70 percent of respondents support a move toward European suppliers. Poland stands out as an exception, where a majority still favors purchasing US weaponry, a position linked in the report to the country’s domestic political climate.
The question of funding defense increases also reveals significant divisions. While many Europeans support higher defense spending, there is widespread resistance to funding it through cuts to social programs, healthcare, or pensions. In countries such as Italy, this trade-off is particularly unpopular, with military spending often perceived as a competing claim on already strained public resources. Across Europe, nearly half of respondents instead favor financing defense investments through common European debt instruments, signaling support for collective rather than national fiscal solutions.
The issue of Ukraine further exposes fractures in European public opinion. While many respondents still view Ukraine as a partner or ally, attitudes vary sharply across political lines, with supporters of right-wing populist parties more likely to describe Ukraine as a rival or adversary. When asked about concrete policy steps, Europeans are divided on sending troops for post-war peacekeeping missions, and opinions on EU membership for Ukraine vary widely between countries, with strong support in parts of Western and Northern Europe and significant opposition in others, including Hungary, Bulgaria, and Austria.
Despite these divisions, the survey also captures a degree of cautious optimism about the future of transatlantic relations. A narrow majority of respondents believe that once Donald Trump eventually leaves office, relations between Europe and the United States could stabilize again. For now, however, the data presented by the European Council on Foreign Relations and reported in Die Zeit depicts a continent reassessing its place in a rapidly shifting security landscape, where long-held assumptions about American protection are no longer taken for granted.
