The wars that have reshaped the Middle East since the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, have entered a diplomatic phase marked by a striking common obstacle: the parties involved remain unwilling to make concessions before their adversaries do the same. Whether seeking leverage or resisting coercion, major state and non-state actors across the region continue to demand that promised commitments be implemented first, complicating attempts to end conflicts and restore stability.
That pattern is examined in a recent assessment by the Soufan Center, which argues that developments across Iran, Lebanon and Gaza demonstrate the limitations of coercive diplomacy in achieving strategic objectives. Actors that might traditionally be regarded as militarily defeated or severely weakened have nevertheless retained sufficient political and military infrastructure to frustrate adversaries seeking to secure war termination on acceptable terms.
Iran and its regional allies, according to the Soufan Center assessment, have demonstrated an ability not only to resist capitulation but also to secure significant strategic gains. At the same time, the United States and its regional partners have repeatedly struggled to translate battlefield advantages into durable political outcomes, with domestic opinion and electoral politics placing additional constraints on their diplomacy.
The problem is particularly visible in Lebanon, where Washington has sought since April to mediate the first direct Israel-Lebanon government-to-government talks since 1983. The effort is intended to strengthen a fully sovereign Lebanese government capable of exercising a monopoly over armed force on its territory and to reduce the influence of Hezbollah and Iran.
A June Israel-Lebanon-U.S. “Trilateral Framework” provides the mechanism for that process. Under the framework, Israel would gradually withdraw from south Lebanon and transfer territory taken from Hezbollah to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Iran and Hezbollah have opposed the arrangement. Hezbollah has said it would not disarm until Israel withdrew from all territory it holds in Lebanon.
Israel, meanwhile, has been reluctant to relinquish its buffer zone against attacks on northern Israel. Israeli forces have continued striking Hezbollah positions they regard as threats and demolishing homes that might shelter Hezbollah fighters. Israel’s insistence that withdrawal from south Lebanon must be contingent on Hezbollah disarmament contributed to the early end of last week’s Israel-Lebanon talks in Rome.
Lebanese officials have pressed the Trump administration to obtain concrete Israeli concessions, including the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from additional areas of southern Lebanon. Yet Beirut has indicated that it will not boycott the next round of negotiations scheduled for September 1. Official Lebanese sources told Qatar News Agency: “There is no freeze on the negotiations, and no one has officially spoken about this matter.”
The diplomatic impasse has also exposed domestic pressures facing Lebanon’s leadership, with experts maintaining that Lebanese leaders are under increasing pressure to demonstrate that negotiations can deliver an Israeli evacuation of southern Lebanon and halt the destruction of Lebanese villages.
A similar dynamic is unfolding in Gaza. Last week, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the “Board of Peace”, the multilateral organisation established under his October 2025 “20 Point Peace Plan” for Gaza, had secured a pledge from Hamas and other armed groups in Gaza to disarm. Trump presented the commitment as an important diplomatic achievement that could contribute to long-term regional stability.
The pledge, if implemented, would address what the Soufan Center assessment describes as the principal obstacle to stabilising and ultimately rebuilding the Gaza Strip, where the overwhelming majority of the population has been displaced from their homes. The U.S.-backed plan envisages an International Stabilization Force entering the enclave and a technocratic governing body appointed to replace Hamas moving into Gaza from Cairo.
But Israel has rejected the arrangement. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told a cabinet meeting on Sunday that the IDF “will not carry out any withdrawal until Hamas is genuinely disarmed and will continue to thwart threats against our forces and our citizens.” The Israeli position effectively makes Hamas disarmament a condition for withdrawal from territory still under Israeli control.
The rejection, in turn, allowed Hamas to reaffirm its own insistence that it would not disarm until Israel withdraws. Press reports indicated that Netanyahu sought to limit further tensions with Trump by informally pledging to restrict attacks on Hamas fighters across the “yellow line” from the 70 percent of Gaza territory controlled by Israel.
The third major obstacle lies in Iran, where the dispute centres on the Strait of Hormuz. Despite more than a month of U.S. strikes, threats of escalation and mediated engagement, Washington has not secured an agreement for the full reopening of the strategic waterway to international shipping.
Such an agreement would create a pathway towards negotiations under a June Memorandum of Understanding covering limitations on Iran’s nuclear programme, relief from U.S. sanctions and internationally funded reconstruction to repair damage caused by the U.S. and Israeli air campaign.
Instead, Iranian hardliners have demanded that Washington provide economic concessions before Iran reopens the Strait to all traffic. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps command and other hardliners have refused to surrender what they regard as their principal strategic gain from the conflict. Iran’s Supreme National Security Committee said the Strait would not reopen until the United States lifted its blockade of Iranian ports, released all Iranian frozen assets, paid reparations, withdrew its forces from the “proximity” of Iran and ended Israel’s intervention against Hezbollah and other Iranian allies.
The demands also reflect the growing influence of hardline elements within Iran’s political and security establishment. The Soufan Center assessment says extreme IRGC hardliners have prevailed over more moderate elected civilian leaders, including President Masoud Pezeshkian and Majles (parliament) Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.
Last week, Iran’s Supreme Leader appointed IRGC Major General Mohsen Rezaei as Secretary-General of the SNSC. Rezaei, who commanded the IRGC during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, had opposed the June MOU as offering excessive concessions to the United States. His appointment was accompanied by the confirmation of Ahmad Vahidi as IRGC Commander and the appointment of hardline cleric Hossein Taeb to head the Basij.
For now, the Iranian decisions indicate that reopening the Strait and returning to the MOU are not imminent. Trump has responded by saying the United States will concentrate on economic pressure rather than military escalation. Regional mediators, however, continue attempting to narrow the differences. Iran and Oman are reportedly discussing a possible formula for shared management of the Strait, while Pakistani and Qatari officials are mediating between Washington and Tehran.
On Tuesday, Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif told Bloomberg News in Islamabad that the two sides were close to “some sort of an arrangement … Things are shaping up again in favor of a peace arrangement or a deal.”
Across all three fronts, the same diplomatic dilemma remains: each side seeks evidence that its adversary will honour concessions before making its own. In Lebanon, Israel wants Hezbollah disarmed before withdrawing; in Gaza, Israel demands Hamas disarm before relinquishing territory; and around the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian hardliners are demanding U.S. economic concessions before restoring unrestricted international shipping.
The result, as the Soufan Center assessment makes clear, is a regional environment in which military pressure has repeatedly failed to produce the political concessions required to end conflicts. Battlefield outcomes may alter the balance of power, but converting those outcomes into lasting agreements remains dependent on reciprocal commitments that the principal actors continue to resist making first.
