For more than a decade, the Islamic State (IS) has been developing a foothold across the Sahel, but recent operations indicate that its regional affiliate has moved into a more advanced stage of organization, territorial control, and military capability. A new issue brief from The Soufan Center, authored by Wassim Nasr, describes Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) as a group that has evolved from a dispersed insurgent movement into a more capable force with the ability to hold territory, conduct complex attacks, and coordinate with other Islamic State networks in Africa.
The report identifies a strategic objective pursued by Islamic State since 2022: consolidating its two strongest African affiliates, ISSP and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Recent U.S. and partner operations, including U.S. strikes in Nigeria’s northern Sokoto State on December 25, 2025, and a joint U.S.-Nigerian operation that killed Abu Bilal al-Minuki, an important ISWAP figure, on May 16, 2026, highlight growing concerns over the connection between the two branches and their expanding operational relationship.
Although al-Qaeda’s Sahel affiliate, Jamaa’t Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), remains the most dominant jihadist organization in the region, ISSP has steadily increased its influence. The group’s growth has been especially visible since 2019, when it demonstrated the ability to maintain a sustained tempo of deadly attacks across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. That year also marked the beginning of direct fighting between ISSP and JNIM, a rivalry that continues to shape militant competition across the Sahel.
The origins of ISSP date back to mid-2015, when Abu al-Walid al-Sahrawi pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the founder and leader of Islamic State. The pledge came during a period when Islamic State was expanding beyond its core territories in Iraq and Syria. Although IS officially recognized Sahrawi’s allegiance in 2016, the Sahel-based faction initially remained linked to ISWAP, despite the geographical distance between northeastern Nigeria and the Sahel region.
The group’s early years were marked by a gradual increase in operational activity. In November 2019, Islamic State claimed its first lethal attack against French forces in the Sahel after an improvised explosive device killed French soldier Ronan Pointeau. Weeks later, 13 French servicemen died when two helicopters collided during an operation against the group in Mali. The organization also gained international attention after the October 2017 Tongo-Tongo attack in Niger, where four U.S. Green Berets were killed in an ambush involving local armed forces and French special operations forces.
French military operations that followed placed significant pressure on the group. Intelligence operations, surveillance, and targeted strikes restricted ISSP’s movement in the area known as the three-border region between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. The campaign eventually contributed to the killing of Sahrawi by French forces in Mali in August 2021.
However, Sahrawi’s death did not dismantle the organization. Instead, it became a turning point. Following his death, Islamic State granted the Sahel affiliate official provincial status, transforming the group into a separate branch. By 2022, ISSP entered a period of expansion driven by regional political instability, foreign military withdrawals, and internal security challenges.
Between 2020 and 2024, six coups occurred across the region, affecting Chad, Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Gabon. During this period, French forces involved in counterterrorism operations were pushed out of several Sahel countries. The arrival of Russia’s Wagner Group and later Africa Corps changed the security environment but did not prevent militant expansion.
The withdrawal of French forces from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, followed by the U.S. evacuation of its Agadez drone base in 2024, reduced Western intelligence and military capabilities in the region. The report states that the resulting security gaps created greater freedom of movement for both ISSP and JNIM, with operations increasingly taking place across areas where state authority remained limited.
The most significant territorial gains by ISSP occurred in Mali’s Ménaka region between 2022 and 2023. During this period, the group fought against multiple armed actors, including the Malian army, local militias, Wagner forces, and JNIM. One by one, these groups failed to stop ISSP’s expansion. While the town of Ménaka remained under government control with support from Africa Corps, much of the surrounding territory bordering Niger came under ISSP influence.
This territorial consolidation provided the group with a stronger base for operations. ISSP demonstrated the ability to move fighters and hostages across borders, extending its reach from areas around Agadez in Niger to the capital Niamey. In 2025, two elderly European women, one Austrian and one Swiss national, were kidnapped in Niger. An American missionary and pilot was also abducted near the presidential palace in Niamey. Indian mining workers in Niger and Moroccan truck drivers in Burkina Faso were among other foreign nationals kidnapped before later being released.
The group’s growing capabilities became increasingly visible in 2026. In February, ISSP carried out an attack against a convoy involving Malian military forces and Africa Corps fighters near Ménaka using a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device. The operation demonstrated the group’s renewed ability to conduct complex attacks after a four-year gap in using such tactics.
The clearest evidence of ISSP’s operational development came in January 2026 with the attack on Base 101 at Niamey International Airport in Niger. The assault represented the first time ISSP targeted an international airport and marked a major escalation in the group’s ability to strike protected military infrastructure.
The attack was carried out on the night of January 28–29, 2026, after what Islamic State claimed was weeks or months of surveillance. Fighters entered the military facility using motorcycles and vehicles, targeting aircraft hangars and military assets. They used rifles, mounted 12.7mm machine guns, RPG-7 rockets, and mortars, while fighters outside the base provided fire support. Commercial drones equipped with thermal vision were reportedly used to monitor the operation.
Unlike a suicide attack, the militants had a planned withdrawal route and left the area after nearly two hours of fighting when Africa Corps forces arrived. Islamic State media later highlighted the successful retreat of most attackers despite drone strikes. The operation demonstrated improved command structures, coordination, and technical skills, which The Soufan Center linked to increased cooperation between ISSP and ISWAP.
Evidence of this connection appeared during the attack itself, when fighters were heard speaking Arabic, Hausa, and Kanuri with accents associated with northeastern Nigeria, the main area of ISWAP activity. The report states that ISWAP likely helped provide ISSP with expertise in areas such as improvised explosive device production, training, fire support, and operational planning.
Less than two months later, ISSP launched another attack against Niger’s military infrastructure. On March 9, 2026, the group targeted Tahoua military airport, known as Base 401, which housed Niger’s TB2 drone capabilities. Two drones were damaged, and the control station was destroyed. The group then attacked military barracks in the city, demonstrating continued focus on security installations.
At the same time, ISSP’s expansion has intensified competition with JNIM. The two organizations remain ideological rivals despite sharing operational space. Their fighting has been concentrated in Mali and Burkina Faso, but both groups are increasingly moving toward border areas linking Niger, Nigeria, and Benin.
In Benin, JNIM carried out an attack on military barracks in Pendjari Park in March 2026, killing at least 15 soldiers and capturing a U.S.-made M113 armored personnel carrier. ISSP has also sought to expand into Benin, although an earlier attempt in 2022 was disrupted after the group faced opposition from JNIM.
The Soufan Center report describes ISSP’s current position as the result of territorial consolidation in Mali, improved links with ISWAP, and the acquisition of new operational capabilities. While JNIM remains the stronger jihadist organization in the Sahel, ISSP has become a significant competitor with the ability to challenge its influence. Therefore, the future of the region will be shaped by continued competition between the two groups, shifting relationships with local communities, and the ability of governments across the Sahel to respond to increasingly capable armed organizations.
