The latest issue of the CTC Sentinel published by the Combating Terrorism Center traces how the Islamic State has transformed China from a peripheral concern into one of its principal ideological and operational adversaries. The analysis concludes that Beijing’s expanding global influence, particularly across fragile Muslim-majority regions, has elevated Chinese interests as recurring targets within the group’s propaganda and attacks, with implications extending from South and Central Asia to Africa.
For years, the Islamic State regarded China as a relatively marginal actor within its global worldview. Today, however, Beijing occupies an increasingly prominent place in the organisation’s propaganda, strategic messaging and operational ambitions. According to analysis published in the latest issue of the CTC Sentinel by the Combating Terrorism Center, this transformation has unfolded gradually over more than a decade, reflecting both the Islamic State’s evolving ideological priorities and China’s expanding political, economic and security footprint across regions where jihadist groups remain active.
Rather than emerging solely as a response to Beijing’s policies towards Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, the analysis argues that the Islamic State’s hostility has developed through several interconnected phases. Early references to Uyghur grievances before 2014 evolved into a sustained propaganda campaign following the proclamation of the caliphate. This was followed by experimentation with Chinese-language media and symbolic threats before the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) emerged as the movement’s principal anti-China vanguard. By the mid-2020s, China had become normalised alongside the United States, Russia and regional governments as one of the organisation’s routine enemies.
The study notes that the Islamic State’s earliest references to China appeared while the group was still operating as the Islamic State in Iraq and remained linked to al-Qa`ida’s wider network. Following the 2009 Urumqi riots, propaganda briefly highlighted the plight of Uyghur Muslims, portraying Xinjiang—described as “East Turkestan”—within a broader narrative of Muslim oppression. Although these messages remained sporadic, they established themes that later became central to the organisation’s ideological framework.
A decisive shift followed the declaration of the caliphate in 2014. Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani repeatedly condemned China’s treatment of Muslims, integrating Beijing into speeches that grouped it with other powers portrayed as oppressors of Islam. During this period, Xinjiang increasingly featured in the organisation’s rhetoric, while references to China became embedded within the Islamic State’s broader global narrative.
Between 2014 and 2017, the organisation expanded its outreach through Chinese- and Uyghur-language propaganda. Its flagship publications, Dabiq and later Rumiyah, regularly referred to “East Turkestan” while envisioning its incorporation into the caliphate’s long-term territorial ambitions. Chinese-language videos, Mandarin nasheeds and Uyghur-focused productions sought to reach new audiences, presenting Chinese-speaking militants as exemplars while testing the appeal of Islamic State messaging among Mandarin-speaking and Uyghur communities.
The campaign also crossed from rhetoric into violence. The Islamic State publicised the killing of Chinese hostage Fan Jinghui in 2015 and later claimed responsibility for the kidnapping and murder of two Chinese nationals in Pakistan in 2017. Although the analysis notes that Chinese citizens had previously been targeted by other jihadist organisations, these incidents marked an important stage in the Islamic State’s deliberate inclusion of Chinese nationals within its own operational agenda.
The report identifies the emergence of ISKP after 2019 as the most significant turning point in the movement’s anti-China campaign. Operating from Afghanistan, ISKP increasingly portrayed China’s relationship with the Afghan Taliban as evidence of Taliban betrayal, accusing Kabul of sacrificing Uyghur Muslims in exchange for Chinese investment, diplomatic recognition and economic assistance. Through publications produced by the Al Azaim Foundation, the group criticised Taliban support for the “One China” policy while condemning commitments not to permit Uyghur militants to operate from Afghan territory.
This messaging was reinforced through a series of attacks and alleged plots targeting Chinese interests. The December 2022 assault on Kabul’s Longan Hotel, which housed Chinese nationals and Taliban officials, became a focal point of ISKP propaganda despite none of the three people killed being Chinese. Subsequent attacks, including the killing of a Chinese mining worker in Takhar in January 2025 and the suicide bombing at a Chinese restaurant in Kabul in January 2026, were presented as evidence that Chinese nationals remained legitimate targets throughout the region. ISKP subsequently used publications including Khorasan Ghag and Voice of Khurasan to portray itself as the only jihadist movement actively defending Uyghur Muslims by attacking Chinese interests.
The analysis argues that ISKP has increasingly fused local grievances with wider geopolitical developments. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Beijing’s expanding diplomatic presence have all been portrayed as evidence of imperial ambition rather than economic development. ISKP publications describe Chinese investment as a vehicle for political domination, debt dependency and foreign control, while warning that infrastructure projects and commercial interests represent legitimate targets.
The COVID-19 pandemic also became integrated into this evolving narrative. Pro-Islamic State media depicted the virus as divine punishment directed against China and other perceived enemies of Islam, framing the outbreak as retribution for Beijing’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims. Rather than existing independently, this messaging reinforced already established anti-China narratives circulating across the Islamic State’s online ecosystem.
By the mid-2020s, hostility towards China had become routine across both official and unofficial Islamic State media. Claims issued through Amaq News Agency, Al Naba and numerous affiliated propaganda outlets increasingly presented China alongside the United States, Russia and regional governments without requiring extensive ideological justification. According to the analysis, this normalisation potentially lowers the threshold for attacks by decentralised cells or self-radicalised supporters, who may increasingly regard Chinese nationals, businesses and diplomatic facilities as self-evident targets.
The report also highlights the diffusion of anti-China messaging beyond South and Central Asia. Islamic State affiliates operating in Africa have increasingly adopted narratives linking Chinese investment to exploitation of natural resources and foreign domination. The March 2026 Islamic State Central Africa Province raid on Chinese-run gold sites in the Democratic Republic of the Congo reflected themes previously developed by ISKP, while propaganda surrounding Mozambique similarly portrayed Chinese commercial activity as part of a broader pattern of external exploitation.
This expansion demonstrates how narratives first developed around Xinjiang have evolved into a much broader ideological framework encompassing great-power competition, resource extraction and geopolitical rivalry. Rather than treating China as a unique adversary, the Islamic State increasingly presents Beijing as one component of a global system of hostile powers that also includes the United States, Russia, Iran and regional governments.
The analysis concludes that China now occupies a structurally embedded position within the Islamic State’s global enemy hierarchy. As Beijing deepens its economic, diplomatic and security engagement across politically unstable regions, its interests are likely to remain prominent targets for both propaganda and violence. While the scale of future attacks will vary according to local conditions, the ideological infrastructure underpinning hostility towards China is now firmly established across the Islamic State’s transnational media ecosystem. For Beijing, this presents a dual challenge: safeguarding overseas personnel and infrastructure while confronting an increasingly sophisticated propaganda campaign that seeks to transform China’s expanding international presence into a powerful recruitment and mobilisation tool for jihadist violence.
