Some sense of diplomacy and peace has prevailed in West Asia after the US-Iran deal was signed. However, its durability remains questionable. India’s strategic response to almost five months of conflict in the Middle East has attracted critical attention. A section of analysts argues that India sided with Gulf partners, mainly the US-Israel axis, and left Iran alone, which has emerged as the winner of this conflict. The one-sided nature of the conflict in the Middle East has cost India, but this perspective is not entirely accurate. The lenses through which India’s crisis diplomacy is evaluated require some revision, but there are lessons to be drawn.
India’s crisis diplomacy has long focused on stability management and balancing. The infusion of a non-alignment approach reflected a sense of pragmatic restraint aimed at balancing hard-power relations more effectively. Perhaps the first real instance of crisis diplomacy came during the Korean War in the 1950s. India managed diplomatic stability through non-alignment, refusing to align with any bloc. New Delhi voted for UN resolutions condemning North Korean aggression but abstained from resolutions authorising the use of force. India maintained diplomatic balance and stability by serving as a mediator and offering a neutral medical unit instead of combat troops. India chaired the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and authored the UN resolution on Prisoners of War (POWs), contributing to a peaceful end to hostilities.
Within three years, India faced its first major crisis in the Middle East during the Suez Canal Crisis, which disrupted international trade, especially imports of industrial machinery and food. A prolonged war in the Middle East threatened India’s economic stability. India condemned the Anglo-French invasion as a return to old imperialism. At the same time, India worked closely with the United States and the United Nations to de-escalate the situation. India carefully balanced its anti-colonial stance with its reliance on Western economic aid. It co-sponsored the UN resolution demanding the withdrawal of foreign forces and contributed significantly to the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to maintain peace in the region.
India’s crisis diplomacy had three essential elements that aligned with key principles of crisis management: stabilisation, communication, and balancing. However, the way it was executed sometimes complicated matters. For example, India’s muted response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait under Saddam Hussein’s leadership faced criticism. However, I. K. Gujral’s visit to Iraq and a quiet diplomatic approach enabled the safe repatriation of around 170,000 Indians trapped in Kuwait, according to some reports. An informal hug with Saddam Hussein sent mixed signals that affected India’s position during the 1991 Gulf Crisis.
However, during Vajpayee’s tenure, this positioning began to exhibit calibrated pragmatism that maintained effective communication, balance, and, most importantly, domestic stability when faced with extreme pressure on diplomatic and economic fronts. India began strategic de-hyphenation and adopted a multi-vector engagement approach in the Gulf, laying the groundwork for expanding its influence in the region. The first major step was cultivating ties with Israel and bringing Indo-Israel relations out of the shadows.
In 2003, Ariel Sharon became the first Israeli Prime Minister to visit India. The visit signalled that India was no longer driven solely by Arab considerations and strategic restraints, but by strategic pragmatism that prioritised national interests. In another example of a pragmatic approach that same year, Iranian President Mohammed Khatami was the Chief Guest at India’s Republic Day celebrations. The two nations signed the Delhi Declaration, focusing on energy security and a strategic partnership. Most notably, India diversified its energy portfolio in the Gulf by expanding hydrocarbon cooperation with Saudi Arabia rather than relying only on transactional oil purchases.
However, the Vajpayee government’s policy faced a major test, similar to the challenge encountered by the V. P. Singh government during the 1991 Gulf War. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 tested India’s response as it was beginning to strategically realign itself with West Asia. India adopted a balancing approach, but this time it was neither reactive nor chaotic, unlike in 1991.
At the economic level, the Vajpayee government managed energy security through aggressive contingency planning, diversified commercial contracts, and open diplomatic engagement with OPEC. By 2003, India’s economic growth was accelerating, making it one of the world’s fastest-growing oil consumers. The Ministry of Petroleum utilised this “demand leverage” during interactions with OPEC ministers.
Vajpayee’s crisis diplomacy reflected a quiet but pragmatic approach and proved successful. It also marked a subtle departure from strategic restraint and slow pragmatism under the NAM strategy, opening the path towards strategic autonomy-based crisis diplomacy.
Cut to the US-Iran war. India’s crisis diplomacy came under intense scrutiny, with critics calling it a failure of strategic autonomy and India’s Gulf policy. Primarily, critics base their arguments on three grounds. First, India allegedly weakened its position through a muted response and by leaning towards one side of the geopolitical axis during the war. Second, critics point to stability issues on the domestic front. Third, they highlight the Pakistan factor during negotiations.
The way these issues were handled can be debated, but India’s crisis diplomacy is not entirely at fault. Rather, it once again demonstrated that its grand strategy-oriented crisis diplomacy is resilient and capable of maintaining stable crisis management.
The response to the first criticism—that India had adopted a muted or fractured position, resulting in misalignment in the Gulf during the war—is that there was never any question of alignment. Crisis diplomacy is fundamentally about maintaining stability under extreme pressure and geopolitical headwinds, and India remained open to all Gulf partners, especially Iran. The goodwill generated through strategic financial and logistical commitments towards the Chabahar port played a crucial role in maintaining India’s engagement with Iran.
During the conflict, India actively leveraged back-channel diplomacy with Iran to safeguard its energy supplies and economic stability. Following the June 2026 US-Iran peace agreement and the subsequent 60-day US sanctions waiver, the benefits of these back-channel discussions became clear. Iran immediately agreed to support India’s energy recovery by offering a rapid resumption of hydrocarbon and crude oil trade.
There was minimal impact on Indo-Iran relations, and India managed to preserve its strategic stability—the first key pillar of crisis diplomacy—unlike Pakistan, where domestic and economic pressures intensified. In a nutshell, India was not aligning; it was managing and balancing. Therefore, the argument that India completely abandoned Iran is inaccurate and unfounded. Diplomatic rhetoric may suggest otherwise, but effective crisis diplomacy is determined by actions rather than narratives.
The second argument is that India faced stability issues on the economic and domestic fronts, but this is also not entirely accurate. India’s back-channel discussions, neutrality, and rapid diversification of oil trade provided some relief in economic indicators despite strong headwinds that placed immense pressure on the government’s fiscal position. Economic data suggests that India absorbed a significant fiscal shock but successfully prevented domestic instability, allowing the country to emerge from the 2026 crisis with its fundamental growth trajectory intact. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) maintained its 6.5% GDP growth projection for India for the 2026–27 fiscal year, citing strong domestic consumer demand. Successfully maintaining stability and emerging from crises further demonstrate that India’s crisis diplomacy delivered effective tactical and strategic responses to the challenges arising from conflict.
The third and most prominent argument concerns Pakistan’s claim that it has emerged as a key regional player or has regained strategic depth in the Gulf, while India remained a silent observer. Pakistan’s role in the negotiations was largely a matter of political projection, with the presentation of documents being portrayed as peacemaking efforts, whereas Qatar played the more substantive role. Despite staging the so-called Islamabad talks in Pakistan and Munir’s reported shuttle diplomacy, both efforts failed to produce significant outcomes.
Critics often overlook the fact that Pakistan has limited strategic depth in the Gulf and has lacked significant influence for a considerable period due to limited strategic leverage and persuasive capacity. The narrative surrounding Pakistan’s renewed strategic autonomy in the Gulf must therefore be examined carefully. In contrast, key regional actors are naturally drawn towards promising and rising markets, where India possesses greater economic and strategic potential. The exaggerated projection of Pakistan’s role must therefore be analysed with greater caution and awareness.
In short, India maintained stability, balance, and, most importantly, communication, even when much of that communication occurred through back channels. Ultimately, India passed the stress test of crisis diplomacy. The critical interpretation of India’s approach perhaps emerges from reading too much between the lines or focusing more on perception than on strategic outcomes.
However, there are several crucial lessons that India must learn to make the execution of crisis diplomacy clearer and more direct. Strategic restraint continues to play a role at times, but it can also create mixed signals. For example, India’s delayed response to certain developments, followed later by diplomatic gestures such as sending the Foreign Secretary to the Iranian Embassy to express condolences, may create ambiguity.
The wait-and-watch approach associated with quiet diplomacy can sometimes affect the communication and balancing aspects of crisis diplomacy, or even conflict with them. This must be addressed through calibrated assertiveness, where strategic autonomy is used to clearly articulate and advance India’s national interests.
In conclusion, apart from a few minor shortcomings, India’s strategic response and grand strategy—which guide its crisis diplomacy—have demonstrated potential as an effective and stable crisis management framework in an unpredictable and anxiety-driven global order.
