A conflict long defined by shifting rivalries has entered a new phase in Mali as two of the country’s most bitter adversaries have forged a partnership against a shared opponent. According to reporting by Le Monde, the predominantly Tuareg Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), the Sahel branch of Al-Qaeda, have put aside years of violent confrontation to coordinate military operations aimed at the ruling military junta led by General Assimi Goïta and its Russian Africa Corps allies.
The alliance has dramatically altered the dynamics of Mali’s security landscape. Since launching a broad offensive on April 25, the two armed groups have coordinated attacks across multiple regions, culminating in the capture of Kidal in northern Mali and the reported killing of Defense Minister General Sadio Camara, widely regarded as the second most powerful figure within the military government.
The latest phase of the campaign unfolded on July 4, when coordinated attacks targeted several towns across northern, central and southern Mali. Among the focal points was Anéfis, approximately 120 kilometers south of Kidal, where fighting continued between FLA and JNIM forces and the Malian Armed Forces, supported by Russian personnel positioned inside the town’s military camp.
Anéfis occupies a strategically important position within northern Mali. As the final major military installation controlled by government forces in the Kidal region, the town serves as a key gateway connecting Kidal with Gao and Timbuktu, two of the region’s largest urban centers. Control of the area has become increasingly significant as the military campaign expands.
The close coordination displayed during the July offensive reflected a relationship that would have appeared improbable only a short time ago. For more than a decade, the FLA and JNIM had fought one another in repeated clashes marked by assassinations, territorial battles and competing political ambitions. Their hostility dates back to the aftermath of their joint seizure of northern Mali in 2012, when jihadist factions turned against pro-independence forces, triggering years of conflict between the two movements.
Le Monde reports that the process leading to reconciliation began following another deadly confrontation in April 2024 in the Wagadou forest near the Mauritanian border. Influential Tuareg leaders, including individuals with connections to both sides of the conflict, concluded that continued internal fighting had become increasingly costly while the military authorities in Bamako strengthened their position.
Central to that effort was a mediation commission composed of tribal chiefs under the leadership of Mohamed Ag Intalla, the traditional amenokal of the Adrar des Ifoghas. His younger brother, Alghabass Ag Intalla, who commands the FLA, supported renewed dialogue with his cousin, Iyad Ag Ghali, the former Tuareg rebel leader who later became the emir of JNIM. According to accounts cited by Le Monde, the mediators urged both camps to unite against the military government and its Russian partners rather than continue fighting one another.
Negotiations reportedly advanced gradually, requiring concessions from both organizations. The FLA accepted the application of Sharia law under the condition that it remain moderate and be administered by independent Muslim judges rather than directly by jihadist authorities. JNIM, meanwhile, agreed to focus its agenda on Mali rather than broader international objectives and sought to distance itself politically from Al-Qaeda, although no formal break has been announced.
Despite those compromises, the two organizations continue to pursue different long-term objectives. The FLA seeks political control over northern Mali, while JNIM advocates the implementation of Sharia law throughout the country. Their cooperation has instead been built around a shared opposition to General Goïta’s government and the Russian forces supporting it.
The evolving military relationship has combined complementary strengths. The FLA retains significant backing among Tuareg communities and includes experienced officers who previously served in the Libyan and Malian armed forces. The group has also developed the use of small kamikaze drones, which Le Monde reports came through training provided by Ukrainian intelligence services.
Since the beginning of the April offensive, the FLA has also reportedly benefited from defections within the Malian Armed Forces. According to military sources cited by Le Monde, Tuareg soldiers and officers who had joined the national army under earlier peace agreements have increasingly abandoned government positions. One officer, identified under a pseudonym, said that violence committed against Tuareg communities by Malian forces and their Russian allies had driven many personnel to leave government service.
JNIM brings different capabilities to the partnership. Operating across northern, central and southern Mali, the group recruits from several ethnic communities, including Peul and Bambara populations. It is believed to field several thousand fighters while maintaining greater financial resources than the FLA. Its highly mobile units travel primarily on motorcycles and possess extensive weaponry, much of it captured during attacks on military installations.
The alliance has also drawn attention beyond Mali’s borders. According to Tuareg sources cited by Le Monde, Algeria encouraged closer cooperation between the FLA and JNIM as tensions deepened between Algiers and the military authorities in Bamako. Algeria has long regarded northern Mali as strategically important and has maintained contacts with numerous political and armed actors in the region. Intelligence assessments from Malian and French services have previously concluded that Iyad Ag Ghali has operated with at least a degree of tolerance from Algerian authorities, although the report does not indicate direct involvement in military operations.
Even as coordination has intensified, FLA leaders have stopped short of describing the relationship as a formal alliance. Instead, they characterize it as a mechanism allowing the two organizations to coexist and coordinate against shared adversaries. FLA spokesperson Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane told Le Monde that durable peace in Mali would be impossible without engaging JNIM, making cooperation unavoidable despite their differing objectives.
JNIM has also adjusted aspects of its public messaging in recent months. Following the April offensive, the group appealed to Malians to unite against military rule and called for what it described as a peaceful and inclusive political transition while maintaining that the establishment of Sharia law remained a central objective. The messaging has reflected an effort to present the organization as an alternative to the current authorities while preserving its ideological foundations.
Le Monde reports that JNIM has not formally severed ties with Al-Qaeda, with leaders acknowledging that such a move remains sensitive within the organization. Some combat units reportedly oppose abandoning the group’s long-standing affiliations, while its leadership is concerned that any formal split could encourage defections to rival factions linked to the Islamic State group, whose presence in the Sahel has recently strengthened. As the coordinated offensive against the Malian military continues, the emerging partnership between the FLA and JNIM marks one of the most significant shifts in the country’s armed conflict, reshaping alliances that had defined the battlefield for more than a decade.
