A recently resurfaced confidential diplomatic cable from 2012, released by WikiLeaks, has shed light on Israeli intelligence assessments regarding the collapse of Syria and its broader geopolitical impact on the Middle East. The memo, sent to then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on July 23, 2012, by her adviser Sidney Blumenthal, details intelligence gathered from high-level sources within Israeli, European, and Turkish security circles. According to the document, Israeli intelligence officials believed that the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime would ignite a sectarian war between Sunni and Shiite factions across the region, ultimately benefiting Israel.
The intelligence suggested that the Assad regime, despite being hostile to Israel, functioned as a stabilizing force that prevented a broader conflict involving Iran and its proxies. Israeli leaders reportedly viewed the potential Sunni-Shiite war as a strategic opportunity to weaken Iran’s influence, as Tehran would be drawn into the sectarian conflict to support its Shiite allies. This development, in the view of Israeli security officials, would not only isolate Iran but also divert its attention and resources away from its nuclear program, a long-standing concern for Israel and its Western allies.
The cable further reveals that European intelligence agencies had assessed that an Israeli attack on Iran at that moment would unify the Iranian population behind their government, strengthening the ruling Mullahs rather than weakening them. Instead, Israeli strategists saw the prolonged instability caused by a Sunni-Shiite war as a more effective means of undermining Iran’s regional power without direct military intervention.
The memo also indicates that Israeli intelligence had calculated that the collapse of Syria would not only hurt Iran but also disrupt Hezbollah’s supply routes, weakening the Lebanese militant group’s capabilities. At the same time, some Israeli officials expressed concerns that the power vacuum left by Assad’s fall could lead to Islamist groups, including al-Qaeda affiliates, gaining control, which presented its own risks.
According to the intelligence cited in the email, Israeli military commanders were preparing contingency plans for various regional scenarios while ensuring that they did not become directly involved in the unfolding conflicts. The memo quotes an Israeli military official referencing Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: “He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight,” indicating a strategic preference for allowing regional dynamics to play out in a way that served Israeli interests without immediate intervention.
This revelation provides a rare glimpse into behind-the-scenes calculations of global powers during a crucial period of Middle Eastern history. The assessments made in 2012 about the potential for a sectarian war following Syria’s collapse proved to be prescient, as the region subsequently saw an escalation of Sunni-Shiite tensions, proxy conflicts, and shifting alliances that continue to shape geopolitics today.
