A proposed agreement on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz could mark a turning point not only for one of the world’s most strategically important waterways, but for the wider Middle East. According to an assessment published by Die Zeit, Iran and Oman have negotiated a framework for managing maritime traffic through the strait, while Oman has informally coordinated with the Trump administration. Whether the arrangement will take effect, and whether it will endure, remains uncertain.
The emerging agreement comes after months of conflict and heightened tensions involving Iran, the United States and Israel. Its potential significance extends well beyond the immediate question of whether ships can pass safely through the narrow waterway. The Strait of Hormuz carries a fifth of the world’s global fossil-energy demand, making any sustained disruption there a matter of international economic importance.
Die Zeit argues that the proposed arrangement could also become another step towards a Middle East increasingly organised independently of the United States. The publication describes the emerging regional order as one in which new alliances are developing while governments around the Gulf reassess their security arrangements and their dependence on Washington.
The reported agreement has been negotiated primarily by Iran and Oman, the two countries bordering the Strait of Hormuz. The United States was not directly involved in the negotiations, although Oman has maintained informal coordination with the Trump administration. The Gulf states were also informed of the process, according to the account. Oman has previously served as an intermediary between Iran and Western countries, giving the sultanate an established role in facilitating communication between the two sides.
Under the proposed arrangement, maritime traffic would follow two separately administered routes. Ships entering the Gulf would travel under the observation of the Iranian navy through Iranian territorial waters. On a southern route through Omani waters, vessels would be able to leave the strait, although this traffic would also be coordinated with Iranian authorities.
No formal customs duty would be imposed, according to negotiating sources cited in the account. However, “voluntary payments” described as processing fees and compensation for environmental impacts would reportedly be encouraged. The proposed system would therefore give Iran a formal role in managing shipping through a waterway whose security has consequences far beyond the countries immediately surrounding it.
For the region and the global economy, any reduction in tensions around Hormuz would nevertheless have immediate significance. Financial markets have already anticipated the possibility of an agreement through recent gains, while lower energy prices could provide relief to governments affected by the conflict and its economic consequences.
The wider implications, however, are more complicated. Die Zeit argues that the proposed deal could strengthen Iran’s position within the region at a time when the country’s government is seeking to consolidate its authority. For Iranians opposed to the Islamic Republic, the publication suggests, an agreement that reinforces Tehran’s regional influence would represent another setback.
The regional powers themselves are already adapting to the changing circumstances. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly sought to discourage US President Donald Trump from pursuing a military solution, while the United Arab Emirates has also sought an accommodation with Tehran after drone attacks threatened Dubai’s economic model based on tourism, transport and commodity exports. Qatar, meanwhile, has long favoured coexistence and mediation with Iran, while sharing the world’s largest gas field with the country.
At the same time, Gulf states are looking beyond traditional reliance on American security guarantees. A new security agreement between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey, publicly announced on Friday, has introduced another significant element into the emerging regional order. The agreement includes a mutual defence commitment under which an attack on one member would be treated as an attack on all three.
The combination of Pakistan’s nuclear capability, Turkey’s large military and defence industry, and Saudi Arabia’s economic and resource strength has been compared by Die Zeit to a kind of Middle Eastern NATO. Its mutual-defence formula recalls Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which established the principle of collective defence within the transatlantic alliance.
The shift is linked to the experience of Gulf states during the recent conflict. American military bases on their territory, rather than providing an unqualified shield, have also made them potential targets. Although the Gulf countries currently have no equivalent alternative to their alliances with Washington, the changing security environment is encouraging consideration of stronger independent deterrence.
That raises the prospect of a wider nuclear arms competition. The possibility is particularly striking because preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons was a central justification for military action by the United States and Israel. The conflict could nevertheless strengthen the calculation among other regional powers that maintaining a nuclear option is necessary for their own security.
On July 22, the US government agreed with Saudi Arabia on cooperation over a civilian nuclear programme. Die Zeit questions how securely such a programme could remain civilian if regional tensions continue, particularly as Saudi Arabia simultaneously develops new defence arrangements and prepares for the possibility that Iran’s nuclear programme cannot be permanently contained.
The proposed Hormuz agreement is also linked to the unresolved question of negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme. A framework for a ceasefire between the United States and Iran in June had envisaged negotiations once the Strait of Hormuz reopened, although that arrangement collapsed within days. If the proposed agreement with Oman produces a lasting reopening of the strait, negotiations over the nuclear programme could theoretically begin within 60 days.
Yet the prospects for such negotiations have become more uncertain as the balance of power has shifted. Reports cited by Die Zeit from CNN and the US think tank CSIS indicate that the United States has used substantial quantities of its missile-defence ammunition during the conflict, including half of its Patriot missiles and four-fifths of its THAAD missiles. The depletion has consequences beyond the Gulf, with Ukraine requiring Patriot systems and US allies in Europe and the Pacific also watching the resulting shortages.
The constraints have narrowed Washington’s military options. A further major escalation against Iran would require resources that the United States may not be able to deploy at the same level as during the weeks of “Epic Fury”. Replenishing depleted stocks to pre-war levels could take years, according to experts cited in the account.
Within Iran, meanwhile, divisions over how to proceed have intensified. President Peseschkian, Foreign Minister Aragtschi and parliamentary speaker Galibaf have reportedly come under growing pressure. They regard the agreement with Oman as an achievement and see a possible agreement with Washington as a route towards economic relief.
The leadership of the Revolutionary Guards, however, has demanded a more aggressive approach and greater concessions from the United States. It has called for the immediate lifting of the blockade, the withdrawal of sanctions and unrestricted oil exports, while moderate government figures have faced denunciations in regime media.
These internal divisions raise a fundamental question about the durability of any agreement. Even if a deal is reached and the Strait of Hormuz reopens, its stability would depend on whether the Iranian faction negotiating the arrangement can maintain sufficient authority to enforce it.
The proposed agreement therefore represents more than a maritime arrangement. It could ease pressure on a vital global trade route while simultaneously exposing the emergence of a more fragmented regional security system. The United States remains an important power in the Gulf, but governments across the region are increasingly considering how to protect their interests when American guarantees appear less certain.
As Die Zeit’s account suggests, the immediate question is whether ships will once again move freely through Hormuz. The larger question is what kind of Middle East will emerge if the region’s governments increasingly organise their security, diplomacy and economic relationships without relying exclusively on Washington. The answer could shape not only the Gulf but the wider international order surrounding one of the world’s most important strategic waterways.
