The Houthi movement’s rapid advance down Yemen’s Red Sea coast has given Iran a significant strategic gain while confronting Saudi Arabia with one of its most serious security challenges in years. By capturing key terrain near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Houthis have moved closer to a position from which they can threaten one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints, while Riyadh faces growing questions over whether it can reverse the advance without direct American military intervention.
The assessment, published by the Soufan Center, places the Houthi gains within the wider confrontation between Iran and the United States. The Houthis, described as the most potent member of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” have achieved what Iran’s other non-state allies have so far been unable to deliver: a development that could provide Tehran with potentially decisive leverage over Washington. Iran-aligned militia groups in Iraq have used ballistic missiles, drones and other weaponry against U.S. forces and allies and have contributed to attacks on energy infrastructure in the Arab Gulf states. Their contribution to Iran’s strategic counterattack has been significant, but not sufficient to compel President Trump to end the war on terms demanded by Tehran.
The Houthi advance has changed that calculation. In a lightning offensive launched in response to a ground attack by Saudi-backed Yemeni forces further north, Houthi forces had, by Friday, captured the port of Mocha and several islands in the Red Sea, including Perim. The fighting between the Houthis and the Presidential Leadership Council, also referred to as the U.N.-recognized Republic of Yemen Government, represented the culmination of tensions that had been escalating since June, when Saudi Arabia sought to enforce its blockade of Houthi-controlled entry points.
The confrontation followed a Saudi strike on the airport in Sanaa intended to prevent the landing of a flight by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-run Mahan Air, which allegedly was carrying Iranian weaponry for the Houthis. Before that strike, the Houthis and Saudi-backed forces had largely adhered to a 2022 ceasefire, although the breakdown of the truce was likely inevitable in the context of the U.S.-Iran war.
The significance of the Houthi gains lies not simply in the territory captured but in its proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. At Perim Island, the commercial shipping lane is only about two miles wide, bringing passing vessels within visual range of Houthi positions. According to regional experts cited by the Soufan Center, the Houthis no longer require advanced detection and guidance equipment to threaten vessels moving through the chokepoint. Direct fire, including anti-tank missiles, could potentially be used against ships attempting to cross it.
One regional expert described the new positioning as giving the Houthis “enormous power”. The strategic implications extend beyond Yemen. The ability to threaten the Bab el-Mandeb could amplify Iran’s broader capacity to exert pressure on global shipping and strengthen its position in relation to the Strait of Hormuz, where Iranian leaders have already sought greater control over maritime traffic as part of their demands for a return to a broader June Memorandum of Understanding.
The immediate economic effect was also significant. The Houthi capture of coastal positions contributed to another spike in global energy prices, pushing crude oil well above $100 per barrel. For Iranian hardliners, including key senior IRGC commanders and former commanders, the development offered a reason to reconsider whether sustained pressure on global energy markets could eventually force Washington to accept Tehran’s terms. Their position that the United States should recognise Iranian management of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has, however, faced opposition from more moderate Iranian leaders as U.S. Navy operations have successfully protected and guided increasingly large daily volumes of oil and other hydrocarbon exports through the strait.
The Houthi advance therefore arrives at a particularly sensitive moment. If the gains remain intact, Tehran could conclude that the leverage it appeared to be losing in the Strait of Hormuz has been partly restored through the Houthis’ position near the Bab el-Mandeb. That could complicate any effort to settle the Iran war, potentially strengthening Iranian demands at the negotiating table.
Washington has publicly sought to play down the immediate importance of the Houthi advance. U.S. officials have pointed out that the Red Sea is primarily a route for consumer goods travelling from China to Europe rather than a principal energy route, and that shipping can use an alternative route through the Suez Canal and around Africa. Regional experts have also noted a potential military vulnerability: the large Houthi force that seized the new territory has moved from protected positions in the mountains to exposed coastal positions, potentially making the fighters vulnerable to air strikes.
For Saudi Arabia, however, the advance represents a direct and immediate threat. Saudi officials assessed it as a breakout from a decade-long effort to contain the Houthis through diplomacy and economic incentives. The crisis was compounded by a reported attack by Iran-aligned Iraqi militias on the Kingdom’s East-West oil pipeline. The strike forced the pipeline to shut down for repairs, interrupting an important route Saudi Arabia has relied upon to compensate for Iran’s disruption of the Strait of Hormuz. The pipeline can carry up to 7 million barrels of crude from Saudi Arabia’s oil-producing heartland on the Persian Gulf to Yanbu on the Red Sea.
Riyadh responded by mobilising military forces and seeking assistance from its strategic partners, particularly the United States. Saudi Arabia reportedly deployed armoured personnel carriers, tanks, Apache attack helicopters and up to 200 fighter jets near the Yemen border. ABC News, citing a U.S. official, reported that the Kingdom would launch a major military operation against the Houthis even without outside assistance. The Houthis claimed that Saudi Arabia conducted 129 air strikes on Saturday, although those strikes reportedly did not materially change the battlefield balance. By Sunday, Houthi forces were continuing their advance towards Taiz and Marib, the last PLC stronghold in north Yemen.
Yet Saudi Arabia has found little evidence that its regional partners are prepared to intervene. The United Arab Emirates, which was the architect of the Saudi-Emirati war effort against the Houthis during 2015-2022, has not mobilised to assist Saudi-backed forces. Abu Dhabi’s position is linked in large part to its support for southern Yemen secessionist groups that rival the PLC. Pakistan has also stated that it would not send troops into Yemen to address a crisis that existed before the Mecca pact, preventing Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman from invoking the newly established “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement” between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan. Türkiye’s position is similar to Pakistan’s, raising questions about the validity and durability of the agreement.
That left Riyadh looking towards Washington. Mohammad bin Salman called President Trump twice on Thursday as the Houthis advanced towards Mocha, asking him to order U.S. air strikes to slow the offensive, according to an Axios report citing two unnamed US officials. Trump declined. On Saturday, he said he had spoken with his “good friend” MBS and that everything in Yemen would “work out fine and dandy” without U.S. intervention.
The decision reflects Washington’s broader reluctance to expand the Iran war into Yemen. Houthi spokesperson Mohammed Abdul Salam had assured that U.S. and Israeli ships in the Bab al-Mandeb would not be attacked if the United States refrained from military intervention. Trump confirmed the verbal exchange with Houthi officials in Dublin on Saturday. U.S. officials are also concerned about further stretching American munitions and other military resources.
For now, Washington has chosen a narrower role. A senior administration official told Al-Monitor that the United States was focused on “protecting our core national security interests — such as ensuring freedom of navigation in the Red Sea — while empowering our regional partners to take the lead in managing and resolving regional security challenges.” The administration has provided non-lethal support, including tactical intelligence, presumably through an established U.S.-Saudi fusion cell, while CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper travelled to Riyadh on Thursday to consult on possible responses.
The central question is whether that support will be enough. The Houthis have gained territory beside a vital maritime chokepoint, Saudi Arabia is confronting threats both inside Yemen and against its energy infrastructure, and Washington has decided not to intervene directly. Unless the Houthi advance is reversed, the Soufan Center assesses that the battlefield shift could leave Tehran with greater leverage as the United States seeks an end to the Iran war. For Saudi Arabia and its allies, the immediate challenge is therefore not merely to regain lost territory, but to demonstrate that the regional balance that has constrained the Houthis for a decade can still be restored without a direct American military commitment.
