A sustained Ukrainian campaign targeting Russia’s oil refining capacity and fuel distribution network has intensified economic pressure inside Russia, exposing the growing domestic costs of the war even as political support for President Vladimir Putin remains resilient. The conflict has entered a new phase in which Ukraine is increasingly able to project power deep inside Russian territory, while the Kremlin faces mounting challenges in sustaining its war effort.
The Russia-Ukraine war has entered a phase that would have seemed improbable when Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of its smaller neighbour more than four years ago. What was once largely a conflict fought on Ukrainian soil has evolved into one in which the effects of the war are increasingly being felt inside Russia itself. Ukrainian long-range strikes have disrupted energy infrastructure, fuel supplies and daily life far beyond the front lines, underscoring a significant shift in the conflict’s dynamics.
The changing character of the war was highlighted over the weekend when a bomb detonated outside a Moscow restaurant where Russian commander Colonel General Alexander Chaiko was celebrating his birthday, killing three people and injuring 21 others. Russian authorities classified the explosion as a terrorist attack, while the Russian embassy in Italy blamed Ukraine. Although that claim remains unsubstantiated, the allegation itself reflects the extent to which perceptions of the conflict have changed. The possibility that Ukraine could be linked to such an incident on Russian soil illustrates how Kyiv has emerged as a far more capable military actor than many anticipated during the early stages of the war.
According to analysis by The Soufan Center, Ukrainian innovation in drone technology has enabled strikes that have penetrated deep into Russian territory, disrupting critical infrastructure and contributing to a worsening fuel crisis. Rather than relying solely on battlefield gains, Ukraine has increasingly sought to undermine Russia’s capacity to sustain the war by attacking its energy sector at multiple levels simultaneously.
At the centre of the crisis are coordinated strikes against Russian oil refineries and fuel distribution networks. Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure escalated throughout 2025 before intensifying again in 2026. The campaign has combined deep strikes against refining capacity with mid-range attacks targeting oil tankers, depots and transport corridors, creating sustained pressure across the supply chain.
One of the most significant attacks occurred in June when the Moscow Oil Refinery in Kapotnya came under attack. The facility supplies roughly 40 per cent of the capital region’s gasoline and half of its diesel. Industry sources cited by Reuters believe the refinery will not be able to restart production before the end of the year, representing a substantial setback for Russia’s domestic fuel supply.
The consequences have been felt most acutely in Russian-controlled Crimea. Earlier Ukrainian attacks prompted Moscow to halt fuel deliveries across the Kerch Bridge, the critical road-and-rail connection linking Crimea with mainland Russia. The peninsula subsequently became dependent on overland supply routes from the north, which have themselves remained under sustained Ukrainian attack since the spring.
By the end of May, authorities had begun rationing gasoline, limiting motorists to 20 liters per vehicle per week through prepaid coupons that sold out within minutes of release. The shortages quickly fuelled speculation, with fuel being resold at double the market price. By June 21, civilian fuel sales had been suspended entirely, with supplies reserved exclusively for government agencies. On June 26, Russian-installed authorities declared a state of emergency across Crimea and Sevastopol. By mid-July, more than 50 Russian regions had introduced restrictions on fuel sales, most imposing limits of between 20 and 30 liters per visit alongside coupon systems and rationing schedules.
The restrictions have extended beyond urban motorists. Many regions also prohibited the filling of jerricans, a measure that disproportionately affected rural communities reliant on stored fuel for generators, chainsaws and agricultural equipment. Without access to reserve fuel, some residents have faced blackouts and reduced access to essential services, including pharmacies.
The economic effects of the shortages have become increasingly significant. Analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) indicates that while battlefield developments have historically done little to weaken Russian public support for the war, economic pressures can have a much greater influence on public attitudes. During the early years of the conflict, military-driven economic growth coincided with strong public backing for the war. The fuel crisis, however, together with wider economic consequences, has weakened support.
Potential shortages of fuel required for agricultural machinery and supply vehicles during the crucial mid-summer harvest have added further concerns. Survey work conducted in Russia’s border regions found that respondents who personally experienced these economic costs were roughly one and a half times more likely to favour troop withdrawal and negotiations.
Yet declining enthusiasm for the war has not translated into equivalent declines in support for Russian President Vladimir Putin. According to the analysis, expressing frustration with the conflict carries significantly fewer risks than directly criticising the Russian leader. Although his approval ratings have declined from their wartime peak, they continue to represent a clear majority, making the prospect of a political crisis highly unlikely.
The Kremlin has simultaneously sought to minimise public awareness of the crisis. In May, Moscow prohibited citizens from publishing footage showing the aftermath of drone strikes. Following the attack on the Moscow Oil Refinery, even a pro-war blogger was questioned by police after posting video showing the burning facility. According to the news outlet Meduza, similar restrictions now apply across at least 64 Russian regions, compared with 33 regions last August, with enforcement increasingly extending beyond fines to filmed public apologies at police stations.
Nevertheless, fuel shortages remain far more difficult to conceal than battlefield casualties. At the same time, Russia faces mounting manpower pressures. A recent CSIS report estimates that Russian forces sustained between 30,000 and 34,000 casualties per month during 2026 while recruiting only around 27,000 new soldiers each month, leaving the military unable to replace battlefield losses fully.
Diplomatic efforts remain stalled as Moscow continues to maintain its maximalist demands while Kyiv rejects the territorial concessions those demands require. Increasingly, the conflict appears likely to be determined by which side can sustain a prolonged war of attrition. Russia continues to confront rising federal deficits while additional sanctions imposed by the European Union and the United States have further constrained oil and gas revenues.
Despite these pressures, the analysis concludes that the Kremlin is likely to continue absorbing the economic and political costs rather than fundamentally altering its approach. Putin’s autocratic system provides a degree of resilience against domestic political pressure that democratic governments often lack. Researchers at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace believe compulsory military conscription could eventually replace increasingly costly financial incentives for recruitment.
Ukraine, meanwhile, has demonstrated an ability to strike deep inside Russian territory while making gains along parts of the front. Even so, the broader military balance remains challenging. Kyiv continues to face missile attacks, diminishing interceptor stockpiles, extensive infrastructure damage and defence spending approaching 40 per cent of GDP, compared with roughly eight per cent for Russia.
The Soufan Center concludes that while Russia’s fuel crisis has exposed growing vulnerabilities and increased the domestic costs of the war, it should not be interpreted as signalling an imminent turning point. A political crisis for Putin remains unlikely, and there is little evidence that the worsening shortages alone will alter the situation on the battlefield or shift Moscow’s negotiating position. A significant change in the conflict’s status quo may still be some distance away. Until then, Ukraine will need to continue capitalising on its offensive momentum, while its international partners will require the patience to sustain their support over what remains an increasingly prolonged and demanding war of attrition.
