As U.S. and Israeli airstrikes continue to target Iran’s command centers, nuclear sites, and ballistic missile infrastructure, military experts caution that the current campaign underscores the inherent limitations of aerial warfare. According to reporting by Haaretz, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) provides a running tally of strikes, types of assets deployed, and broad categories of targets—but omits critical details such as munitions used, specific target locations, and battle damage assessments. These gaps make it difficult to determine the campaign’s effectiveness or whether gains can be maintained over time.
“The targeting list points to the limitations of airpower and why boots on the ground keep coming up,” Dr. Kelly Grieco, senior fellow at the Stimson Center and an expert on aerial warfare, told Haaretz. Despite President Donald Trump’s public discussions of negotiations with Tehran and a temporary halt on strikes targeting energy facilities, U.S. ground forces are already en route to the region. Two Marine Expeditionary Units, roughly 5,000 troops, have been deployed, with additional reinforcements reportedly under consideration.
Further illustrating the buildup, Haaretz notes that the Pentagon has dispatched around 2,000 paratroopers as part of an immediate response force capable of deploying worldwide within 18 hours. In total, approximately 50,000 troops are currently assigned to the Iran operation. Yet experts warn that even this scale may be insufficient to achieve strategic objectives without risking prolonged entanglement.
“Boots on the ground would make the Iraq war look like a walk in the park,” said William Hartung, senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Grieco added that the U.S. public’s enduring wariness of Middle East ground operations compounds the challenge. “Americans have spent two decades absorbing the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan in lives, money, and credibility. The lesson is not that we should commit more troops,” she said.
Analysts point to two potential objectives for a ground intervention: seizing Kharg Island, Iran’s central oil hub, or securing its nuclear facilities and enriched uranium stockpiles. Both scenarios pose extreme risks. Kharg Island is heavily defended, and Iranian forces are prepared to employ drones, naval assets, and missile fire to contest any landing. Taking the island may be feasible, but Iranian counterattacks along hundreds of kilometers of coastline could turn a tactical gain into a prolonged engagement.
Attacking nuclear facilities presents equally complex challenges. While U.S. and Israeli airstrikes have temporarily damaged or disabled sites, they cannot guarantee complete destruction or prevent facilities from being rebuilt. “The claims that Iran has been set back decades tend to exaggerate the impact of airstrikes,” Grieco told Haaretz. Air campaigns can degrade infrastructure and stockpiles but cannot erase the industrial expertise needed to restore operations.
Iran’s strategy relies on asymmetric warfare rather than direct confrontation. Its goal is not to match U.S. or Israeli airpower but to make operations costly and disruptive enough to force adversaries to question the price of continued engagement. The asymmetry is evident in costs: inexpensive drones and missiles can compel the U.S. to expend millions on interceptors, munitions, and defense systems.
Experts describe the Iranian approach as “hybrid air denial,” a tactic aimed at making airspace costly and contested rather than achieving total air superiority. Grieco told Haaretz that small, widely available drones can disrupt civilian life, close airports, interfere with shipping lanes, and undermine confidence in government defenses—all without deploying ground troops. In this framework, the campaign’s effects extend far beyond conventional military objectives.
The limited transparency of U.S. strikes adds another layer of concern. Haaretz reporting indicates that bombings have occasionally affected schools, hospitals, and other non-military sites, raising questions about civilian safety and strategic judgment. Meanwhile, Iranian tactics provide a model for other U.S. adversaries, who are closely studying drone and missile operations refined over years by proxy forces in Yemen, Lebanon, and Gaza.
Even a materially weakened Iran may emerge politically hardened. Grieco warned that a regime surviving American and Israeli campaigns could adopt a more hardline posture, remain isolated, and pursue nuclear capabilities as a security guarantee. Geopolitical complexities—including the Abraham Accords, U.S.-Israel security cooperation, and Gulf state rivalries—further complicate predictions about the region’s post-conflict landscape. “The absence of any serious public discussion about the postwar order, while the war itself is ongoing, is a significant failure of strategic thinking,” Grieco told Haaretz.
As Washington navigates a conflict combining airstrikes, rapid-response forces, and potential ground operations, experts caution that the pursuit of quick victories may be illusory. A ground operation risks entangling the U.S. in a quagmire far deeper than Iraq or Afghanistan, while asymmetric Iranian tactics could persist indefinitely. The unfolding situation demonstrates the limits of conventional military power and highlights the high stakes of engaging an adaptive and resilient adversary in a complex regional theater.
