“The investigation into the Martinair crash has revealed serious deficiencies in both operational procedures and navigational aids. We are committed to addressing these issues to enhance aviation safety.” ~ Attributed to the Sri Lanka Aviation Authority
The Martinair crash on December 4, 1974, over Sri Lanka, stands as one of the gravest aviation tragedies in the nation’s history. The disaster involved a DC-8 aircraft from the Dutch airline Martinair, and it claimed the lives of all 191 passengers and crew on board. The flight, a chartered service transporting Indonesian Muslim pilgrims to Mecca, ended in disaster during its attempt to land at Colombo’s Bandaranaike International Airport.
This doomed flight began its journey in Surabaya, Indonesia, and was headed for Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, with a planned stopover in Colombo, Sri Lanka, for refueling. The passengers, mainly Indonesian Hajj pilgrims, were eagerly anticipating their spiritual pilgrimage. The aircraft involved, a Douglas DC-8-55CF, was a long-haul jet that had been in operation for several years, under the management of Martinair, an airline noted for its cargo and charter flights.
Capt. Elmo Jayawardene – a glowing example of the best of the profession of aeronautics – in a recent hour-long interview for Aviationvoice explained in coherent and logically persuasive reasoning based on his phenomenal experience as a pilot over 51 years, coupled with his profound knowledge of aeronautics, the plausible scenario that may have led to the accident. Capt. Elmo hastened to add that his explanation was based on his own reasoning without access to the details of what took place that night. Capt. Elmo explained that due to a miscalculation occurring in the Doppler equipment in the aircraft concerning distance to Colombo, and the relaying of the information by the captain of the flight to air traffic control in Colombo, the Captain may have been given instructions from ground control to descend prematurely, resulting in the aircraft hitting the Seven Virgins mountain range in Sri Lanka.
At the time, I was a first-year student at the Law Faculty of the University of Colombo – a freshman without the faintest idea of what aviation was, and fell prey to all sorts of theories, the most prolific of which was that the pilot had seen the lights of a sacred mountain over which the aircraft was flying at the time and mistaken it for the landing lights at Colombo airport’s runway. Little did I know that 12 years later in May 1986, I would, as head of Insurance and International Relations of Airlanka (now SriLankan airlines) be in the throes of the second major aviation tragedy in Sri Lanka when Air Lanka Flight 512 – offering a service operated by Air Lanka (now SriLankan Airlines) – from Colombo to Male was destroyed on the tarmac by a devastating explosion which tore the plane apart, destroying it completely. The flight was carrying mostly tourists from France, West Germany, Britain, and Japan. The explosion claimed the lives of 21 people, including 3 British, 2 West German, 3 French, 2 Japanese, 2 Maldivian, and 1 Pakistani passengers. Additionally, 41 people were injured in the incident.
This unfortunate and sad event gave me much experience on the insurance claims that followed in negotiations with the loss adjusters and the London brokers concerning hull, war risks and third party liability of the airline.
Based on my experience, my thoughts of the Martinair crash are as follow.
The Aftermath
I have had no access to any reports, facts or documentation with regard to the Martinair crash. Similar to Capt. Elmo – who gave a credible and persuasive “plausibility” scenario in a technical sense – I can – without any claims to pretension that I can be as clear as Capt. Elmo – surmise the aftermath of the Martinair crash from a legal and liability perspective.
The doomed flight was operated between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. When the accident occurred in 1974, Indonesia had ratified the Chicago Convention (of 1944) in 1950 and the Warsaw Convention (of 1929) in 1952; Saudi Arabia had ratified the Chicago Convention in 1960 and the Warsaw Convention in 1969. Therefore, both these treaties applied to the Martinair crash in terms of accident investigation and liability claims.
Accident Investigation
Article 25 of the Chicago Convention states that each contracting State agrees to offer assistance to aircraft in distress within its territory as far as it is practical to do so. Additionally, these States must allow the aircraft’s owners or the authorities of the State where the aircraft is registered to provide necessary assistance, subject to the control of the local authorities. When searching for missing aircraft, each contracting State is expected to cooperate in coordinated efforts as recommended by this Convention.
This text details the obligations and collaborative actions required of contracting states to aid aircraft in distress and to participate in searches for missing aircraft. It is part of a larger Convention designed to ensure safety and coordination in international aviation. A closer examination of the key terms and statements within this text will reveal its significance and the fundamental principles it upholds.
The term “Each contracting State” refers to the countries that are signatories to the Convention, agreeing to follow its rules and responsibilities.
Article 26, which deals with accident investigation, states that if an accident involving an aircraft from one contracting State occurs in the territory of another contracting State, resulting in death, serious injury, or indicating a significant technical defect in the aircraft or air navigation facilities, the State where the accident occurred must conduct an investigation. This investigation should follow the procedures recommended by the International Civil Aviation Organization, as far as the State’s laws allow. The State where the aircraft is registered must be given the chance to appoint observers to attend the investigation, and the State conducting the inquiry is required to share the report and findings with the State where the aircraft is registered.
Therefore in this case the accident investigation had to be (and indeed was) conducted by the Sri Lanka aeronautical authorities, and assuming the aircraft was registered in the Netherlands, Dutch authorities had the right to appoint observers to the investigative process.
Airline Liability
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention requires that the carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking. Article 19 has a caveat which says that the carrier is not liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures.
While Article 17 would prima facie establish liability of Martinair without dispute (as facts speak for themselves), Article 19 would leave a window open for the airline to establish that it was not the carrier’s fault that caused the accident. However, Martinair was held responsible by the courts for the deaths of the passengers in the 1974 crash over Sri Lanka. Following the accident, the victims’ families pursued legal action, which resulted in a protracted legal battle.
In 1981, a Dutch court found Martinair guilty of negligence, pointing to several factors such as pilot error and poor communication between the flight crew and air traffic control. The court determined that Martinair was liable for the disaster and ordered the airline to provide compensation to the victims’ families. The ruling emphasized the airline’s failure to maintain passenger safety, which ultimately contributed to the tragic incident.
My Take
My general understanding is that the investigation conducted by Sri Lankan authorities into the Martinair crash uncovered several critical findings. It was determined that the primary cause of the crash was pilot error, as the flight crew miscalculated their approach and descended below the glide path, causing the aircraft to impact the ground before reaching the runway. The investigation also noted that poor weather conditions, such as heavy rain and limited visibility, exacerbated the situation, making it difficult for the pilots to assess their position accurately.
Additionally, there were communication problems between the flight crew and air traffic control, with unclear exchanges of information contributing to the misjudgment of the aircraft’s position. The investigation further revealed that the navigational aids at Colombo’s Bandaranaike International Airport were insufficient, which posed challenges for a safe approach in adverse weather. Moreover, the investigation found that the flight crew’s training and procedures might have been inadequate for dealing with the complex conditions encountered during the approach. These findings underscored the necessity for improved navigational systems, enhanced pilot training, and better communication protocols to help prevent similar accidents in the future.
It must be noted that there have been instances where airlines were not held fully accountable or were exonerated for crashes involving inadequate navigational aids or communication problems. In these cases, investigations often uncover that various factors contributed to the accident, leading to shared responsibility among multiple parties.
For example, the crash of Air France Flight 296Q, a demonstration flight in France, was partly due to insufficient navigational aids and procedural errors. The aircraft, an Airbus A320, went down during a low-level flyover after flying too close to the ground. Although navigational aids and procedural issues were present, the primary cause was deemed to be pilot error. The airline was not solely blamed, as the investigation also pointed to issues with crew management and safety procedure adherence.
In another case, a Singapore Airlines flight collided with a construction vehicle while taking off from Taipei’s Taoyuan International Airport. The investigation found that the runway was under construction and inadequately marked, which contributed to the accident. While the airline was criticized for not aborting the takeoff under adverse conditions, responsibility was also assigned to airport authorities for failing to provide proper navigational information and warnings.
Similarly, the crash of Pan Am Flight 6, a transpacific flight, occurred due to the aircraft running out of fuel and crashing into the ocean. The investigation identified problems with navigational aids and communication, but the airline was not held solely liable. Factors such as poor weather and navigational inaccuracies were also considered, leading to shared responsibility among the airline, navigational authorities, and other involved entities.
In many such cases, investigations reveal that deficiencies in navigational aids and communication are only part of the picture. Pilot error, maintenance issues, and procedural shortcomings often contribute to accidents, resulting in distributed liability rather than placing sole blame on a single party.
An investigator into the accident is reported to have said: “ The Martinair crash serves as a sobering reminder of the critical importance of precision in navigation and communication. The findings will help guide future safety measures and procedural changes.”
