Young people across Germany are preparing to take to the streets in a series of demonstrations organised by the youth initiative Gen Z regelt, reflecting growing frustration over economic insecurity, deteriorating public infrastructure, rising living costs and what many perceive as a political system that prioritises older generations. Demonstrations have been announced for Saturday in Berlin, Cologne, Munich, Karlsruhe, Bielefeld and Aachen. The initiative reports more than 157,000 registrations on its website, although the actual scale of participation remains uncertain, with reports suggesting that some activists have already withdrawn their support.
The planned demonstrations mark an unusual development in Germany, where young people have so far remained comparatively restrained despite mounting concerns about their economic prospects and the country’s political direction. Stephan Grünewald, a psychologist and head of the Rheingold market and media research institute, believes that an expression of public frustration could be constructive. His institute conducts approximately 5,000 in-depth interviews annually, with particular attention to younger generations. He argues that one of their central difficulties is not simply anxiety about employment, pensions or climate change, but an inhibition that prevents them from expressing their opinions and openly challenging political decisions.
The initiative’s central message captures this frustration. “Wherever we look, we see crises and hardly any prospects for ourselves,” its organisers say. Their campaign challenges what they regard as an unequal distribution of economic and social responsibilities between generations, particularly at a time when government spending on defence and pensions is rising while schools and public infrastructure remain in poor condition. Grünewald summarises the prevailing sentiment as a belief that political decisions are being made primarily for the baby-boomer generation. “The army is being rearmed, but the schools are falling apart,” he says. He describes the condition of Germany’s public infrastructure with the phrase “Marode in Germany”, suggesting that decay has become a defining feature of what was once associated with the country’s reputation for quality and efficiency.
The deterioration in young people’s confidence is reflected in the findings of the Shell Youth Study, which has surveyed Germans aged 12 to 25 about their fears, expectations and attitudes since 1953. According to the latest survey, published in 2024, the proportion of young people who viewed their personal future optimistically fell from 58 per cent in 2019 to 52 per cent. The decline was particularly pronounced among young people from more privileged social backgrounds, whose optimism dropped from 76 per cent in 2015 to 55 per cent in the latest findings. Among those from less affluent backgrounds, optimism increased. Mathias Albert, the study’s lead author, says the traditional gap between social groups has narrowed considerably. Higher educational qualifications and a privileged background had previously offered a relatively dependable route to professional success, but that assumption is becoming less secure.
Grünewald recalls that discussions with young people a decade ago were characterised by considerably greater optimism. Demographic changes had created the impression that employers would compete for young workers rather than the other way round. Many believed they could achieve exceptional success through entrepreneurship, social media influence or ambitious business ventures. That confidence has since been weakened by a succession of disruptions. The coronavirus pandemic was followed by new wars, renewed debate over compulsory military service and uncertainty about employment prospects. Young adults attempting to move out of their family homes are confronted with high rents, while the rapid development of artificial intelligence has created uncertainty about the future value of educational qualifications and the availability of jobs. “We are experiencing harsh encounters with reality,” Grünewald says. “Many young people have lost their sense of what their future prospects might be.”
Housing affordability is one of the most immediate sources of generational tension. Although historical comparisons show that purchasing power was lower in the mid-1970s and that rents were also more expensive relative to income, the situation is different for people entering the housing market today. Rents for newly available properties continue to rise in areas where accommodation is scarce. Young adults moving out of their parents’ homes face these increases directly, unlike older residents who have remained in the same properties for years or already own their homes.
Despite these pressures, unemployment remains a more complicated issue than the protests’ broader message might suggest. The Shell study found that only 35 per cent of young people feared unemployment, the lowest proportion since the surveys began. Germany’s youth unemployment rate stood at 6.3 per cent in September 2026, considerably below levels in countries such as France and Italy. Including those who were neither working nor undertaking training, the proportion reached 10 per cent in 2025. Albert cautions that many young people have not yet experienced the difficulties of entering the labour market and discovering that repeated applications do not necessarily lead to employment.
The uncertainty is particularly significant for university graduates. Albert argues that the expansion of higher education has increased competition for professional opportunities, meaning that academic qualifications no longer guarantee the same employment advantages as before. Apprentices in occupations experiencing shortages of skilled workers may have more secure prospects. Artificial intelligence, however, has intensified concerns among graduates and students about whether their qualifications will retain their value. Alexander Burstedde, a labour market expert at the German Economic Institute, attributes current difficulties in recruitment primarily to economic stagnation rather than artificial intelligence. He expects skilled labour shortages to rise sharply when economic growth resumes and the baby-boomer generation retires.
The protest movement has also placed compulsory military service at the centre of its demands. Gen Z regelt opposes its reintroduction, arguing that decisions affecting young people’s futures should not be made without their participation. Burstedde, who has researched the economic implications of compulsory service, says his simulations indicate that Germany would need approximately 50,000 volunteers annually to meet its military recruitment target, compared with more than 300,000 young men in an entire age group. Compulsory service could therefore require a quarter of a million people to spend a year in activities that produce little economic output and offer limited transferable skills, he argues. Reducing the available workforce would be particularly damaging during a period of demographic change.
Questions over the distribution of public expenditure have also attracted support from economists. Burstedde points to criticism that approximately one-third of tax revenue goes towards pensions while schools receive insufficient investment. The current fuel discount, costing €2.5 billion, is more expensive than the €2 billion allocated annually to the Startchancen programme for disadvantaged schoolchildren. Axel Börsch-Supan, director of the Munich Research Institute for the Economics of Aging, similarly argues that Germany must redirect public resources towards education, innovation and investment rather than consumption-related benefits. He estimates that 10 per cent of the people currently employed will be missing from the labour market within the next decade, according to a 2024 demographic report submitted to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs.
Börsch-Supan is also critical of the government’s pension reforms, arguing that the guaranteed protection of pension levels places an excessive burden on younger contributors. A future system of capital-funded pensions could impose an additional burden because Generation Z would have to save for its own retirement while continuing to finance payments to older generations through contributions. He believes the transition towards a funded pension system should have begun 40 years ago, when the baby-boomer generation was still working and saving.
For Grünewald, addressing the frustration requires a new generational agreement based on shared responsibilities rather than shifting costs towards younger citizens. “Young people know that restrictions and sacrifices are also necessary,” he says. “But there needs to be a feeling that everyone is contributing, rather than only them paying.” Albert argues that political leaders must engage with young people directly, rather than relying on social media appearances and public statements. Whether Saturday’s demonstrations attract the numbers claimed by their organisers or fail to materialise, the debate over Germany’s generational responsibilities has already become a significant question for its economic and political future.
