The latest issue of China Leadership Monitor has cast new light on the inner workings of Chinese politics, offering a striking reinterpretation of the growing number of purges that have shaken the upper ranks of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during President Xi Jinping’s third term in office. Far from signaling the complete triumph of Xi’s authority, the study suggests that the escalating removals of senior officials may reveal an increasingly intense struggle among competing groups operating within Xi’s own political network.
Authored by political scientist Guoguang Wu, a senior research scholar at Stanford University and a leading specialist on Chinese elite politics, the article titled “Changes of Factional Dynamics under Xi Jinping” argues that the nature of factional competition inside the CCP has fundamentally changed under Xi’s rule. While many analysts have viewed Xi’s consolidation of power as the end of meaningful factional politics, Wu contends that factionalism has not disappeared. Instead, it has evolved into a new form shaped by the realities of one-man rule.
The argument comes at a time when the scale of disciplinary action against senior Chinese officials has reached unprecedented levels. According to the study, by April 2026, 47 members and alternate members of the CCP’s 20th Central Committee had either been investigated or penalized. This amounts to 12.5 percent of the committee’s membership within just three and a half years of its formation following the 20th Party Congress in October 2022.
The figures stand in sharp contrast to previous leadership periods. During the comparable period after the 18th Central Committee took office, only 5.32 percent of members were disciplined, while the equivalent figure following the 19th Central Committee was just 0.8 percent. The current wave of investigations has also affected some of the highest-ranking figures in the country. Three members of the 24-member Politburo have either been expelled or placed under disciplinary scrutiny, while only two of the seven members of the Central Military Commission remain active, one of them being Xi himself.
Such developments have puzzled many observers. Xi has spent more than a decade consolidating authority, dismantling rival power centers, strengthening ideological control, and centralizing decision-making. Conventional wisdom would suggest that a leader with such extensive power should face fewer internal threats, not more. Yet the opposite appears to be occurring.
Wu argues that understanding this apparent contradiction requires a new framework for analyzing CCP politics. Drawing upon the political philosophy of Aristotle, he distinguishes between two forms of authoritarian governance: oligarchy, in which power is shared among several elite groups, and tyranny, where authority becomes concentrated in the hands of a single ruler.
According to the study, China’s political system under former leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao functioned more like an oligarchy. Multiple influential factions coexisted within the CCP leadership, including networks linked to the Communist Youth League and the so-called Shanghai faction. Although these groups competed with one another, they also served as mutual constraints, preventing any single leader from exercising unchecked authority.
Xi’s rise transformed that structure. During his first decade in power, he systematically weakened competing factions while building a loyal political base. By the time the 20th Party Congress convened in 2022, most independent power centers had either been dismantled or absorbed into a broader Xi-centered political order.
Yet the disappearance of rival factions did not eliminate factional politics altogether. Instead, Wu argues, it produced what he describes as a “factional cascade.” In this system, a single dominant faction led by Xi sits at the top, while a series of subordinate groups operate beneath it. These sub-factions are associated with influential leaders such as Premier Li Qiang and senior party strategist Cai Qi, but all remain ultimately dependent on Xi’s authority.
The emergence of these sub-factions has created a new form of political competition. Unlike the factional battles of previous decades, today’s rivalries are not aimed directly at challenging Xi’s position. Instead, they focus on struggles for influence, appointments, access to resources, and political survival within the broader Xi coalition.
This dynamic helps explain why so many officials widely regarded as loyal to Xi have nevertheless fallen from power. Their removal does not necessarily indicate opposition to the leader. Rather, it may reflect efforts by competing groups within Xi’s political empire to weaken rivals and strengthen their own standing.
The study suggests that anti-corruption investigations have become a key weapon in this process. Because corruption remains widespread throughout the bureaucracy, rival networks often possess information that can be used against competitors. When such information reaches the leadership, disciplinary action may follow.
Wu characterizes this phenomenon as a form of “muckraking with CCP characteristics.” In the absence of independent investigative journalism or legal accountability mechanisms, internal factional competition itself becomes a driving force behind the exposure of wrongdoing. Political rivals effectively investigate one another, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of accusations, investigations, and purges.
At the same time, Xi appears to encourage a system of overlapping loyalties and mutual surveillance among senior officials. Different leaders maintain direct relationships with him rather than operating through a single chain of command. This arrangement prevents any subordinate faction from becoming dominant while reinforcing Xi’s role as the ultimate arbiter of power.
However, the study argues that such a structure also creates long-term vulnerabilities. As officials devote increasing energy to political maneuvering, governance may suffer. Competition among sub-factions can distract from policy implementation and economic management, while fear of making mistakes may discourage initiative and innovation within the bureaucracy.
The article also challenges assumptions that significant policy debates continue within the top leadership. Under earlier systems of collective leadership, senior officials could promote alternative approaches to economic and social policy. Under Xi’s highly centralized model, visible policy disagreements have become increasingly rare.
Although leaders such as Li Qiang may appear more pragmatic on economic issues, their ability to diverge from Xi’s priorities remains limited. As a result, policymaking may become less flexible and less responsive to changing circumstances.
Perhaps the most significant challenge identified in the study concerns succession. While Xi remains firmly in control, uncertainty about China’s future leadership is likely to intensify as he grows older. Ambitious officials and emerging factions have strong incentives to position themselves for a post-Xi political landscape.
According to Wu, this factor may already be contributing to the escalation of elite competition. The removal of several younger high-ranking officials, including figures viewed as potential future leaders, could reflect early battles over the distribution of power after Xi eventually leaves the scene.
The study draws parallels with the final years of Mao Zedong’s rule, when uncertainty over succession fueled increasingly bitter factional struggles beneath an aging leader. Although today’s political environment differs in important ways, Wu argues that similar structural pressures may be beginning to emerge.
The broader conclusion is sobering. Xi’s concentration of power succeeded in defeating many of the traditional factions that once shaped Chinese politics. Yet in doing so, it created new forms of competition operating within the very system he built. These rivalries may not currently threaten Xi’s position directly, but they have the potential to undermine governance, complicate succession, and erode political stability over time.
For students of Chinese politics, the latest issue of China Leadership Monitor offers a provocative message. The era of factional politics in China is not over. Rather, factionalism has adapted to the realities of one-man rule, reappearing in new forms beneath the surface of Xi Jinping’s political empire. If the analysis proves correct, the greatest challenge to Xi’s system may come not from external opposition or rival camps, but from the growing competition among the forces that exist within his own house.
