While the Islamic State (IS) no longer controls territory across Iraq and Syria as it did at the height of its power, the group is adapting to a transformed security environment, exploiting political uncertainty, institutional weaknesses, and evolving regional dynamics to maintain its presence.
A new assessment from The Soufan Center finds that IS operations have reached historic lows in 2026, but the decline in attack numbers does not indicate the group has been neutralized. Instead, the organization has adjusted its methods, expanding its focus beyond traditional battlefield targets as security conditions across the Levant continue to shift.
The group’s activity this year has followed a pattern marked by two major spikes, one in February and another in June, amid a broader decline in overall operations. Recent attacks in Syria have demonstrated a change in strategy, with IS targeting a wider range of government, infrastructure, and political targets rather than concentrating primarily on military positions associated with the U.S.-led counter-ISIS coalition.
In the latest wave of violence, IS carried out at least four attacks in a single week against buses transporting Ministry of Defense personnel, oil tankers, commercial trucks, military regional headquarters, and local political figures, including judges. Additional attacks targeted security checkpoints near oil fields, while IS leadership issued messaging calling for the removal of U.S. influence from Syria.
The developments come as the United States completes its military withdrawal from northeast Syria and prepares for a full withdrawal from Iraq by the end of 2026. The departure of U.S. forces is also accompanied by changes to other international support missions, including capacity-building and advisory efforts such as the NATO Mission-Iraq.
Despite the recent increase in attacks, analysts continue to assess that IS remains significantly weaker than it was during the mid-2010s, when the group controlled large areas of Syrian and Iraqi territory, attracted thousands of foreign fighters, operated an alternative political economy, and launched sophisticated international attacks.
The number of IS attacks recorded in 2026 remains substantially lower than the surges seen in 2023 and 2024. However, analysts caution that measuring the threat solely through attack numbers overlooks the significance of changing tactics and target selection.
Aaron Zelin of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy told The Soufan Center that IS activity should not be viewed simply as either eradication or resurgence. He described the group as being at its weakest point since it entered Syria in 2013, while noting that unresolved security factors require careful assessment of the current threat environment.
“The reality is somewhere in between,” Zelin said, according to The Soufan Center’s assessment, emphasizing that the group’s reduced operational capacity does not eliminate concerns about future opportunities for recovery.
The changing nature of IS operations is closely tied to developments in Syria, where the collapse of the Assad regime and the emergence of a new administration have created new openings for militant groups to exploit. The administration, largely composed of fighters affiliated with the former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is attempting to consolidate authority while managing contested territories, new security structures, and competing political pressures.
IS has shifted from its previous focus on ambushes against checkpoints and convoys linked to the international coalition, particularly in northeastern Syria, toward a broader campaign targeting sectarian minorities, political figures, and Syrian Ministry of Defense and Interior personnel.
The group’s attacks appear designed around two objectives: weakening the new administration’s security forces and undermining confidence in its ability to provide stability. By creating insecurity and disruption, IS seeks to exploit existing grievances and prevent the consolidation of state authority that could limit its ability to rebuild.
The transition has also created challenges for Syria’s emerging counterterrorism institutions. Although the new government has committed to fighting IS, cooperated with neighboring countries including Türkiye on arrests and disrupted plots, and formally joined the U.S.-led counter-ISIS coalition in November 2025, its capabilities remain under development.
A recent Office of the Inspector General quarterly report on Operation Inherent Resolve noted that Syria’s counterterrorism capacity will require time to mature. Building intelligence networks, improving security procedures at detention facilities, strengthening relationships with local tribes, and maintaining focus on IS while addressing other national challenges remain long-term tasks.
In Iraq, security officials continue to assess that IS has far less ability to reorganize compared with its remaining networks in parts of Syria, including Deir Ez-Zor, Hasakah, Damascus, and Aleppo. However, concerns remain over detention facilities holding IS members and the possibility of low-level escape attempts that could support recruitment efforts.
The vulnerability of these facilities was highlighted during regional tensions in March, when Iran-aligned Hashd al-Shaabi militias launched strikes near Baghdad’s Al-Karakh prison, which housed thousands of IS prisoners transferred from Syria. On June 21, Iraq’s Joint Operations Command announced strikes against IS hideouts in Anbar’s desert region, reflecting the group’s continued but fragmented presence.
As the United States moves toward a reduced role in direct counterterrorism operations, responsibility will increasingly shift to regional governments. IS has continued to call for the removal of U.S. influence, while attempting to exploit the security gaps created during this transition.
The group’s current position is far removed from its territorial expansion years, but its evolving tactics show an organization adapting to new circumstances. As Iraq and Syria enter a new phase of security management, the ability of local forces to sustain counterterrorism operations will shape the next chapter of the fight against Islamic State.
