The Trump administration is considering military action against Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), al-Qaeda’s affiliate in the Sahel, in what could mark a significant expansion of US counterterrorism operations in Africa. As outlined in an analysis by The Soufan Center, the deliberations come as Mali faces one of its gravest security crises in more than a decade, with insurgent groups expanding their reach, new tactical alliances emerging, and Russia’s security partnership with Bamako increasingly failing to reverse the deteriorating situation.
According to the source material, senior US officials are debating whether to authorise military operations in Mali as JNIM continues to strengthen its position as one of al-Qaeda’s most capable global affiliates. The group’s guerrilla campaign has intensified across the Sahel, raising concerns that instability could spread into neighbouring states. If President Donald Trump approves military strikes, Mali would become the eighth country in which Washington has authorised military action during his second term, including operations against Islamic State targets in Nigeria.
The discussions come as the United States is simultaneously engaged in military operations involving Iran and is considering possible action in Cuba, raising broader questions about the sustainability of multiple security commitments. At the same time, the debate reflects a changing US approach towards Africa following the withdrawal of American troops from Niger in 2024 and the rapidly evolving security dynamics across the Sahel.
An unnamed Trump administration official told The Washington Post that Russia’s performance in Mali should serve as a warning to other African nations, stating: “We hope that other African nations take note of Russia’s terrible performance in combating terrorism.”
Mali’s current security crisis has unfolded against the backdrop of sweeping political changes. Since military officers seized power in successive coups in 2020 and 2021, the ruling junta has distanced itself from Western partners, particularly France, while deepening security cooperation with Russia. Initially relying on the Wagner Group and subsequently on the Russian-controlled Africa Corps, Bamako sought to restore government authority following the withdrawal of French forces. However, the expected reversal of insurgent gains has failed to materialise.
Instead, JNIM has demonstrated an increasing ability to conduct complex and coordinated operations across multiple regions. According to Héni Nsaibia, West Africa Senior Analyst at ACLED, the Malian government is now increasingly operating from a defensive position, responding to JNIM offensives rather than setting the pace of the conflict.
Recent attacks illustrate the changing balance of power. In the village of Kouakourou, JNIM fighters attacked Malian and Africa Corps forces, shooting down and destroying a Russian Mi-24 helicopter. According to the source material, Africa Corps personnel reportedly abandoned dozens of Malian soldiers during the engagement, many of whom were subsequently captured and executed by insurgents. The incident underscored both Bamako’s dependence on Russian military support and the government’s diminishing ability to project force across large parts of the country.
The deteriorating security environment has also been shaped by an emerging tactical relationship between JNIM and the predominantly Tuareg separatist Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). Although the organisations pursue fundamentally different long-term objectives—JNIM seeks to establish governance based on its interpretation of sharia law, while the FLA seeks greater autonomy for northern Mali—they currently share an immediate interest in weakening the military junta and expelling Russian-backed forces.
That cooperation has become increasingly visible on the battlefield. Earlier this month, Reuters reported that insurgents launched coordinated attacks against five positions across Mali, forcing government forces to respond simultaneously on multiple fronts. Although Malian authorities stated that the assaults had been repelled and that numerous militants had been killed, the operations nevertheless demonstrated a level of operational coordination rarely seen during earlier stages of the conflict.
Even as JNIM and the FLA cooperate tactically, competition among armed groups remains intense. According to the New York Times, JNIM continues to compete with Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) for territory, recruits and influence throughout the Sahel. While JNIM has established itself as the region’s dominant jihadist organisation, ISSP continues expanding its presence, particularly in eastern Mali and western Niger. The existence of this rivalry complicates strategic calculations, with some experts warning that weakening JNIM could unintentionally create opportunities for ISSP to expand its influence.
The evolving battlefield has simultaneously highlighted the limitations of Russia’s security assistance. According to ADF Magazine, Moscow has introduced kamikaze-style first-person-view (FPV) drones following repeated battlefield setbacks against JNIM and the FLA. Yet insurgent groups have adapted rapidly. The FLA has become particularly proficient in employing FPV drones, reportedly even destroying a government helicopter with one in 2025, while armed groups have learned to disperse their forces and exploit terrain that reduces the effectiveness of Russian drone operations.
Against this backdrop, Mali has not dismissed the possibility of greater cooperation with Washington. In comments reported by The Washington Post, Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop said Bamako would consider working with the United States provided that any partnership respected Mali’s sovereignty and reflected the country’s national priorities. While the junta continues to emphasise its strategic relationship with Moscow, his remarks suggest growing recognition that existing security arrangements have not succeeded in containing the insurgency.
Nevertheless, significant questions remain over whether direct US military involvement would alter the trajectory of the conflict. As highlighted by The Soufan Center, analysts remain divided over the potential effectiveness of another external intervention. Wassim Nasr, Senior Research Fellow at The Soufan Center, told The Washington Post that neither France nor Russia had succeeded in suppressing the insurgency and questioned what would make an American approach fundamentally different. Analysts have also cautioned that direct US military action could encourage JNIM to begin targeting American interests, something it has historically avoided.
Ultimately, the security environment confronting policymakers bears little resemblance to that of the insurgency’s early years. The growing tactical coordination between JNIM and the FLA, the continuing rivalry with ISSP, and the inability of either Malian forces or their Russian partners to regain the initiative have produced a far more resilient and adaptive insurgent ecosystem. As The Soufan Center concludes, whether Washington ultimately authorises military strikes, limits its role to intelligence support, or decides against intervention altogether, it will face a conflict that has become significantly more complex, more fragmented, and more difficult for outside powers to influence.
