A Chinese businesswoman romantically linked to Nvidia chief executive Jensen Huang was connected to an extensive network of companies and intermediaries allegedly involved in transferring advanced artificial intelligence chips into China, according to an investigation by the Financial Times (FT). The investigation identifies Alice Huang, a former executive at data centre company Megaspeed, as a central figure in a complicated commercial structure linking semiconductor suppliers, Chinese technology businesses, offshore corporations and individuals associated with an alleged Cambodian criminal enterprise.
Based on interviews with more than a dozen people familiar with the operations and an examination of hundreds of corporate filings, the FT reconstructed relationships between businesses that appeared largely unconnected but allegedly contributed to one of the world’s most lucrative illicit trading operations. The investigation found that these enterprises operated through multiple corporate layers, allowing Nvidia processors to move between jurisdictions before reaching customers in China.
The network developed against the background of increasingly restrictive US export controls designed to prevent Beijing from obtaining advanced Nvidia processors essential to developing sophisticated artificial intelligence systems. Washington’s restrictions have created a substantial underground market involving companies and intermediaries seeking to exploit gaps in international supply chains. According to the FT, the operation depended on three principal components: authorised suppliers, customers capable of satisfying corporate compliance requirements and intermediaries able to transport the hardware into China.
One of the principal connections involved Inspur, a Chinese technology company that had been among Nvidia’s major partners for assembling chips into servers. In March 2023, the US government placed Inspur on its entity list over allegations that it had assisted the Chinese military. However, its part-owned US subsidiary in San Jose, California, was not included. Following a name change to Aivres, the subsidiary continued trading with Nvidia.
The FT reported that Nvidia internally examined whether Aivres should qualify as an original equipment manufacturing partner because of its relationship with Inspur. The company ultimately concluded that Aivres satisfied its compliance and export control requirements. Nvidia has since confirmed that it restricted sales to Aivres.
The second component involved Megaspeed, an offshore business that emerged from the restructuring of an earlier Singapore-based company associated with 7Road International. Alice Huang acquired the Singapore unit in 2023 and renamed it Megaspeed. She subsequently presented the company to Nvidia as a legitimate cloud computing provider operating data centres in Malaysia and holding a leasing agreement with Alibaba.
According to people familiar with the arrangement, Huang was selected because her professional reputation, Hong Kong residency, English-language abilities and established business relationships made her a suitable representative for a company seeking access to international semiconductor supplies. Her husband, Kang Wei, was an early investor in Century Huatong, a Chinese gaming company whose commercial relationships also featured prominently in the FT’s investigation.
The third and reportedly essential component was the alleged smuggling infrastructure. People familiar with the operations identified Hu Xiaowei as an important intermediary. US authorities have described Hu as a leading figure in a Cambodia-based syndicate accused of cyber scams and money laundering. He was arrested in Japan during the summer. The FT traced his connections to Century Huatong through corporate shareholdings, business partnerships and individuals associated with the gaming industry.
The investigation also examined connections involving Prince Group, whose alleged criminal activities have been the subject of US sanctions and accusations. The group’s spokesperson rejected the allegations, saying Hu had never worked for the business and denying that it operated an illicit network. The spokesperson also disputed claims that the organisation used aircraft and underground financial channels to facilitate smuggling. Hu could not be reached for comment.
The commercial scale of Megaspeed’s operations was substantial. According to ImportGenius trade data examined by the FT, goods imported from Aivres by Speedmatrix, a Megaspeed subsidiary in Malaysia, had a declared value of approximately $4.6 billion between December 2024 and December 2025. Multiple people familiar with the distribution channels told the newspaper that many of the chips eventually reached China through smuggling routes involving several Southeast Asian countries.
An Indonesian police raid in early 2026 reportedly found empty server racks without graphics processing units at a local Megaspeed subsidiary, according to Singapore’s Straits Times. The FT also traced connections between the alleged distribution network and Shanghai Century Litong, identified by people familiar with the transactions as an important distributor of smuggled Nvidia processors within China.
The investigation identified further corporate relationships involving Century Huatong, its associated companies and Alice Huang’s business interests. However, the FT found no evidence that Tencent or Alibaba had participated in the alleged smuggling operations. Tencent, which holds a minority investment in Century Huatong, said it had no connection to or knowledge of the activities described. Alibaba did not respond to a request for comment.
Nvidia said it placed Megaspeed and a subsidiary on its block list in 2025, adding that it would reject sales through original equipment manufacturing partners if the companies were identified as intended recipients. Megaspeed has previously maintained that its business activities are legitimate and lawful.
The wider implications extend beyond the companies identified in the investigation. The FT previously reported that at least $1 billion worth of smuggled Nvidia chips had entered China within three months after President Donald Trump tightened restrictions on the H20 processor, a less powerful chip developed for the Chinese market.
Hanna Dohmen, a senior research analyst at Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology, argued that restrictions alone could not eliminate illicit supply chains when demand remained substantial. She warned that limiting access through Southeast Asia could simply encourage intermediaries to seek alternative countries and routes.
The investigation illustrates a central difficulty confronting Washington: export controls can restrict legitimate commercial transactions, but complex corporate structures, offshore intermediaries and established smuggling networks can create alternative channels for strategic technologies. As competition over artificial intelligence intensifies, the ability to control the international movement of advanced semiconductors remains a significant challenge for US policymakers.

