In Gori, a provincial Georgian city better known as the birthplace of Joseph Stalin, dozens of bullet marks remain visible on the façade of the town hall, physical scars from the fighting between Georgian and Russian forces in 2008. Russian troops eventually withdrew after nine days of occupation, but their presence did not disappear from Georgia. Russian units remain deployed about 20 kilometres from Gori, while the internationally recognised Russian border lies roughly 100 kilometres away. Between them is South Ossetia, a Georgian separatist region, alongside Abkhazia, another territory outside Tbilisi’s control. Together, the two regions account for about 20% of Georgia’s territory under Russian occupation.
The comparison with Ukraine, however, has clear limits. Abkhazia and South Ossetia are home to national minorities involved in sovereignty disputes with Georgia that have lasted for more than a century. Apart from the brief 2008 war, which lasted about a week and enabled both self-proclaimed independent republics to expand their territory with Moscow’s military support, the conflicts have remained largely frozen for more than three decades. That relative stability has not erased resentment in Georgia, where anti-Russian graffiti remains common. “The situation is tense, but there is no military mobilisation, nor is a return to hostilities expected,” said Kaja Gogolashvili, a researcher at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies.
The most persistent tensions are along the boundary with South Ossetia. Since the 2008 offensive, Russian forces have installed fences and demarcation lines, in some cases gradually extending the territory under their control. The barriers have disrupted the lives of people in neighbouring villages, with some residents finding their agricultural land divided by fencing. Approaching the new demarcation line or a Russian checkpoint can result in arrest, or what Georgian media commonly describe as a “kidnapping”. According to a report by Georgia’s Public Defender, 72 people were detained in 2025. The boundary remains particularly hazardous for about 30,000 Georgians living nearby because its precise location is not always clear or fixed.
Yet tensions between Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, and Tbilisi have declined in recent years. Alik Puhati, an Ossetian blogger, attributes the calmer atmosphere to the Georgian Dream government and improved relations between Tbilisi and Moscow. “Since Georgian Dream has been in power, there is greater calm. Relations with Moscow have improved. There will be no other war with them,” he said. But closer Georgian-Russian ties have also created unease in South Ossetia, where Puhati says there are fears that Russia could use the territory as a bargaining card in negotiations with Georgia.
Eleonora Tafuro, an expert at the Italian analysis centre ISPI, rejects that possibility, arguing that even Georgian Dream does not seek such an outcome. South Ossetia has fewer than 60,000 inhabitants, while North Ossetia-Alania, across the Russian border, has more than 700,000. Puhati says most people favour unification with Russia, describing the boundary between the two Ossetias as artificial. Moscow, however, does not currently appear interested in formal annexation, perhaps to avoid closing channels with Tbilisi, and instead favours a status quo that already gives it effective control.
Abkhazia presents a more complicated relationship with Moscow. Tafuro says Abkhaz society wants independence rather than absorption by Russia, either politically or economically. Protests in Sukhumi in 2024 against an agreement granting broad privileges to Russian investors forced regional president Aslan Bzhania to resign, while his successor, Badra Gunba, withdrew the legislation. Relations between Abkhazia and Georgia are also somewhat more fluid than those involving South Ossetia, with greater humanitarian and commercial contacts.
The strategic importance of Abkhazia, however, has grown because of the war in Ukraine. Russia has maintained a permanent military base there since 2009, while a second base for “technical support” to its Black Sea fleet was announced in 2025. Despite the continuing political deadlock, civil society contacts remain possible. Peace-building organisations such as the Berghof Foundation have continued dialogue efforts despite deep mistrust and the lack of progress in the Geneva talks.
Christian Horváth-Stenner, who leads those projects, said social-level dialogue has produced progress even as formal negotiations remain stalled. Tafuro likewise sees little movement at the Geneva table but warns that circumstances could change. Russia, she argues, is a patron currently facing financial weakness, which could alter the balance. For Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the unresolved conflicts therefore remain not only territorial disputes but potential pressure points whose future could depend heavily on Moscow’s changing capacity and interests.
