Wednesday marks three years since the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, an event that the Soufan Center describes as a direct starting point for the current US-Iran war and the strategic dead end facing the Trump administration. The attack was carried out by Hamas, a member of Iran’s Iran-led “Axis of Resistance”, with the stated objective of compelling Israel to end its control of Palestinian territories. It also sought to disrupt an emerging US-led coalition linking Israel with moderate Arab states that Hamas regarded as increasingly prepared to set aside the Palestinian issue in favour of strategic cooperation with Israel and economic development.
Israel responded with a military campaign that destroyed most of Gaza and killed tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians, according to the source. The scale of the operation returned the Palestinian issue to the centre of regional and international attention. Several days later, Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran’s closest ally and another group positioned along Israel’s border, entered the conflict with rocket and missile attacks intended to divert Israeli military resources from Gaza. Israel continued its operations in both Gaza and Lebanon until it had largely achieved its military objectives, but the use of extensive airpower and ground forces generated international and regional outrage and, in some cases, economic and diplomatic sanctions against Israel.
By late 2024, the October 7 operation was increasingly assessed as a strategic blunder for Iran and its allies. Israel had killed Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, who was also identified as the architect of the October 7 attack. Those developments shifted the military balance towards Israel and its allies and helped Washington broker ceasefires and peace agreements with Hamas and Hezbollah on terms largely favourable to Israel. Neither arrangement, however, had resulted in the complete disarmament of either militia. In Iraq, Baghdad also came under US economic and political pressure to demand the disarmament of Iran-aligned Shia militia groups, although some continued attacking regional targets in support of Iran’s war effort.
Iran suffered another major strategic setback in December 2024, when the Assad regime in Syria collapsed after a decade of civil war. Tehran had been Assad’s principal backer, but the new Sunni Muslim-led government expelled Iranian and Russian influence and aligned rapidly with the US and moderate Arab states in pursuit of sanctions relief and reconstruction investment. The loss of Syria also deprived Iran of a secure land corridor for resupplying and rebuilding Hezbollah.
The defeats prompted debate inside Iran over the strategy developed over decades and associated with the late Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Qasem Soleimani: building regional non-state allies capable of deterring attacks on Iran and projecting Iranian power. Some Iranian strategists argued for retrenchment, with greater emphasis on direct defence and deterrence against Israel and the US. Others, particularly hardliners, concluded that Iran had done too little to support its allies and advocated rebuilding them as a central element of Iranian foreign and security policy.
Judging Iran and its network to be severely weakened, US President Donald Trump, returning to office for a second, non-consecutive term, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took the conflict directly to Iranian territory. A joint air campaign in June 2025 severely damaged Iran’s main uranium enrichment facilities, while Israel attacked key centres of the regime’s power. Iran responded with missiles and drones but did not attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz or inflict wider damage on the global economy. After six months of relative calm, a major Iranian uprising between December 2025 and January 2026 appeared to persuade Trump and Netanyahu that limited outside intervention might remove the regime. Their subsequent air campaign, however, reached a strategic dead end despite an opening decapitation strike that killed much of Iran’s senior leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The remaining Iranian leadership regrouped and demonstrated the resilience of the regime. Tehran closed the Strait of Hormuz to energy-export traffic, while missiles and drones caused significant damage to US-manned bases and energy infrastructure across several Arab Gulf states. The results are likely to push Iran towards greater reliance on its own forces and technology rather than non-state allies as a “force multiplier”. The Houthis in Yemen remain an exception. Largely unscathed by the war, the movement has helped Iran threaten the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, reinforcing arguments within Tehran for rebuilding an ally-based forward-defence strategy.
Iran’s strategy has placed political pressure on Trump but has not forced Washington to end its naval embargo of Iranian ports, withdraw US forces or rule out further strikes. Since April, US officials have sought de-escalation and an agreement that could end the conflict and open negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme. Yet the war has demonstrated the difficulty of forcing a defiant, ideologically committed regional power to capitulate under bombardment. US, Israeli and Arab leaders now assess that confrontation with Iran and its Axis of Resistance may continue indefinitely.
The conflict has also weakened confidence in the US security umbrella on which moderate Arab governments have depended. Gulf states may therefore consider Tehran’s longstanding proposals for a regional security structure excluding outside powers, particularly after Trump rejected a Saudi request for direct US intervention against a Houthi ground offensive advancing along the Red Sea coast towards the Bab el-Mandeb. Yet Gulf governments remain unwilling to abandon their defence relationships with Washington. The refusal of Türkiye and Pakistan to invoke their August “Mecca Defense Agreement” in response to the Houthi advance has also exposed the limitations of regional defence arrangements. Gulf states are consequently expected to strengthen their own capabilities, including hardened energy infrastructure and expanded supplies of missile and drone defences, including systems supplied by Ukraine.
