The only local government institution that the JVP has ever won in Sri Lanka’s local government history is the Tissamaharama Pradeshiya Sabha. The JVP secured victory in the Tissa Pradeshiya Sabha during the 2002 local government elections. By winning Tissa, the JVP demonstrated to the country that if it ever formed a government, it would model it after Tissa. At that time, the JVP generated media attention by publicising its governance in Tissa, highlighting how the Pradeshiya Sabha saved money and reintroduced the cooperative system.
Winning the Tissa Pradeshiya Sabha was a significant victory for the JVP, marking the party’s peak. Following this success, the JVP contested the 2004 general election in alliance with the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). To the surprise of not just the JVP but the entire nation, the party secured 39 parliamentary seats. Notably, JVP candidate Vijitha Herath topped the Gampaha District preferential list, surpassing Anuradha Bandaranaike, the perceived political heir of the Bandaranaike family.
As the JVP surged in popularity, Colombo’s business and diplomatic communities grew wary. Business leaders began engaging with the JVP, while diplomats sought meetings with its leaders. Business organisations even invited JVP representatives to seminars on Sri Lanka’s economy, eager to understand the party’s economic vision. Many believed that the JVP was either on the verge of forming the next government or becoming the main opposition.
The JVP’s next major political manoeuvre was supporting Mahinda Rajapaksa in the 2005 presidential election, leading a campaign to defeat Ranil Wickremesinghe. When Mahinda won, many assumed he would govern in alignment with JVP principles and that the party would secure powerful ministerial positions in his government.
However, Mahinda did not give the JVP the recognition it expected. Aware of Mahinda’s attempts to weaken the party from within, the JVP decided to withdraw from its alliance with the SLFP and contest the 2006 local government elections independently. These elections were held when the JVP was at its peak, yet the party managed to win only one local government body—Tissa Pradeshiya Sabha, which it had previously won in 2002. This was the beginning of the JVP’s decline.
The downfall accelerated when the opposition leader, Ranil Wickremesinghe, attempted to ally with Mangala Samaraweera to defeat Mahinda’s budget. The JVP initially considered supporting this move, but Mahinda countered by engineering a split within the party, breaking the JVP-Ranil alliance. This led to Wimal Weerawansa leaving the JVP, further fragmenting the party. By the 2011 local government elections, the JVP lost control of the Tissa Pradeshiya Sabha, where it had previously dominated. The party’s influence dwindled as it fell to third place in the Tissa Pradeshiya Sabha election.
The JVP’s trajectory in Sri Lankan political history has been one of dramatic rises and equally sharp declines.
In 1971, the JVP launched an armed rebellion, shaking the entire nation. Both local and foreign observers believed the party was on the brink of seizing power. Although the rebellion was ultimately crushed, the JVP emerged as a major political force. However, this wave of momentum was short-lived. Following the rebellion’s suppression, the JVP was marginalised.
The party re-entered democratic politics by contesting the 1982 presidential election, securing over 200,000 votes. However, this outcome shattered the JVP’s hope of gaining power through elections. The party seemed weak and politically ineffective.
The JVP resurged in 1988, fuelled by widespread anti-India sentiment following the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord. Between 1988 and 1989, the JVP wielded immense influence, controlling the country through fear and coercion. Many believed the party was on the verge of seizing state power. Yet, in a shocking turn of events, the Premadasa government brutally suppressed the JVP, eliminating its entire leadership except for Somawansa Amarasinghe.
After this devastating defeat, the JVP remained in political obscurity for years. It began to regain strength with the 2000 general election. By 2004, the JVP had climbed back to the political forefront, reaching its highest point in electoral success. However, like in previous instances, its momentum did not last. The decline began in 2006 and continued thereafter.
It is difficult to pinpoint the exact reason, but the JVP’s rise has always resembled a ‘soda bottle’—an intense burst of energy followed by a rapid decline. Unlike other political parties, the JVP does not experience gradual, sustained growth. Instead, it surges like a storm and then dissipates.
This pattern repeated itself after the 2022 ‘Aragalaya’ (struggle). Before the protests, the JVP was often ridiculed as a mere 3% party. However, following the mass uprising, the party experienced an unexpected surge, resembling a political tsunami.
Yet, the 2024 presidential election results did not reflect this perceived wave. Anura Kumara Dissanayake secured 42% of the vote—an impressive feat but still short of the 50% threshold required to win outright. In the 1988 presidential election, Ranasinghe Premadasa managed to secure 50% of the vote despite facing JVP-instigated violence. Anura’s 42% was seen as a major mandate in the 2024 general election, largely because the major opposing parties—Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) and Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP)—failed to mount serious campaigns. Many powerful politicians refrained from aggressive campaigning, fearing electoral humiliation at the hands of the JVP. As a result, the JVP reached its political peak once again, securing both the presidency and a two-thirds parliamentary majority.
It is impossible to predict with certainty. Unlike in 1971, 1988, and 2004, the JVP now controls both the presidency and a commanding majority in government. This could serve as the foundation for sustained political dominance.
However, history suggests that the very factors contributing to the JVP’s rise—its revolutionary zeal and uncompromising approach—could also lead to its downfall. If the party fails to adapt to the challenges of governance, its current wave may collapse like those before it. Whether the JVP can break free from this cycle remains to be seen.
