France’s deepening political and social crisis has exposed the limitations of Emmanuel Macron’s promise to transform the country’s political system from the centre. More than a month of unrest has left the president increasingly unable to contain the turmoil, with the next presidential election less than six months away. The prospect of a contest dominated by Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally and Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s hard-left France Unbowed has raised a troubling question: how did the political project that brought Macron to power in 2017 end up creating conditions in which both extremes appear increasingly influential?
An analysis published by El País argues that Macron’s difficulties cannot be understood simply as the consequence of his political mistakes or the violent disturbances confronting his government. His presidency, rather, reflects a deeper weakness in the French political system: the concentration of power in a dominant executive, combined with the failure to establish effective institutions capable of mediating between the president and the public. Macron sought to govern from the centre while bypassing the traditional political structures that had previously connected citizens, parties and local authorities. He weakened the old system without constructing a sustainable replacement.
There is, however, a longer historical pattern behind the difficulties facing Macron. French presidents elected through universal suffrage since 1962 have frequently ended their terms in political disappointment or institutional crisis. Charles de Gaulle resigned in 1969 after losing a referendum on a relatively secondary issue. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, elected in 1974, was defeated seven years later amid economic difficulties, divisions within the political right and a series of scandals.
François Mitterrand remained in power for two terms, but his presidency also ended under the shadow of controversy. Jacques Chirac secured re-election, yet his government was forced to share power with the left between 1997 and 2002 after the Socialists won the parliamentary elections and Lionel Jospin became prime minister. Nicolas Sarkozy, elected in 2007, lost the presidency in 2012 following divisions between centrists and conservatives and the failure to fulfil economic promises. François Hollande, his Socialist successor, became so unpopular that he declined to seek a second term, with approval ratings falling to just 4%.
Macron initially appeared to offer a decisive break from this cycle. His 2017 victory disrupted the traditional alternation between the established left and right, presenting a centrist political alternative at a time when both camps were experiencing internal difficulties. He was widely credited with dismantling the two-party system that had shaped French politics since the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958. Yet the argument that Macron alone destroyed that system overlooks the pre-existing weaknesses of both political blocs. The National Rally had already become a serious challenge to the traditional right, while the left was increasingly fragmented before he entered the Élysée Palace.
Macron’s more consequential failure, according to the El País analysis, was his inability or unwillingness to build a new political organisation capable of sustaining his programme beyond his personal leadership. He regarded political parties as obstacles to be circumvented rather than institutions through which political ideas could be developed, debated and organised. His movement, En Marche, never evolved substantially beyond an electoral campaign structure. It mobilised support around Macron but failed to establish the institutional depth required to maintain a durable political project.
His distrust extended beyond political parties to local and regional government. Municipal councils, departments and regions were not treated as essential partners in governing a diverse country but as intermediate structures that could complicate the exercise of presidential authority. Macron favoured reform imposed from above, based on the assumption that a president elected with popular legitimacy should be able to exercise power with minimal interference.
The scale of executive centralisation is reflected in the number of ministers appointed during his presidency. Of the 767 ministers appointed in France since 1958, Macron named 176. Yet many of these officials reportedly had little direct access to the president, reinforcing the concentration of decision-making around a single political figure. The resulting system resembled personal rule more than collective government, leaving institutions and political allies poorly positioned to provide continuity when presidential authority weakened.
This approach draws on a longstanding feature of French political culture: the preference for a powerful executive, often embodied in a figure who appears to stand above ordinary political competition. The country has repeatedly invested its expectations in leaders who promise decisive authority, only to turn against them when their power becomes unpopular or ineffective. France, in this interpretation, is a republic that repeatedly seeks a king and eventually grows impatient with the monarch it has created.
Macron’s political instincts place him within a tradition associated with Napoleon and de Gaulle. The executive presidency has long been central to the country’s political identity, while periods of stronger parliamentary sovereignty have often ended in instability. The Third Republic collapsed in 1940, and the Fourth Republic disintegrated in 1958 under the pressures of the Algerian War. The problem is therefore not simply the personality of one president, but a political structure that repeatedly encourages the concentration of authority.
The danger is that Macron’s successor may reproduce the same model under a different political ideology. Both Le Pen and Mélenchon are committed to the idea that popular sovereignty should not be filtered through intermediary institutions. Their political traditions are sharply different, but their approaches to leadership raise questions about pluralism, internal democracy and the distribution of power.
Mélenchon has promised to change the Constitution and establish a Sixth Republic, presenting institutional reform as a central element of his political programme. Yet the way he controls his own party suggests that his conception of political authority may be highly centralised. His background in the Trotskyist left and his proposal that social security should be administered by its beneficiaries rather than public officials also reflect a distinctive view of the state and the relationship between citizens and institutions. The contradiction between his promise of institutional transformation and his own leadership style remains a significant question.
Le Pen comes from an entirely different political tradition, but the prospect of a more conciliatory form of government under her leadership appears equally uncertain. She exercises firm control over her party and places personal loyalty at the centre of its organisation. The El País analysis suggests that this approach could translate into a similarly concentrated style of presidential authority, despite the ideological differences separating her from Mélenchon.
The tendency to appeal directly to voters is not confined to the extremes. Gabriel Attal, the former prime minister and another presidential candidate, has proposed holding a referendum every year. Although presented as a means of strengthening popular participation, such a programme could further entrench the plebiscitary character of a political system already heavily dependent on direct presidential legitimacy.
Two figures appear to offer a different approach. Édouard Philippe, the centre-right mayor of Le Havre, and Raphaël Glucksmann, a social-democratic figure on the left, are presented as potential alternatives to the populist concentration of authority. But both face significant political constraints. Philippe’s association with Macron, under whom he served as prime minister for three years, raises questions about how substantially his presidency would differ from the current administration. Glucksmann, meanwhile, is attempting to establish a distinct social-democratic position after breaking with both Mélenchon and political figures associated with Macron. Building the alliances necessary to compete in a presidential run-off could prove difficult.
France is not alone in experiencing polarisation, but the character of its political divide is particularly consequential. The two forces currently exerting the strongest pressure on the political system are the National Rally and France Unbowed, movements that challenge liberal political assumptions from opposite ideological directions. The danger is that Macron’s failure to construct a durable centrist alternative may leave France choosing not between competing models of democratic government, but between two different forms of anti-liberal politics.
The central warning in El País is therefore broader than a verdict on Macron’s troubled presidency. By weakening established political structures without creating institutions capable of replacing them, he has helped deepen the vacuum in which his most powerful opponents now operate. His successor may inherit not merely a divided country, but a political system increasingly inclined to concentrate authority in a single leader. Such an outcome would have implications beyond France, potentially accelerating Europe’s wider movement towards a post-liberal political order.

