The expulsion of hundreds of Russian intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover across Europe in 2022 forced Moscow to reconsider how it conducted covert operations abroad. Rather than relying primarily on intelligence personnel stationed in European capitals, Russian intelligence services increasingly turned to an unconventional pool of recruits: criminals, migrants and economically vulnerable individuals who could be hired remotely to conduct surveillance, vandalism, arson and other acts of sabotage. The resulting system resembles a commercial service in which violence and disruption can be commissioned, outsourced and paid for, often without the people carrying out the operations understanding who is directing them.
The expansion of this model, described as the use of ‘disposable agents’, represents a significant challenge for European security services. According to research by The Soufan Center, Russian intelligence organisations, particularly the GRU and Federal Security Service (FSB), have progressively developed these recruitment methods since 2022. The tactics escalated between 2022 and 2025 and appear to have expanded further in 2026, with no clear indication that the pattern is slowing. Other states, including Iran, are also reportedly adopting similar methods to generate instability in Europe and elsewhere.
Poland has become one of the most prominent examples of this emerging threat. Its Internal Security Agency recently announced the arrest of two Ukrainian men, aged 24 and 25, accused by prosecutors of conducting reconnaissance of critical infrastructure and military installations on behalf of Russian intelligence. They are also alleged to have set fire to vehicles fitted with Ukrainian military registration plates, an operation prosecutors say was intended to inflame anti-Ukrainian sentiment at a time of heightened tensions within Poland.
The arrests follow a series of investigations involving suspected Russian-directed activities. In July, Polish prosecutors charged an 18-year-old Ukrainian with 47 offences, including desecrating memorials to Polish victims of wartime massacres and preparing a drone attack. He was allegedly recruited online and paid through cryptocurrency. Warsaw has also attributed the May 2024 fire that destroyed the Marywilska 44 shopping centre to Russian intelligence services. In January, Polish prosecutors charged four Ukrainian nationals and one Russian national over explosive parcels that ignited at courier depots in Britain, Germany and Poland.
The recruitment process is designed to create distance between intelligence agencies and the individuals executing their instructions. Research by Bart Schuurman, a professor at Leiden University, indicates that disposable agents are typically men from Eastern European countries, including Ukraine, Russia, Moldova and Bulgaria, as well as the Baltic states. Recruitment frequently begins in Telegram job-search channels or through criminal intermediaries. What appears to be an ordinary employment opportunity can become an entry point into an operation involving surveillance, sabotage or violence.
The scale of these online recruitment activities is considerable. Independent news outlet Vot Tak identified more than 20 million job advertisements containing concealed sabotage offers in Telegram chats during 2026 alone. The volume illustrates how digital platforms can be exploited to identify potential recruits without requiring intelligence officers to establish direct contact with them.
The networks themselves operate through several layers of intermediaries. The GRU and FSB reportedly rely on handlers based in Western Europe to identify recruits and communicate instructions. Additional intermediaries may separate those handlers from the individuals carrying out the operations. Research by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism in The Hague found that instructions can pass through at least five intermediaries before reaching a young operative who may have little or no knowledge of the wider operation. Some recruits never meet their handlers, know their identities or even realise that they are working for a foreign intelligence service.
The 2024 arson attack on a London warehouse illustrates how such arrangements can develop into serious operations. In October 2025, five men were sentenced for their involvement in setting fire to a warehouse in East London containing supplies destined for Ukraine. The attack, carried out in March 2024, caused approximately £1 million in damage.
According to British counter-terrorism police, 21-year-old Dylan Earl established contact with the Wagner Group, a Russian private military organisation, through Telegram in 2023. He subsequently recruited Jake Reeves, who helped bring three additional men into the operation. Investigators also discovered that the group had conducted surveillance of two other London businesses in preparation for further attacks. The wider operation was disrupted following Earl’s arrest in April 2024.
The methods are not confined to Europe. In September, the United States Department of Justice unsealed charges against five individuals allegedly involved in a Russian intelligence-linked criminal network. Prosecutors allege that the network was led partly by a former Russian intelligence officer and his son, an active FSB officer, and used Cuban and Venezuelan nationals as intermediaries to recruit individuals in the United States. Their alleged objective was to surveil and ultimately assassinate a Russian dissident. One recruit was reportedly offered between $1,000 and $1,500 for surveillance work, with a further $40,000 promised for carrying out the assassination.
Financial incentives are central to the system. Research by the Royal United Services Institute’s Centre for Finance and Security indicates that payments vary according to the seriousness of the assigned activity. Minor acts of vandalism attract relatively small sums, while serious violent operations can command tens of thousands of dollars. Nationality also influences payment levels: Ukrainian recruits are often offered approximately one-tenth of the amounts offered to disposable agents in Western Europe.
Payments are frequently made through Bitcoin or Tether USD, a cryptocurrency pegged to the US dollar. Other transactions involve cash distributed through cryptocurrency brokers and informal exchange desks, or transfers into ordinary bank accounts. These arrangements allow recruitment networks to move money through channels that can obscure the relationship between the person making a payment and the individual performing the task.
This presents a particular problem for European financial institutions. Banks already operate anti-money-laundering systems designed to monitor transactions, identify unusual payment patterns, screen customers against sanctions lists and detect connections to known criminal or terrorist activity. However, sabotage financing has not received the same dedicated attention as terrorist financing or sanctions evasion. European countries have yet to establish specific financial alerts, guidance or national risk assessments addressing this activity.
The distinction matters. Existing monitoring systems may identify suspicious transactions without recognising their connection to an intelligence-directed sabotage operation. Without clear indicators, financial institutions may struggle to distinguish payments for apparently minor criminal activities from transactions forming part of a wider foreign intelligence campaign.
The emerging threat therefore extends beyond the immediate question of who sets fire to a warehouse, damages infrastructure or conducts surveillance. It concerns the ability of state intelligence services to exploit economic vulnerability, criminal networks, digital recruitment platforms and weaknesses in financial oversight to organise operations while keeping their own personnel at a distance. Europe’s challenge is no longer simply to identify foreign intelligence officers operating on its territory. It is to recognise and disrupt networks in which the people carrying out the attacks may never know whose interests they are serving.

