Syria is not a direct combatant in the escalating confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Iran, yet it is far from a passive observer. According to analysis from the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Damascus under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa has adopted a strategy best described as “active neutrality,” seeking to avoid direct military involvement while leveraging the crisis to reposition itself regionally and internationally.
This approach reflects a significant shift from Syria’s previous alignment. Under former president Bashar al-Assad, the country functioned as a central pillar of Iran’s regional network, serving as a conduit for weapons transfers and a base for Iranian forces and Hezbollah operations. Since Assad’s fall in late 2024, however, Iran’s presence in Syria has been dramatically reduced, and the new leadership increasingly views Tehran as a destabilizing force rather than an ally. In this context, efforts by the United States and Israel to weaken Iran align, at least partially, with Syrian interests.
Despite avoiding direct participation in hostilities, Syria has played a strategic role in the broader conflict. Its territory has effectively served as a corridor for aerial operations, enabling freedom of movement for American and Israeli forces targeting Iranian threats. While earlier instances of such activity appeared to reflect Syria’s limited capacity to resist, current developments suggest a degree of tacit coordination, underscoring improving ties between Damascus and Washington.
Diplomatically, al-Sharaa has embarked on an intensive campaign to reintroduce Syria as a constructive regional actor. Through sustained engagement with regional and international leaders, Syria has condemned Iranian actions while emphasizing its own commitment to stability. Planned visits to major European capitals and outreach to Arab states signal a broader effort to rebuild legitimacy and attract political and economic support.
This diplomatic push also includes a clear attempt to integrate Syria into the Sunni Arab bloc. Engagements with countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Jordan, and others reflect a coordinated strategy to reposition Syria within a new regional alignment. At the same time, Damascus is promoting its geographic and strategic value, including proposals to serve as an overland trade corridor linking the Gulf to the Mediterranean, particularly as maritime routes face disruption.
On the security front, Syria has increased its military activity along key borders, particularly with Lebanon and Iraq. Reports of Hezbollah movements near the Syrian-Lebanese border have prompted a reinforcement of Syrian troop deployments, alongside discussions—though not confirmed—of potential offensive measures. Such actions remain highly sensitive. Syria’s military capabilities are still recovering, and any escalation risks drawing the country into a broader conflict while inflaming internal divisions.
The situation along the Israeli border is even more delicate. Syrian forces have attempted to establish a buffer zone in the south to prevent provocations by Iranian-linked groups, but these moves have been met with suspicion by Israel. Tensions escalated in March when Israeli forces struck Syrian military targets following clashes between government forces and armed Druze groups. While the Syrian government framed its actions as a security operation against smuggling, local actors accused it of targeting communities and escalating violence.
These incidents highlight the fragile and complex relationship between Damascus and Jerusalem. From Syria’s perspective, the conflict with local militias is part of a broader effort to consolidate state authority, similar to its approach in other regions. For Israel, however, any expansion of Syrian military activity near its borders raises concerns about long-term intentions and the potential for future confrontation.
Beyond military and diplomatic maneuvering, the war has also exacerbated Syria’s internal challenges. Disruptions to regional energy supplies have significantly worsened the country’s already fragile electricity sector, cutting available power by roughly half in some areas. Economic recovery efforts have stalled amid ongoing instability, while returning refugees place additional strain on limited infrastructure and services.
These pressures have intensified public dissatisfaction, prompting the government to emphasize resilience and gradual progress. In a recent address marking Eid al-Fitr, al-Sharaa acknowledged the severity of the economic situation while framing it as part of a transitional phase. He warned against internal destabilization and sought to project confidence in the government’s direction, even as living conditions continue to deteriorate for many Syrians.
The broader implications of Syria’s current strategy are complex. Al-Sharaa appears to be navigating a narrow path between external opportunity and internal constraint. His efforts to distance Syria from Iran, rebuild ties with Arab states, and engage with Western powers suggest a long-term vision of reintegration into the regional system. At the same time, his leadership must contend with limited resources, security threats, and questions about legitimacy.
For Israel, this evolving reality presents both risks and potential openings. Deep mistrust of the Syrian leadership persists, shaped by both historical experience and concerns about al-Sharaa’s ideological background. Yet the weakening of Iranian influence and Syria’s apparent willingness to curb Hezbollah activity create areas of overlapping interest.
As the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) analysis suggests, the challenge for policymakers lies in balancing deterrence with cautious engagement. Maintaining military readiness while exploring indirect channels of cooperation could help shape Syria’s trajectory in ways that contribute to regional stability.
