On 22 September 2026, the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) – a banned Baloch ethno-nationalist separatist group in Pakistan, waging an insurgency in Balochistan, allegedly from bases in Afghanistan – claimed that its newly formed all-female unit, the Karima Armed Assault Division (KAAD), carried out its first armed operation near Jusak in the Turbat tehsil (revenue unit) of Kech District in Balochistan. According to BLF spokesperson ‘major’ Gwahram Baloch, KAAD fighters ambushed a Pakistani military Action Task Force (ATF) convoy on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Highway. The group stated that the attack damaged military vehicles and left several ATF personnel dead or injured, though it did not release specific casualty figures. At the same time, the BLF’s media wing Aashob released training footage showing more than 20 uniformed women handling heavy weapons in mountainous terrain.
In a subsequent statement demarcating KAAD’s objectives, the BLF declared that its female fighters would operate on dual fronts: militarily against the Pakistani Army, intelligence agencies and military infrastructure, and socially against patriarchy, class exploitation and what the organisation terms regressive traditions within Baloch society. The statement positions KAAD as both an operational combat formation and a deliberate ideological project. BLF portrays its female members as predominantly highly educated and politically conscious, leveraging their involvement to frame insurgency as an intellectual and political movement rather than a purely armed or tribal uprising. It further contends that women’s participation bolsters the movement’s legitimacy and helps transcend regional, tribal and sectarian divides. KAAD, named after the prominent Baloch activist Karima Baloch, a former chairperson of the Baloch Students Organisation (BSO-Azad), whose death in suspicious circumstances in Toronto, Canada, in December 2020 became a significant rallying point, is presented by the BLF as an organised unit that combines armed, political, ideological and organisational roles.
The formation of KAAD forms part of a wider strategic and political shift within the BLF in 2025-2026. For years, the group had largely avoided both suicide operations and the systematic recruitment of female fighters. This stood in contrast to the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), another Baloch ethnonationalist militant organisation, whose Majeed Brigade had first popularised high-visibility suicide attacks from 2022 onward, as well as the use of female operatives in those missions. The BLF only began employing female suicide operatives later, with its first confirmed case on November 30, 2025, and subsequently formalised this change by creating KAAD as a competitive response to BLA’s tactics. BLA’s methods had generated significant media attention, prompting the BLF leadership under Allah Nazar Baloch to adjust its approach, while also seeking to expand the group’s operational scope.
In 2025, on November 30, Zareena Rafiq, aka Tarang Maho/Trang Mahoo, associated with the BLF-formed Saddo Operational Battalion (SOB), carried out a suicide attack on the Frontier Corps (FC) headquarters in Nokundi, Chagai District of Balochistan. BLF presented this as its first use of a female suicide bomber. The attack resulted in the death of at least one FC trooper and injuries to several others, though casualty figures remain contested. The involvement of a relatively small number of Baloch women in armed and suicide operations has drawn significant attention. SOB is named after Commander Waja Sado aka Saadat Marri / Sado Marri, a veteran Baloch fighter born in 1927 who participated in earlier phases of Baloch resistance during the 1960s, 1970s and later years. He was killed on December 3, 2007, during an attack on an FC post in Kech. BLF messaging describes SOB recruits as highly motivated volunteers selected for discipline and a willingness to undertake high-risk operations. It is labelled as an evolutionary step that moves the BLF beyond traditional guerrilla tactics toward more professional, high-intensity special operations.
Although KAAD and SOB are operational units within BLF, they feature distinctly different structural frameworks and roles. Unlike KAAD, which is an exclusively female unit, SOB is not restricted to women. It includes male members and functions as an elite mixed-gender formation designed for complex, high-intensity missions.
As the South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) noted earlier, the participation of Baloch women in insurgent groups, including as female fidayeen (suicide) attackers, has become increasingly prominent in recent years. Women in Balochistan have been prominent in non-violent political activism over the past decade. Much of this activism has centred on issues of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, reflecting a parallel but distinct form of mobilisation within Baloch society. The first confirmed use of a female suicide bomber by a Baloch insurgent group occurred on April 26, 2022, when BLA attacked the Confucius Institute at the University of Karachi. The bombing killed five people, including three Chinese nationals, their Pakistani driver, and a security guard. In claiming responsibility, the BLA released the image and identity of the attacker, Shaari Hayat Baloch aka Bramsh, a member of the group’s Majeed Brigade suicide squad. She had joined the Majeed Brigade two years earlier.
Significantly, BLA is also actively expanding its women’s wing. On May 22, 2026, BLA publicly announced the creation of its women’s wing and released a video via its media wing, Hakkal, featuring Shaynaz Baloch as its ‘commander’. In the approximately 11-minute video, Shaynaz Baloch appears in combat gear alongside other armed women, states that she joined the organisation about seven years earlier as an ordinary member, and appeals to Baloch women and youth to join the struggle. She frames women’s participation as equal and rooted in historical Baloch tradition.
During Operation Herof 2.0, a large-scale, multi-district offensive launched by BLA across Balochistan in January-February 2026, the group heavily publicised the front-line involvement of its female cadres. In February 2026, Asifa Mengal, a 24-year-old Majeed Brigade operative, carried out a vehicle-borne suicide attack on the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) headquarters in the Nushki District of Balochistan.
Similarly, in February 2026, Hawa Baloch, a fighter on the Gwadar front in Gwadar District, recorded a final propaganda video against the Pakistani state hours before dying in combat; and Dur Jan Baloch, a militant within BLA’s specialised Fateh squad, featured in BLA media carrying weapons alongside male fighters during attacks in Nushki.
In recent years, BLA has strategically deployed highly educated women for high-impact suicide missions, exemplified by the actions of Summiya Qalandarani and Mahal Baloch. On June 24, 2023, Qalandarani, a 25-year-old Computer Science student and BLA media propagandist, executed a suicide bombing targeting a Pakistani military convoy near Chakar Azam Chowk in Turbat, killing a police constable and prompting the BLA to officially declare the “era of women’s active participation in the armed struggle.”
Building on this tactical shift, law student Mahal Baloch aka Zilan Kurd, participated in BLA’s coordinated “Operation Herof” on August 26, 2024, driving a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) directly into the gates of the FC Headquarters at Bela in Lasbela district to breach the military infrastructure.
The emergence of female suicide bombers marks a departure from traditional patterns in the Baloch insurgency. Using women enhances operational effectiveness by exploiting gendered assumptions in security protocols while expanding the recruitment base available to insurgent organisations. Sustained military operations, arrests, and targeted killings often shrink the pool of available male recruits, prompting groups to seek alternative sources of manpower. The present shift combines tactical innovation, ideological rebranding, and gendered symbolism in an effort to reposition the organisation within the increasingly competitive landscape of Baloch militancy.
KAAD is significant primarily because it may signal a tactical shift from the occasional participation of women in Baloch militancy toward a more institutionalised female combat structure. It reflects an organisational strategy shaped by the pressures of prolonged conflict. The growing presence of women in militant violence highlights the capacity of these groups to adapt, innovate, and reshape social norms to ensure their own survival.
