A mounting series of arrests, expulsions, and intelligence alerts across Europe has intensified concerns that China is running a broad and coordinated espionage campaign targeting the European Union and its neighboring states. Over the past two years, intelligence services in multiple countries have uncovered what officials describe as a dispersed network of agents, collaborators, and influence operatives embedded in academic institutions, technology firms, political circles, and diaspora communities. The pattern emerging from these cases suggests not isolated incidents, but a sustained effort to extract strategic information and shape political environments in ways that serve Beijing’s long-term interests.
One of the most illustrative recent cases emerged in Germany, where authorities detained a German-Chinese couple accused of collecting sensitive military-related technological information from universities. The investigation, which became public in May, pointed to the systematic targeting of academic research environments, particularly those linked to dual-use technologies that can serve both civilian and military applications. German officials believe such operations are part of a wider strategy to acquire early-stage innovations before they reach commercial or defense-sensitive maturity, an approach that has become increasingly common in espionage cases across Europe.
Across the continent, intelligence services estimate that around thirty suspected agents or collaborators linked to Chinese state interests have been identified in just the past two years. Some have been arrested, others expelled, and several cases remain under judicial review. European security officials describe the network as fluid rather than hierarchical, relying on a mix of professional intelligence officers, contractors, recruited intermediaries, and individuals operating under commercial or academic cover. While Beijing consistently rejects allegations of espionage and dismisses them as politically motivated accusations, the accumulation of cases has raised questions about the scale and coordination of its overseas intelligence operations.
Concerns have also been voiced within European political institutions. German Member of the European Parliament Engin Eroglu, who chairs the delegation for relations with China, has argued that Chinese intelligence activity in Europe has become “significantly more professional, broad and diversified” over the past decade. According to his assessment, the focus has shifted away from traditional military and diplomatic secrets toward a wider spectrum of targets, including critical infrastructure, artificial intelligence research, semiconductor development, and political decision-making processes. He has also warned that diaspora communities and dissident networks are increasingly subject to surveillance and pressure.
The issue of covert influence has extended beyond classic espionage cases. In recent years, so-called “clandestine police stations” allegedly linked to Chinese authorities have been reported in several European countries. Dutch authorities first moved against such facilities in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, prompting wider scrutiny across the continent. An investigation by NGO Safeguards Defenders claimed that more than one hundred unofficial overseas security offices operated across dozens of countries. Governments in Europe have expressed concern that such structures may be used to monitor, intimidate, or pressure members of the Chinese diaspora, including political dissidents and activists.
The scale of the challenge is often illustrated through comparisons of intelligence capacity. European policymakers have pointed out that Chinese security and intelligence personnel may number anywhere between 100,000 and 800,000, depending on estimates. By contrast, the United States is believed to maintain roughly 30,000 intelligence officers, while European Union member states collectively account for around 35,000 to 40,000. Although such figures are imprecise, they reflect a perception in European policy circles of structural asymmetry in intelligence resources and global reach.
Germany has also become a focal point for political and corporate espionage concerns. In 2024, an assistant to a Member of the European Parliament affiliated with the far-right Alternative for Germany party was arrested on suspicion of spying for China. Around the same period, German authorities charged several individuals with transferring sensitive military and scientific data obtained through publicly funded research projects. These cases have reinforced fears that academic and political ecosystems remain vulnerable entry points for foreign intelligence services.
In Belgium, a major investigation into the Chinese technology giant Huawei further intensified scrutiny. Police raids targeting its Brussels offices and associated lobbying networks led to multiple arrests and allegations of bribery and influence operations intended to shape European policy on 5G infrastructure. Prosecutors also requested the lifting of parliamentary immunity for several Members of the European Parliament, underscoring concerns that lobbying activities may overlap with covert influence strategies.
Similar patterns have appeared elsewhere. In Greece, a senior air force officer with access to NATO-level classified information was arrested and later convicted after allegedly passing sensitive material to Chinese contacts. Investigators described a recruitment pathway involving social media contact, foreign travel, and incremental financial incentives. In France, two engineers were detained after allegedly attempting to intercept satellite communications, using equipment installed in a rented property that ultimately caused technical disruptions and alerted authorities.
Eastern Europe has also seen sustained counter-espionage activity. Poland, which has been particularly sensitive to security threats following regional instability, has intensified its monitoring of foreign intelligence operations. Authorities there have previously detained individuals accused of transferring military-related data and have implemented restrictions on Chinese-manufactured equipment in sensitive facilities. Officials in Warsaw have described espionage risks as part of a broader hybrid security environment combining cyber operations, political influence, and traditional intelligence gathering.
Security analysts in Washington, including researchers at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argue that Europe’s vulnerability is particularly acute in areas where infrastructure and technology intersect. Critical systems such as ports, energy networks, and telecommunications are seen as strategic targets. Analysts also point to the growing importance of electric vehicles and connected technologies, which function as data-rich platforms capable of collecting sensitive geographic and behavioral information.
The United Kingdom has become one of the most active arenas in counter-espionage enforcement. British intelligence services, including MI5, have warned repeatedly about sustained foreign intelligence activity targeting political institutions and diaspora communities. Recent prosecutions have involved individuals accused of accessing immigration databases to track dissidents from Hong Kong. Authorities have also documented attempts to recruit individuals with access to elite political and financial networks.
Even as security concerns intensify, governments across Europe face a parallel pressure: maintaining economic ties with China, one of their largest trading partners. This tension is visible in debates over major infrastructure projects, including diplomatic facilities and investment in strategic ports. Some European states have opted for stricter screening of foreign investment, while others continue to balance caution with commercial engagement.
Spain, for instance, has taken a comparatively discreet approach, with limited public disclosure of espionage-related arrests linked to Chinese nationals. Intelligence assessments suggest ongoing monitoring of foreign cyber and intelligence activity, particularly from state-backed hacking groups, but public communication remains restrained compared to other European partners. Officials acknowledge the sensitivity of the issue, given the economic and diplomatic weight of relations with Beijing.
As Europe confronts this evolving intelligence landscape, analysts argue that the central challenge is no longer merely detection of individual spies but the development of coordinated defensive structures. The broader concern is whether fragmented national security systems can respond effectively to transnational, adaptive networks. For many policymakers, the question is not whether espionage activity exists, but how deeply it is embedded within the continent’s technological, political, and economic fabric—and whether Europe can construct a unified response without undermining its own openness and competitiveness.
