Syria has fallen, but not into the arms of liberation – it has tumbled headlong into the clenched fists of extremism. The overthrow of Bashar al-Assad by Abu Mohammad al-Julani, the jihadist mastermind behind Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is less a revolution than a recalibration of chaos. Once an al-Qaeda affiliate, HTS now stands as the governing force in a fractured and war-weary Syria. In the ashes of al-Assad’s regime rises a state born of ideology, not inclusion, where diplomacy bows to dogma and the spectre of global terrorism regains its swagger. This is not the dawn of peace like most celebrate but the prelude to a storm, one whose ripples will rattle the corridors of power from Tehran to Washington.
The 53-year rule of the al-Assad family ended in a mere 12 days. The fall of the al-Assad regime marks the end of an era of authoritarian rule, but it hardly heralds a new dawn of stability. Al-Julani’s HTS has transitioned from a fringe jihadist group to the de facto ruler of Syria, but its path to governance is fraught with peril. The group’s extremist roots, though masked by recent rebranding efforts, leave Syria teetering on the edge of a new kind of chaos. This seismic shift in the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape carries far-reaching implications, reverberating across terrorism, regional alliances, and global security.
Internally, HTS faces the daunting task of governing a country ravaged by war. But the ironic matter is that HTS in itself is a jihadist entity previously affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Media groups, civil society and the general worldwide population seem to cheer al-Julani on as he topples al-Assad. But in reality, having a terrorist entity in power is never a solution. This has never worked and never will. Instead, what is likely to transpire is an alienation of Syrians who hoped for liberation rather than an exchange of one form of oppression for another. Humanitarian concerns will skyrocket as millions already displaced by the conflict find themselves further marginalised under a regime unlikely to prioritise inclusive recovery efforts.
They say history does not repeat itself, but it sure does rhyme. The world witnessed this same stage play during the overthrow of the Saddam regime in 2003 Iraq. Worldwide cheers after bringing down the ‘Butcher of Baghdad’ quickly drowned as the great head of the Islamic State snake rose in that conflict – a conflict that led to the rise of al-Julani himself.
Al-Julani, whose real name is Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa, is a young leader with a well-trimmed beard, fair complexion and warm smile. But none of these trumps the fact that al-Julani is a violent terrorist who has brought havoc to countless people, families and regions. Before his position at the helm of HTS, al-Julani led its predecessor group, Jabhat al-Nusra, also known as the al-Nusra Front.
His journey to jihad could be simplified as follows. The second Palestinian intifada in 2000 instils in him the vigour to wage jihad against the ‘oppressors’. The 9/11 attacks inspires him to take arms and fight. The 2003 US invasion of Iraq gives him the opportunity to join al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a predecessor of the Islamic State. The 2011 Syrian Revolution gives him a footing in Syria. The ongoing Syrian Civil War allows him to thrive and expand within Syria, leading up to his current position as de-facto leader of the country.
During his time with AQI, al-Julani is said to have become close with the founder of Islamic State, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, although reports vary. After or during his imprisonment by coalition forces, he meets the infamous Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who will go onto become the first caliph of the Islamic State. When the Syrian Revolution and subsequent civil war starts, al-Bagdadi’s Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), the successor of AQI and predecessor of Islamic State, is moved to Syria. The Syrian element is called Jabhat al-Nusra or al-Nusra Front. Leadership of this group is given to al-Baghdadi’s friend and ally al-Julani.
With the al-Nusra Front’s grip on terrorism in Syria, the US moved to list al-Julani as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. The group was responsible for scores of attacks killing hundreds of civilians including children. With the security vacuum in Syria during the revolution and war, al-Julani placed a firm grip on the region. With this success, al-Baghdadi decided to publicly announce the IS caliphate and that the Iraqi (ISI) and Syrian (al-Nusra) elements of the group are forming under a single caliphate known as the Islamic State (IS) under his rule. However by now, al-Julani was already comfortable with power in Syria and rejected al-Baghdadi’s merger, instead vowing to operate separate to IS. This never meant that al-Nusra had become reformed or moderate – it simply meant that al-Julani declined to cede power to al-Baghdadi and instead opted to focus on Syrian nationalism rather than transnational IS jihadism.
Although al-Julani cut off ties and opposed IS from this point, he was still closely allied with al-Qaeda, especially with bin Laden’s second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri. Later, due to internal conflicts, al-Julani seemed to have opposed al-Zawahiri as well. Ultimately al-Nusra Front entered into a merger of multiple rebel groups to form Hayat Tahir al-Sham in 2017. The membership and core ideology of al-Nusra Front is dominant within HTS. Therefore the rise of HTS to takeover Syria is not some white knight in shining armour coming to liberate Syria from al-Assad. It is a violent jihadist who has had affiliations with not only one but two of the largest terrorist groups on the planet – IS and al-Qaeda.
The rise of HTS to power could reinvigorate the global jihadist movement. Al-Julani’s ability to establish himself as a state leader grants newfound legitimacy to extremist ideologies, inspiring a wave of recruitment worldwide. Syria, once a battlefield for diverse opposition factions, is now poised to become a centralised hub for jihadist activity. HTS’s control over Syrian territory provides a safe haven for extremist groups, echoing the early days of IS’s caliphate. This foothold could enable HTS to attract foreign fighters, fundraise through illicit means, and orchestrate attacks abroad – should it easily return to its transnational jihadist roots.
Regionally, HTS’s ascendancy forces neighbouring powers to recalibrate their strategies. For Iran, the loss of its key ally al-Assad deals a severe blow to its ambitions of regional hegemony. Tehran’s influence in Syria, crucial for its ‘axis of resistance’ against Israel, is now under threat. The crippling of Hamas, defeat of Hezbollah, cornering of the Yemeni Houthis and now the fall of al-Assad is a critical blow to its network of allied groups. This could provoke a more aggressive Iranian posture elsewhere in the region, particularly in Iraq, Yemen, Jordan and Lebanon, to compensate for its Syrian setback. Jordan is likely to be the first to be affected by new proxy conflicts between the Iranians and Israelis.
Turkey, which has walked a tightrope between opposing al-Assad and containing HTS, faces a new conundrum. While Ankara may find short-term relief in Assad’s removal, it must now contend with the prospect of an unstable state on its southern border. This could exacerbate tensions over Kurdish forces and reignite Turkish interventionism in Syria. This is not to overlook the role Turkey played in the fall of al-Assad, especially through the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA).
For Israel, the threat is clear and present. An HTS-controlled Syria poses a direct security challenge, with the potential for increased cross-border attacks and an emboldened jihadist presence in the Golan Heights. The prospect of an extremist state near its borders will force Israel to bolster its military posture and forge closer ties with Arab states through pragmatic alliances – or outright invasion. With the fall of al-Assad, the Israeli military has already bombed Syrian government buildings, military assets and installations. In addition, the Israelis have taken control of the tallest mountain in Syria, Mount Hermon considered a major strategic victory.
The Gulf states, having cautiously reengaged with al-Assad in recent years, are now thrust back into uncertainty. Their stance toward HTS – either as a foe to be suppressed or a force to be co-opted – will shape the next phase of Middle Eastern diplomacy.
The shockwaves from Syria will not stop at the Middle East. For the United States and its Western allies, HTS’s takeover presents a conundrum. Direct intervention to dislodge HTS risks igniting another prolonged conflict, but inaction allows the group to consolidate its power. Washington must also grapple with the erosion of its influence in the region, as rivals like China may seep to exploit the power vacuum.
Russia, having invested heavily in propping up al-Assad, faces humiliation. Moscow’s strategic outpost in Syria is now in jeopardy, undermining its broader ambitions in the Middle East. Meanwhile, China’s approach may be more calculated: it could seize the opportunity to offer HTS conditional economic assistance in exchange for influence, leveraging its Belt and Road Initiative to solidify its foothold in the region.
The European Union, already struggling with the fallout of the Syrian refugee crisis, faces the prospect of a new wave of displacement. HTS’s extremist ideology, coupled with its inevitable crackdowns, will likely drive Syrians to flee en masse, straining Europe’s social and political fabric. However, at the same time, EU lawmakers will also try to justify sending back large swaths of Syrian refugees claiming that the threat to their lives have been removed with the fall of al-Assad.
An HTS-controlled Syria reshapes the global threat landscape in profound ways. For one, it signals the durability of jihadist movements in the face of international counterterrorism efforts. HTS’s success may embolden other extremist groups, challenging the notion that such organisations can only exist on the fringes of global politics. Like the Taliban’s resurgence to the helm of Afghan leadership, a former al-Qaeda/IS militant at the helm of Syrian leadership is a significant shift to the regional and global security landscape.
Furthermore, the rise of a jihadist state undermines the rules-based international order. If HTS is able to govern and engage with other nations, however tenuously, it sets a dangerous precedent for non-state actors seeking to wield state power. This destabilises not only the Middle East but also fragile regions like the Sahel and South Asia, where insurgent groups may be inspired to emulate HTS’s playbook.
Al-Julani’s takeover of Syria represents not the end of the Syrian conflict but the beginning of a new and uncertain chapter. The repercussions will ripple far beyond Syria’s borders, destabilising regional alliances, empowering extremist ideologies, and complicating global security strategies. The world’s response to this crisis will determine not only the future of Syria but also the trajectory of the global fight against extremism. To contain the fallout, the international community must act decisively, balancing pressure on HTS with efforts to alleviate the humanitarian crisis. Yet, as history has shown, solutions in Syria are never simple.
It all comes down to the next calculated move of Uncle Sam and his allies. If sanctions and listings on HTS and al-Julani are removed, it could prove to be a perilous situation to global security. The West has not seemed to realise that the enemy of their enemy is not necessarily their friend in the war on terror. This was witnessed in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and African states. Supporting one bad actor to suppress another always leads to catastrophic consequences.
However, the Western media seem to romanticise al-Julani and his band of jihadists as some saviours of Syria. The fatal flaw in this type of reporting is a radical perception change whereby al-Julani and HTS would come to be considered allies and friends, or at least moderates. Until they are not. When things go south, as they will, global think tanks and media groups would class it as the typical ‘No one saw that coming’ event, then a series of reports on why the standard analysis from standard institutions using standard tropes went up Merde Creek sans Paddle. In essence this is avoidable by not dropping the guard on violent unpredictable groups in the first place. In the shifting sands of the Middle East, stability remains elusive, and the path forward is as perilous as ever.
