President Xi Jinping’s relentless purge of China’s military and defence-industrial elite has taken a new and revealing turn, deepening doubts about whether the People’s Liberation Army is truly ready to match the power of the United States. The sudden disappearance of three senior civilian figures linked to weapons production has sharpened speculation that the downfall of China’s top general last month was not merely about corruption, but about deeper failures in military preparedness.
According to reporting by the Times UK, an academic, an engineer and the former head of China’s main state-owned aerospace company have been quietly removed from the National People’s Congress, the country’s parliament. State media offered no explanation for their disappearance from public life, a familiar signal in Chinese politics that an investigation is under way. Their removal follows the dramatic fall of General Zhang Youxia, formerly vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission and the most senior uniformed officer in the country.
The scale of the purge is striking. Of the six top military leaders who sat on the Central Military Commission at the Communist Party Congress in autumn 2023, five have now been disgraced. Only one remains: General Zhang Shengmin, who oversees the military’s sprawling anti-corruption campaign. The message from the top appears unmistakable. Loyalty to Xi, and results in modernisation, are no longer optional.
The three newly vanished figures are deeply embedded in China’s weapons ecosystem. Zhou Xinmin was chairman of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, the vast state conglomerate responsible for producing fighter jets and drones for the PLA. Luo Qi served as chief engineer of the China National Nuclear Corporation, while Liu Cangli led the China Academy of Engineering Physics, a body central to nuclear weapons research. All three have been accused, directly or indirectly, of corruption tied to failures in military manufacturing and procurement, particularly within the strategically sensitive rocket force that oversees missile deployment.
Their removal lends weight to a growing theory: that General Zhang’s fall was triggered not only by corruption allegations but by disagreements with Xi over the pace and priorities of military modernisation. Xi has set an ambitious timetable for the PLA, demanding that it complete its modernisation programme by 2035, with an interim milestone next year marking the force’s centenary. In official language, this goal is often interpreted as achieving parity with, or the ability to defeat, the US military in a regional conflict.
Behind the scenes, however, the reality appears less impressive. Investigations into the rocket force have uncovered what officials privately describe as a woeful state of readiness, especially when Xi first came to power. Corruption, the selling of ranks for cash and falsified procurement records have long plagued the PLA, hollowing out capabilities that look formidable on paper but unreliable in practice.
It was the downfall of Zhang Youxia that truly startled observers. Zhang, 75, was no ordinary general. His father had fought alongside Xi’s father during and after the civil war, and both men hailed from the same district. That personal history led many to assume that Zhang was a trusted ally, hand-picked by Xi and even retained beyond retirement age at the last party congress as a sign of confidence.
His purge therefore carried an unmistakably personal edge. An editorial in the People’s Liberation Army Daily accused him of “trampling on” the chairman responsibility system, language widely read as an accusation of defying Xi’s authority as head of the military. Rumours circulated last year, though never substantiated, that Zhang had even considered a coup attempt, claims dismissed by many analysts as implausible but politically useful.
The continuation of the purge into the civilian defence sector complicates the narrative. These officials wielded technical and industrial power rather than political clout, suggesting that the party leadership is intent on reinforcing the idea that systemic corruption and incompetence, rather than factional politics, lie at the heart of the crisis. As the Times UK notes, Zhou Xinmin’s departure from Avic last July indicates that investigations have been unfolding quietly for months.
Analysts argue that the real fault line may be strategic. K Tristan Tang of the Jamestown Foundation has pointed to recent articles in the PLA Daily that emphasise “obstacles” to meeting the centenary goal. Xi is widely believed to prioritise readiness for a rapid invasion of Taiwan, demanding forces that can act at short notice. Zhang, by contrast, may have favoured a more balanced, long-term approach to modernisation, spreading resources across the services rather than concentrating on a single scenario.
In most systems, a strategic disagreement would not automatically end a career. Under Xi, however, dissent carries a high price. Zhang is the only senior figure in the current leadership whose rise was not entirely dependent on Xi’s patronage, making him uniquely vulnerable once trust eroded. As Tang observed, once Xi’s authority appeared undermined, “only one option was available”. Removing Zhang became a political necessity as much as a military decision.
The purge has unfolded as Xi has sought to project confidence abroad. This week he held talks with President Putin and President Trump, underscoring that he remains firmly in control at home. In his conversation with Trump, Xi returned to his central concern, warning that US arms sales to Taiwan risk destabilising relations. “The US must handle the issue of arms sales to Taiwan with prudence,” he said.
Yet the turbulence within China’s military leadership raises uncomfortable questions. If Xi is forced to repeatedly purge those closest to the heart of the defence establishment, it suggests that the gap between ambition and reality remains wide. For a leader who has staked his legacy on national strength and military revival, the fall of so many generals may be less a sign of confidence than of unfinished business.
