Ukraine’s campaign of long-range strikes against Russian military and industrial targets has expanded rapidly, with specialised drone units using increasingly sophisticated weapons, intelligence networks and detailed mission planning to hit facilities deep inside Russia and Russian-occupied territory. One of the units at the centre of that expansion, the Kairos deep-strike battalion, has grown from a small operational force into a larger command capable of overseeing other units.
The transformation reflects advances in Ukrainian weapons manufacturing, but also a more complex system for identifying targets, planning routes and assessing the results of attacks. Satellite imagery supplied by Western partners, intelligence gathered on the ground and expertise from veterans of the energy industry help planners identify vulnerabilities in Russian air defences, oil refineries and natural gas facilities. In September, Kairos and other Ukrainian units set fire to an oil refinery near Moscow.
When Ray, the lieutenant colonel who commands Kairos, began operating unmanned aircraft in combat, Ukraine’s early mid-range strike drones could travel about 100 kilometres and carry warheads weighing roughly as much as a bowling ball. The weapons now used by his unit increasingly include small, inexpensive cruise missiles capable of travelling much farther into Russian territory, targeting everything from air defence systems to energy infrastructure.
The change has required more than improvements in range and payload. Before an operation, planners examine detailed maps and satellite photographs, comparing images taken at different times to identify changes at a target and determine where a strike might cause the greatest damage. Ray, who is identified only by his call sign because of the security sensitivity of his role, described the process as essential to preparing missions.
“We had to get the latest satellite images, not just for the strike target, but retrospectives to compare changes that had happened with time, and thereby crystallize the elements that we needed to strike,” he said.
Communications remain a significant constraint on the campaign. Ukraine cannot use SpaceX’s Starlink satellite internet service to control strikes inside Russia because the service is switched off there. Operators have developed other ways to communicate with weapons operating beyond the radio horizon, but Ray said no alternative had proved as effective or straightforward as mounting a Starlink terminal on an aircraft.
The distinction between remotely controlled drones and cruise missiles is important to the way the weapons operate. Drones are steered by pilots towards their targets, while cruise missiles are programmed to fly to specified locations. Without a reliable communications link, operators have less ability to guide a weapon during its flight or receive useful footage until the moment of impact.
The limitations have been particularly apparent during operations over Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory. Those missions have a higher success rate than strikes deep inside Russia, where communications restrictions make control more difficult. Ray recalled that, on the evening of a recent Starlink speed-throttling episode, Kairos drones operating over occupied Ukraine “simply dropped out of the sky”. However, a person familiar with the matter said Ukraine recorded no limits on the speed of its Starlink terminal connections during overnight testing on Saturday.
Despite these technical obstacles, Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign has reached a scale that is likely unprecedented. Russia’s Defence Ministry regularly reports hundreds of Ukrainian weapons entering Russian airspace during a single night. Moscow retains an advantage in ballistic missiles, including those used in attacks on Ukrainian cities, but Kyiv has increased the volume of its own attacks through sustained drone and cruise missile operations against targets inside Russia.
Kairos has also carried out numerous strikes within Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders, including operations across Russian-occupied territory. These missions became possible after Ukraine’s Defence Ministry negotiated a form of “white list” arrangement with SpaceX earlier this year, blocking Russian access to Starlink terminals while allowing Ukrainian forces to operate drones across occupied Ukrainian territory.
Ray said Kairos was the first unit to plan and execute a campaign against tankers in the Sea of Azov, striking 60 ships over the course of a month. The unit’s expansion has accompanied a broader increase in attacks on Russian oil refineries, gas terminals, Black Sea tankers and military targets. During this summer’s operation to isolate Crimea, the Unmanned Systems Forces recorded 7,000 drone strikes in the theatre, Ray said.
Kairos has since been upgraded from a battalion to the Unmanned Systems Forces’ 7th Separate Center, a larger command with hundreds of soldiers and the capacity to supervise other units. A similar organisational change took place in the 14th Separate Regiment, which originated much of Ukraine’s deep-strike work and has now become the 1st Separate Center.
The expansion comes as Ukraine faces growing pressure elsewhere in its war effort. With winter approaching, the country’s air and missile defences are running low, while relations with the United States, previously its biggest supporter, have deteriorated. President Donald Trump and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy have exchanged sharp remarks in recent weeks, adding uncertainty to Ukraine’s external support.
The economic effects of Ukrainian strikes have become increasingly visible in Russia, where consumers face shortages and rising prices and major companies struggle to maintain production. Attacks that take data centres offline can also disrupt internet traffic and commercial activity. Yet establishing the precise impact of individual operations remains difficult, and Kairos analysts must draw on multiple sources to determine whether their targets have been damaged.
Those sources include intelligence gathered on the ground, cyber intelligence, digital intrusions and videos posted on Russian social media. “After launch until the moment of strike we’re waiting on our results from different sources — Telegram channels from the Russian populations negligent enough to film,” Ray said. “And also people on the ground, digital hacks, cyber intel. This is all used by us not just to prepare the mission but to evaluate our results.”
Ray said additional funding and resources would allow Kairos to expand its operations further. “Especially in Crimea, throughout the sea, we can work seven times more,” he said.
