Water, the lifeblood of civilizations, is growing rapidly as the new instrument of power in South Asia. Afghanistan’s recent pronouncements about building dams on the Kunar and Kabul rivers are more than just development initiatives; they are a politically charged move that risks turning shared rivers into tools of coercion. These pronouncements, made during regional upheaval, indicate political desperation and foreign manipulation rather than strategic forethought. Against this backdrop, Pakistan’s response has been cautious, based on diplomacy and legality, reinforcing its position as a responsible partner in regional water politics.
Afghanistan’s hydrological map shows five major river basins: Amu Darya, Indus-Kabul, Northern, Harirod-Murghab, and Helmand. The Indus-Kabul basin is the most significant for Pakistan. Each year, approximately 23 million acre-feet (MAF) of water flows from Afghanistan into Pakistan, with the Kabul River accounting for 17.5 MAF. This river system supplies roughly 80% of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa agriculture, feeding Pakistan’s northern plains and providing livelihoods for millions of people.
Despite this crucial dependency, there is no legal water-sharing agreement that oversees the two countries’ shared rivers. Previous attempts to reach such an accord between 2003 and 2014 were unsuccessful due to political instability in Kabul. Afghanistan currently operates 21 dams and intends for another 12, in addition to 200 smaller hydropower projects. India funds or provides technical help for several of these projects. Given Afghanistan’s economic vulnerability, international isolation, and frozen assets, these objectives appear to be about political signaling rather than self-sufficiency.
India’s Shadow and Proxy Hydrology
India’s involvement in this hydropolitical scenario is evident. Since 2011, New Delhi has offered over USD 2 billion for Afghanistan’s dam projects, although development has mainly halted at the feasibility stage. However, following a military loss and diplomatic isolation in May 2025, India has increasingly relied on indirect efforts to regain regional power. By encouraging Kabul to undertake upstream projects, New Delhi essentially engages in hydropolitics by proxy, with the goal of reducing Pakistan’s downstream water availability and creating new pressure points.
This convergence holds symbolic relevance for Kabul’s leadership, which is dealing with a legitimacy crisis and internal discontent. Announcing dam projects displays the leadership as forceful and sovereign, even if real building is unlikely. However, this collaboration has severe repercussions. By tying water policy to regional rivalries, Afghanistan risks inheriting India’s record of water weaponization, a practice that has repeatedly endangered subcontinental peace.
Pakistan’s Strategic Approach
Pakistan, on the other hand, continues to adhere to international conventions. As a lower riparian, it preserves the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization, as well as the need not to cause major harm, which are both inscribed in international water law. Pakistan does not oppose Afghanistan’s right to utilize its natural resources. It merely requires transparency, data exchange, and prior consultation to guarantee that upstream activities do not impact downstream populations.
Islamabad’s actions under the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960, a globally recognized framework that has withstood wars and political upheavals, reflect its commitment to collaboration. The IWT can serve as a model for a water treaty between Pakistan and Afghanistan, turning competition into collaboration. This institutional approach reflects Pakistan’s diplomatic maturity and preference for stability over unilateralism.
Economic and Developmental Dimensions
Beyond the politics of scarcity is an untapped economic potential. If Pakistan and Afghanistan switched from conflict to cooperation, shared water resources might boost regional trade, energy, and connectivity. Joint hydropower projects on the Kabul and Kunar rivers might offer both countries with affordable electricity while strengthening their economic ties. The CASA-1000 project, which transports surplus hydropower from Central Asia via Afghanistan and into Pakistan, is a prime illustration of how water cooperation may yield mutual economic benefits.
However, Afghanistan’s unilateral dam development diminishes this possibility. Such acts have a high opportunity cost, deterring international contributors like China, Russia, and Central Asian governments, who prefer to invest in countries that follow stable, treaty-based agreements. By pursuing externally motivated projects rather than collaborative frameworks, Kabul isolates itself economically and politically.
Pakistan’s objective is consistent with bigger connectivity initiatives like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which require stability and mutual trust for investment. Water cooperation might thus develop into an economic bridge between Pakistan and Afghanistan, assuming both sides commit to communication rather than division.
Environmental and Climate Security
While political issues dominate headlines, climate change and environmental degradation pose a more serious threat. Pakistan and Afghanistan are among the most water-stressed countries in Asia. The Hindu Kush-Himalayan range, which supplies the Kabul and Kunar Rivers, is undergoing rapid glacier melt, unpredictable monsoons, and decreasing snowpack. All of these developments threaten regional water stability and food security.
In this environment, competition for river flows is counterproductive. The two countries face common vulnerabilities that cross boundaries. Poorly organized dam building could worsen flooding, restrict groundwater recharge, and cause agricultural crises on both sides. Instead of viewing water as a zero-sum asset, Pakistan and Afghanistan must consider it a shared environmental duty.
Islamabad can take the lead by proposing collaborative hydrological monitoring and climatic data-sharing procedures, possibly under the aegis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or the United Nations Environment Programme. Such steps would not only assure openness, but would also position Pakistan as a champion of climate diplomacy in South Asia, in stark contrast to India’s forceful attitude to transboundary resources.
Realism in Regional Practice
Through the lens of Realist Theory in International Relations, the dynamics of the Kabul River dispute are typical power politics. Anarchic states seek survival and influence. Afghanistan’s dam rhetoric, despite its low technical and financial capacity, serves as a symbolic expression of power, aided by India’s strategic goals. Together, they reflect an attempt to change the regional balance of power through non-military methods.
However, Pakistan’s behavior exemplifies neorealist caution, balancing national security considerations with diplomatic involvement. Rather of escalating, Islamabad aims to incorporate water politics within institutional and global institutions. This strategic restraint strengthens Pakistan’s legitimacy as a peace-seeking actor, especially in an environment dominated by Realist competition.
Regional Outlook: From Hydro-Political to Hydro-Diplomatic
Water must be linked into the larger regional conversation framework in order to promote long-term peace. Pakistan advocates for transboundary water cooperation in venues such as the Moscow Format, the China-Pakistan-Afghanistan Trilateral, and the Quadrilateral Dialogue (Russia-China-Pakistan-Afghanistan). These platforms enable stakeholders to institutionalize data openness, technical collaboration, and donor coordination, limiting the opportunity for unilateral or politically motivated projects.
The Indus Waters Treaty provides a model for success and serves as a reminder that even bitter opponents can cooperate when guided by organized systems and common interests. Extending this strategy to Afghanistan could transform a potential conflict into a source of peace.
Conclusion: Afghanistan’s attempt to weaponize water may have short-term political benefits, but it ultimately weakens regional stability. Unilateralism, backed by external supporters, has the potential to turn rivers of life into rivers of strife. Meanwhile, Pakistan maintains a worldview based on legality, cooperation, and environmental responsibility, emphasizing diplomacy over nationalism and sustainability over hostility.
As the climate problem worsens and regional politics become more entwined, Pakistan’s proposal for an equitable, treaty-based, and ecologically concerned water-sharing framework emerges as a forward-thinking regional peace policy, rather than a defensive one.
In South Asia’s new water geopolitics, which nations survive will be determined by the deepest trust, not the tallest dams. Pakistan’s balanced diplomacy and principled realism demonstrate that it understands this truth. Now it is up to Kabul and its supporters to do the same.
