Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps used a procurement network operating out of the United Arab Emirates to obtain sensitive Chinese satellite communication equipment linked to its military drone programme, according to leaked commercial contracts and shipping records reviewed by the Financial Times. The revelations expose how Tehran continued to exploit Gulf trade networks despite years of western sanctions targeting its defence procurement system.
The documents show that the IRGC Aerospace Force acquired military-grade satellite communications technology in late 2025 through a company based in the emirate of Ras al Khaimah. The arrangement is particularly controversial because the same branch of the Revolutionary Guards later launched missiles and drones at the UAE during Iran’s retaliation against joint US-Israeli strikes. The attacks left extensive damage across the Gulf state and intensified fears about the vulnerability of regional trade and financial hubs to covert military operations.
According to the records seen by the Financial Times, the UAE-based company Telesun facilitated the shipment of approximately 1.8 tonnes of Chinese-made satellite antenna equipment from Shanghai to Iran. The cargo reportedly passed through Dubai’s vast Jebel Ali container port before being transferred onto an Iranian vessel for final delivery to Bandar Abbas.
The case highlights the increasingly sophisticated methods Iran has employed to bypass sanctions and acquire strategic technologies. Analysts have long warned that the UAE’s sprawling network of free trade zones, designed to attract global business and investment, can also be exploited by actors seeking to evade international oversight. For decades, the Emirates has served as a commercial gateway for Iranian businesses operating offshore, even during periods of heightened regional tensions.
Financial Times reporting and satellite analysis traced the movement of the shipment through multiple stages. The records indicate that the Chinese container ship Zhong Gu Yin Chuan transported the cargo from Shanghai to Dubai, arriving at Jebel Ali Container Terminal 1 in August 2025. Shipping documents show the container was later collected by the Iranian vessel Rama III, which docked at the same quayside in November before departing toward Iranian waters.
What followed has raised further concerns among maritime security experts. According to GPS tracking data reviewed by the Financial Times, the Rama III initially appeared to sail out of the Gulf before pausing briefly near the coast of Oman. Yet satellite imagery captured on November 25 suggested the vessel was nowhere near its reported position, indicating it may have been engaging in “spoofing” — the deliberate broadcasting of false navigational information to disguise its true movements.
Days later, satellite images showed a vessel matching the Rama III’s dimensions and appearance docked at Shahid Rajaee port in Bandar Abbas, the destination identified in customs paperwork linked to the shipment. The findings suggest an orchestrated effort to conceal the transfer route and reduce the likelihood of detection by foreign monitoring agencies.
The shipment itself was described in customs records as “antenna and accessories” and arrived in six separate cases. The cargo was consigned to Ertebatat Faragostar Kish, or EFK, an Iranian telecommunications company that is not currently under western sanctions. However, contracts reviewed by the Financial Times show Telesun acquired the Chinese equipment on behalf of EFK for a project connected to Saman Industrial Group, a company already sanctioned by the US Treasury.
Washington has accused Saman Industrial Group of acting as a front company for the Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization, the research and development arm behind the Revolutionary Guards’ ballistic missile, electronic warfare and drone programmes. US authorities previously alleged that Saman coordinated the acquisition of drone-related equipment through intermediary companies operating across several countries, including components such as servomotors, antennas and other unmanned aerial vehicle technologies.
The European Union has also sanctioned the Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization, accusing it of involvement in supplying Iranian drones to Russia during the war in Ukraine. Western intelligence officials increasingly view Iran’s expanding drone programme as one of the most destabilising military developments in the region, with Tehran using both domestic innovation and international procurement networks to strengthen its capabilities.
The Financial Times previously reported that the Revolutionary Guards had secretly acquired a satellite launched by the Chinese company The Earth Eye. The satellite was allegedly used to monitor US military installations and Gulf infrastructure before Iranian attacks earlier this year. In response, the United States imposed sanctions on The Earth Eye, warning that Chinese entities assisting Iran’s military operations would face further punitive action.
US officials have repeatedly argued that Tehran’s procurement operations rely heavily on commercial intermediaries and dual-use technologies that are difficult to regulate. The latest disclosures are likely to intensify scrutiny of Gulf-based trading firms and shipping routes that remain vulnerable to sanctions evasion schemes.
The shipping agent connected to the latest consignment, Blue Calm Marine Services, had already been sanctioned by Washington in 2023 for allegedly facilitating shipments tied to Iran’s missile propellant development programme. The company’s inclusion in the operation underscores the persistence of logistics networks that continue functioning despite mounting western pressure.
Neither Telesun nor officials from the UAE foreign ministry responded to questions from the Financial Times regarding the allegations. Iran’s embassy in London also declined to comment.
The revelations come at a time of mounting regional instability following months of escalating confrontation between Iran, Israel and the United States. The UAE, despite maintaining a cautious diplomatic relationship with Tehran, became one of the principal targets of Iranian retaliation after the US-Israeli strikes. Iranian forces launched more than 2,800 missiles and drones toward the Gulf state, including attacks on civilian infrastructure and military sites.
For Gulf governments and western allies, the leaked records offer a rare glimpse into the hidden commercial architecture underpinning Iran’s military supply chains. They also raise difficult questions about whether major regional trade hubs can effectively prevent sensitive technologies from being diverted into conflict zones. As investigations continue, the Financial Times reporting suggests that the battle over sanctions enforcement is increasingly being fought not only on the battlefield, but deep within the global shipping and logistics industry itself.
