The warning comes as tensions between the Ethiopian Government’s National Defense Force (ENDF) and the ethno-nationalist Tigray’s Liberation Front (TPLF) have escalated in recent weeks, with a drone strike on the city of Mekelle, nestled in the south-east of the Tigray region in Ethiopia, marking the most recent incident. The development follows months of clashes between the two forces, which have been massing troops along the border of the Tigray region and the rest of Ethiopia.
The possibility of renewed war is particularly significant because the previous conflict, fought between 2020 and 2022, was devastating. The Tigray War left 600,000 Ethiopians dead and millions more displaced before the Pretoria Peace Agreement brought the fighting to an end in 2022. That fragile peace held until 2025, when renewed low-level clashes between the two forces began to flare again.
The Soufan Center, which analysed the developing tensions, warns that a new conflict could be considerably more complicated than the previous war because the regional alliances surrounding Ethiopia and Tigray have changed. The original conflict had already drawn in neighbouring Eritrea, which supported the ENDF while seeking to neutralise the TPLF threat along its border. But Eritrea was excluded from the Pretoria Agreement, contributing to worsening relations between Asmara and Ethiopia’s federal government.
Those tensions have since deepened. Eritrea has moved towards fully backing the TPLF in its operations against Addis Ababa, creating the possibility that a renewed Ethiopian-Tigrayan confrontation could quickly become part of a wider regional struggle.
The latest escalation has provided evidence of how rapidly that alignment could develop. On August 3, senior Eritrean military members crossed into Ethiopian territory, carrying Eritrean flags in the border town of Zalambesa. Three days later, a formal coalition between the TPLF and the Eritrean government known as “Tsimdo” deployed tanks and heavy weaponry into the Tigray region. Fighting subsequently erupted in Western Tigray, with the ENDF and TPLF disputing responsibility for initiating the clash.
Many experts assess that the simmering tensions could eventually boil over into renewed conflict, effectively ending the Pretoria Agreement. Yet the significance of such a war would extend beyond the original battlefield. Since 2022, the TPLF has developed new alliances with regional actors dissatisfied with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his increasingly assertive regional policies.
At the centre of those tensions is Ethiopia’s ambition to regain access to the Red Sea. Abiy has repeatedly asserted his country’s historic “right” to access the sea through Eritrea, a position that has aggravated relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara. Egypt, meanwhile, has its own serious dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile and three additional planned hydropower dams.
The dispute has particular importance for Egypt because the waterway provides about 85 percent of its fresh water. Concerns have also grown in Egypt and Sudan over how Ethiopia will manage downstream water releases. Cairo has consequently maintained close relations with Eritrea, supporting Asmara in its disputes with Addis Ababa and viewing Ethiopia’s ambitions along the Red Sea as a challenge to Egypt’s regional position.
Saudi Arabia shares Egypt’s concerns. Riyadh has a long-standing relationship with Eritrea, dating back to support for its independence during the Cold War and its backing of Eritrea during its dispute with Yemen in the 1990s over the Hanish Islands. The strategic importance of the Red Sea has grown further amid Washington’s war with Tehran and the subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
The security of the Red Sea is also affected by the conflict involving Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthis. Repeated attacks on commercial vessels and threats of blockades around the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint have caused severe disruptions. The Red Sea carries substantial global tanker and container traffic, meaning disruption has produced higher insurance costs for shipping companies, supply-chain delays and a direct impact on global trade.
The regional contest is further complicated by competition between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. While Saudi Arabia and Egypt back Eritrea through strategic geopolitical alignment, diplomatic mediation and infrastructure investments, the UAE has invested heavily in Ethiopia and provided military assistance to Addis Ababa. The competing relationships have made the Horn of Africa an arena for wider strategic rivalry.
Ethiopia and the UAE are also connected through their support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan’s civil war. The UAE is described by the Soufan Center as the main backer of the RSF, while the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have accused Ethiopia of allowing the RSF to establish bases and training camps in its western region and of facilitating UAE weapons shipments.
A renewed Ethiopia-Tigray war could therefore pull together a network of actors already connected through overlapping conflicts and rivalries. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Eritrea, the Somali Federal Government and the SAF would likely align with the TPLF against Addis Ababa, while the UAE and RSF would be more inclined to support the ENDF.
Cameron Hudson, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), told France24 that such a conflict could escalate into “Africa’s second world war.”
For Washington, the stakes would be unusually high. The United States has a long-standing interest in deterring conflict in the Horn of Africa while managing relations between two important regional partners, the UAE and Saudi Arabia. A conflict that spilled into the Red Sea could also generate significant economic consequences at a time when the global economy has already been severely affected by the Iran War.
Washington has recently shown renewed interest in reducing tensions in the region. In May, it lifted five-year-old sanctions on Eritrea in an effort to stabilise Red Sea shipping lanes and ease friction between Asmara and Addis Ababa.
But if hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea intensify and develop into a proxy war, the United States would face a difficult balancing act between competing Gulf partners whose cooperation it needs as the war with Iran continues. What began as renewed tension between the ENDF and TPLF could therefore become something considerably larger: a regional confrontation with consequences stretching from the Horn of Africa to the Red Sea and, potentially, the wider global economy.
