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Somalia Is Losing Control on Two Fronts

A constitutional confrontation in Mogadishu is unfolding alongside an expanding al-Shabaab offensive, as withdrawing foreign forces, competing regional interests and divisions between federal authorities and regional administrations threaten to weaken the Somali state.

4 mins read
Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud

Somalia is facing a convergence of political and security crises that threatens to undermine the authority of its federal government. A Supreme Court ruling declaring the expiry of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s mandate has escalated a constitutional dispute into a confrontation over the legitimacy of the administration. At the same time, al-Shabaab is intensifying its military campaign, foreign security commitments are becoming less certain, and regional powers are deepening their involvement in Somalia’s internal divisions. The result is an increasingly fragmented security environment in which the government must contend simultaneously with an insurgency, a domestic political challenge and competing external interests.

Earlier this month, Somalia’s Supreme Court ruled that the mandates of parliament and the federal government expired in April, while the president’s term ended in May. The court rejected the retrospective application of a one-year extension introduced through constitutional amendments approved in March 2026. It instructed political leaders to establish an electoral framework within 30 days and organise elections within 90 days. The judgment directly challenged the government’s position on the extension and raised fundamental questions about the constitutional basis of its continued authority.

The confrontation had already intensified before the ruling. On its eve, Mohamud dismissed the chief justice, while allegations subsequently emerged that government troops had been deployed around the court. The executive’s refusal to accept the judgment has further widened the dispute. The opposition Somali Future Council boycotted talks convened by the president, demanding instead that negotiations take place under the oversight of the United States, the United Kingdom, Türkiye and the European Union.

Formed in 2025, the Council brings together the Somali Salvation Forum, Jubaland and Puntland. Its emergence reflected disagreements over constitutional amendments and the relationship between the federal government and Somalia’s federal member states. It has now rejected the legitimacy of Mohamud’s presidency, raising the possibility that the dispute could extend beyond disagreements over election procedures into a broader struggle over political authority.

There is a recent and serious precedent. In April 2021, former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo’s attempt to extend his mandate contributed to divisions within the security forces along clan lines. The political confrontation eventually developed into armed clashes in Mogadishu. Similar tensions surfaced in June this year, when rival factions disputed the latest extensions. The present crisis therefore carries implications not only for constitutional governance but also for the cohesion of the institutions responsible for maintaining security.

Al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s regional affiliate, has repeatedly exploited political divisions in Mogadishu to expand its operational reach. Its latest offensive in Lower Shabelle is unfolding as the federal government struggles to establish a common political position. The group has continued its strategy of isolating the capital while putting pressure on government forces and their supporting security structures.

On 26 October, al-Shabaab claimed to have killed hundreds of Somali soldiers in an ambush near Leego. Reports indicated that the attack may have combined vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices with weaponised drones. The group’s casualty claims remain unverified and are likely exaggerated. Nevertheless, if the reported use of drones is confirmed, it would represent a significant development in its operational capabilities. Al-Shabaab has reportedly received training and material for its drone programme from Yemen’s Houthi movement, suggesting a possible expansion beyond its established methods of attack.

The violence has also extended across the Kenyan border. A suspected al-Shabaab attack in Mandera County killed eight people, reinforcing the regional dimensions of the insurgency. The organisation has long sought to pressure Nairobi into withdrawing its security and peacekeeping support from Somalia. The latest attacks in Kenya appear to have been partly connected to security operations inside Somalia, while the political paralysis in Mogadishu offers the group additional opportunities to exploit weaknesses in the government’s response.

Washington continues to conduct airstrikes against al-Shabaab positions. In early November, United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) struck a target in Jamaame, marking its 91st publicly declared airstrike in Somalia in 2026. However, air operations cannot independently address the wider challenge posed by an organisation that functions as a parallel governing authority in areas under its influence. Strikes may disrupt offensive operations, but they cannot ensure that territory cleared of militants remains under government control.

The American military presence is also undergoing a geographical shift. In late October, US forces left Baledogle airfield, a longstanding centre for training the Somali National Army’s elite Danab Brigade. AFRICOM described the departure as economically motivated. Washington is increasingly looking towards Puntland as a base for its counterterrorism operations. Under an agreement signed in August 2026, Puntland says the United States can expand its facilities in Bosaso, which could also support maritime security operations in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea region.

The shift comes as Somalia faces uncertainty over the future of African Union security assistance. Uganda, the first country to deploy troops to Somalia in 2007, has announced plans to withdraw all its forces by the end of 2027. Ethiopia is reportedly considering the withdrawal of approximately 3,000 troops, while Burundi’s continued participation remains uncertain. Although the US State Department reversed its threat on 15 November to cut support for African Union and United Nations missions, extending assistance for another year, the longer-term security arrangements remain unsettled.

Türkiye has emerged as Mogadishu’s principal security partner amid these changes. It has been discussed as a possible future user of Baledogle airfield, although Ankara has denied reports that it intends to deploy 15,000 troops to Somalia. Its continued security assistance is increasingly important as other contributors reconsider their commitments.

Meanwhile, relations between Mogadishu and the United Arab Emirates have deteriorated further. President Mohamud has accused Abu Dhabi of negotiating port agreements without federal approval, financing political divisions and conducting a proxy war inside Somalia. He has also alleged Emirati involvement in Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. The UAE maintains relationships with Puntland, Jubaland and Somaliland, positioning it within the same federal divisions that the central government is attempting to manage.

The dispute has acquired a military dimension. Mogadishu had already prohibited Emirati military flights in January. An Emirati drone reportedly struck al-Shabaab fighters in the Cal Madow mountains in October, while an Emirati base in Bosaso has been linked in reports to weapons transfers to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, allegations the UAE denies. On Thursday, Somalia ordered the Emirati ambassador to leave the country, accusing Abu Dhabi of an invasion.

These developments reveal a security architecture increasingly shaped by competing foreign relationships rather than a unified federal strategy. Regional administrations maintain their own external partnerships, while counterterrorism capabilities risk becoming instruments of political competition.

The coming months will test whether Somalia can establish an accepted electoral process, maintain the cohesion of its security forces and preserve sufficient international support to contain al-Shabaab. The danger is not confined to the survival of the current administration. With federal member states exercising greater autonomy, foreign powers pursuing separate interests and the insurgency consolidating its position in Lower Shabelle, the authority of the Somali state itself is under sustained pressure.

Sri Lanka Guardian

The Sri Lanka Guardian is an online web portal founded in August 2007 by a group of concerned Sri Lankan citizens including journalists, activists, academics and retired civil servants. We are independent and non-profit. Email: editor@slguardian.org

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