President Trump justified his June strikes on Iran, asserting that the United States could not allow Tehran to develop a nuclear weapon. He later claimed the attacks had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear programme. Yet new reports suggest that while the strikes seriously damaged Iran’s infrastructure, they did not eliminate its capabilities. On Monday, Tehran announced that the Natanz nuclear facility and sites near Isfahan were targeted in the latest air raids, highlighting the continued tension surrounding the country’s atomic ambitions.
Analysts, as well as Rafael Grossi, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), agree that the June bombings have complicated assessments of Iran’s nuclear progress. At that time, estimates suggested that Iran could refine and weaponize its enriched uranium into a bomb within three to eight months if it chose to do so. Since then, Iran has only partially cooperated with IAEA inspectors, denying access to the main sites hit in June and withholding information about its existing stocks of enriched uranium.
Iran declared possession of 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent—enough, if further refined to 90 percent, to produce up to ten nuclear warheads. Even at 60 percent, the uranium could potentially be used in a weapon. These stockpiles are thought to have survived last year’s US-Israeli attacks, stored in underground tunnels at Natanz, Isfahan, and the Fordow site. While the main enrichment plants and centrifuge arrays were heavily damaged, the extent to which Iran can reconstruct them or whether it possesses reserve components remains uncertain. Notably, a newly developed facility under “Pickaxe Mountain” near Natanz was not struck in June, and satellite imagery indicates ongoing construction there.
“The Pickaxe tunnel complex is not yet operational, but construction has been steady for several years and now appears to be nearing the end,” noted a November report from the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington. The facility could play a central role if Iran decides to reconstitute its centrifuge programme, covering component production, assembly, and uranium enrichment. Evidence of activity at other sites largely appears to reflect cleanup and safety measures, rather than a full-scale restart of the programme.
For two decades, most analysts have maintained that Iran has worked on the technical components of a nuclear weapons programme without demonstrating a political commitment to weaponization. There has been no concerted effort to restore the programme to pre-June levels, likely due to fear of provoking further attacks. Yet the possibility remains that the regime could resume work in the future.
“Iran has not been actively seeking nuclear weapons for a couple of decades, but it has maintained the foundations for a weapons programme,” said Ian Stewart, former Ministry of Defence specialist and executive director of the James Martin Centre for Non-proliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute in the United States. If Iran were to press ahead now, progress would be hindered by the loss of senior nuclear scientists in the June airstrikes and the fact that Israeli intelligence has deeply penetrated the programme.
Nonetheless, Iran retains baseline knowledge and technical capacity, leaving the door open for rapid progress under different circumstances. Should a more hardline figure replace Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has ruled it un-Islamic to build a bomb, factions within the regime that favor nuclear weapons could seize the opportunity. Stewart warns that while Iran cannot quickly acquire nuclear weapons under current leadership, the risk of acceleration by extremists cannot be ignored.
